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Abstract		
	
This	thesis	considers	the	connection	between	the	policy	and	culture	of	the	Canadian	Armed	
Forces	(CAF),	representation	of	women	and	the	prevalence	of	sexual	assault.	I	analyzed	how	the	
policies	and	discourse	of	the	CAF	contribute	to	the	permissive	environment	for	sexual	assault	
within	the	institution.	Through	this	analysis	I	have	found	that	the	policies	of	the	CAF	do	not	
substantively	represent	victims	and	do	not	contribute	to	a	change	in	culture.	The	CAF,	as	with	
any	culture,	is	resistant	to	change	and	the	outdated	policies	contribute	to	this.	Policies,	as	a	
guiding	factor	in	the	behaviour	of	CAF	members,	must	be	updated	to	include	clear,	direct	
wording	that	is	substantively	representative	of	victims	of	sexual	assault.	Although	new	
documentation,	like	Operation	HONOUR	has	been	recently	released,	the	policies	in	the	QR&Os	
and	DAODs	must	be	adjusted.		
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Chapter	1:	The	Connection	Between	Representation	of	Women	and	Sexual	Assault		
	
The	rate	of	sexual	assault	in	the	Canadian	Armed	Forces	(CAF)	has	decreased	but	this	crime	is	
still	prevalent.	There	is	still	a	higher	chance	that	a	woman	in	the	CAF	will	be	sexually	assaulted	
than	in	the	civilian	population	(Allen	2016,	18;	Cotter	2016,	5).	According	to	the	2016	Statistics	
Canada	survey	Sexual	Misconduct	in	the	Canadian	Armed	Forces,	in	the	past	12	months	1.7%	of	
Regular	Force	members1	(960	members)	reported	being	victims	of	sexual	assault	(Cotter	2016,	
11).	Broken	down	by	sex	this	is	4.8%	of	women	(380	members)	versus	1.2%	of	men	(570	
members)	in	the	Regular	Force	(Cotter	2016,	8).	According	to	the	same	survey	of	Regular	Force	
members,	7.1%	(3,940	members)	reported	being	victims	of	sexual	assault	at	some	point	over	
their	career	in	the	CAF;	by	sex	this	breaks	down	to	27.3%	of	women	(2,120	members)	and	3.8%	
of	men	(1,810	members)	(Cotter	2016,	5).	In	the	civilian	population,	according	to	police	
reported	data	from	2016,	there	were	approximately	21,300	victims	of	sexual	offences	aged	15	
years	and	older,	with	92%	of	these	being	women	(19,596	women)	(Allen	2016,	18).	With	a	
Canadian	population	of	approximately	36,286,378	in	2016	(Statistics	Canada	2016)	this	
indicates	a	Canadian	woman	has	a	1%	chance	of	being	sexually	assaulted	each	year	and	
subsequently	reporting	it.	In	the	survey	regarding	CAF	members	the	definition	of	sexual	assault	
was	the	same	as	in	the	Criminal	Code	of	Canada,	including:	sexual	attacks,	unwanted	sexual	
touching,	and	sexual	activity	where	unable	to	consent	(Cotter	2016,	8).			
However,	“we	will	likely	never	know	the	actual	incidence	of	sexual	violence”	in	either	
Canada	or	the	CAF	(Johnson	2012,	630).	There	are	many	women	who	choose	not	to	report	their	
																																																						
1	The	CAF	is	split	between	Regular	Force	members	who	work	full	time	as	their	primary	career	
and	Reserve	Force	members	who	work	part	time	as	a	secondary	career.	
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sexual	assaults	either	to	police	or	in	surveys,	both	in	the	military	and	in	civilian	life.	Johnson	
discusses	what	kinds	of	considerations	victims	must	make	in	deciding	whether	or	not	to	report.	
Unless	the	attack	occurs	in	a	public	place	in	full	view	of	witnesses	who	make	the	
decision	for	her,	a	woman	who	is	sexually	assaulted	must	first	weigh	the	benefits	and	
costs	of	sharing	this	with	others	in	her	social	network,	asking	for	medical	assistance,	
emotional	support,	or	help	from	police.	She	must	first	consider	whether	others	in	her	
social	network	will	support	her	decision	–	whether	they	will	support	her	perception	of	
events	or	see	her	as	somehow	complicit	or	responsible	for	the	attack.	…Her	decision	to	
report	to	the	police	is	also	affected	by	shame	and	embarrassment,	a	desire	to	protect	
others,	especially	family	members,	and	concern	about	whether	the	police	will	take	her	
complaint	seriously,	treat	her	with	respect,	and	not	subject	her	to	ill	treatment	(Johnson	
2012,	626-27).		
	
The	decision	to	report	does	not	always	lead	to	positive	outcomes	and	this	can	be	a	major	
deterrent.	The	Canadian	Forces	Military	Police	Report	from	2015	states	the	Military	Police	
initiated	130	sexual	assault	investigations.	When	compared	to	the	960	members	(in	2016)	who	
stated	they	were	victims	of	a	sexual	assault	in	the	Statistics	Canada	survey	the	difference	is	
significant.	According	to	Johnson,	the	Statistics	Canada	crime	victimization	survey	indicates	the	
number	of	civilian	women	who	are	sexually	assaulted	looks	more	like	460,000,	with	only	8%	of	
those	actually	reported	to	police	(Johnson	2012,	613).		If	we	consider	that	approximately	
460,000	women	were	sexually	assaulted	rather	than	the	19,000	who	reported	it,	then	it	would	
be	more	accurate	to	say	Canadian	women	have	a	2.5%	chance	of	being	sexually	assaulted	
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yearly.	This	is	still	significantly	lower	than	the	chances	that	women	in	the	Canadian	military	
have	of	being	sexually	assaulted,	which	leads	to	the	question	of	why	might	women	in	the	CAF	
have	a	considerably	higher	chance	of	experiencing	sexual	assault	than	their	civilian	
counterparts?		
The	CAF	has	a	history	that	extends	beyond	its	official	life	as	a	Canadian	institution.	
Canadian	men	serving	in	the	military	transitioned	from	serving	as	part	of	the	British	forces	to	
serving	as	part	of	the	Canadian	Navy,	Air	Force	or	Land	Force	in	the	19th	century.	The	current	
iteration	of	Canadian	Armed	Forces	as	a	unified	structure	was	established	in	1968	(Restoring	
the	Historic	Designations	of	the	Royal	Canadian	Navy,	the	Canadian	Army,	and	the	Royal	
Canadian	Air	Force).	Women	began	participating	in	military	service	with	Canadian	military	
forces	starting	in	1885	as	nurses	and	the	number	of	women	serving	sharply	increased	during	
the	Second	World	War	(Women	in	the	Canadian	Armed	Forces).	These	numbers	subsequently	
decreased	after	the	Second	World	War	ended	as	there	was	encouragement	for	men	and	
women	to	each	return	to	classic	gendered	positions	in	society,	and	women	were	again	pushed	
out	of	the	historically	masculine	and	male-dominated	military,	even	as	nurses.	Women	were	
allowed	to	enroll	again	in	the	1950s	with	the	beginning	of	the	Korean	War,	but	their	service	was	
limited	to	roles	such	as	medicine,	communication,	logistics,	and	administration	(Women	in	the	
Canadian	Armed	Forces).	In	the	latter	half	of	the	20th	century	the	role	of	women	in	the	
Canadian	Forces	progressed	relatively	steadily.	In	the	1960s	a	study	on	the	employment	of	
women	in	the	forces	determined	that	women	should	remain	employed	in	the	military	but	the	
number	of	women	should	be	limited	to	1,500	and	a	number	of	occupations	remained	closed	to	
women	including	combat	(Hope	44.2).	Since	1970	there	have	been	various	policies	introduced	
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by	the	Canadian	government	that	deal	in	whole	or	in	part	with	the	rights	of	women	in	society	
and	in	the	military.	In	1970	the	Royal	Commission	on	the	Status	of	Women	put	forward	a	
number	of	recommendations.	Six	of	them	pertained	directly	to	the	CAF.	They	are:	open	all	
trades	in	the	CAF	to	women;	allow	married	women	to	enlist;	standardize	the	length	of	initial	
engagement	for	which	personnel	are	required	to	enlist	in	the	CAF;	eliminate	having	children	as	
grounds	for	release	for	women;	standardize	pension	benefits	for	men	and	women;	and	for	
women	be	allowed	to	attend	Canadian	military	colleges	(Bird	1970,	402).	Due	to	the	
recommendations,	by	1974	67%	of	all	military	occupations	were	open	to	women,	as	compared	
to	the	19%	in	1967	(Hope	44.2).	Furthermore,	the	numbers	of	women	had	increased	to	4,405	
(Hope	44.2).	In	1977	the	Canadian	Human	Rights	Act	prohibited	discrimination	based	on	race,	
sex,	age,	and	religion.	In	1989	a	Canadian	Human	Rights	Tribunal	ordered	that	all	occupations	
be	open	to	women	in	the	Canadian	Forces,	with	the	exception	of	submarine	service	(which	was	
subsequently	opened	in	2000)	(Women	in	the	Canadian	Armed	Forces;	Hope	44.2).	This	was	
ordered	with	the	intention	of	achieving	complete	integration	of	women	into	the	CAF.	Currently,	
women	may	serve	in	any	capacity	in	the	CAF	(Women	in	the	Canadian	Armed	Forces).	Although	
there	are	no	remaining	formal	obstacles	to	women’s	service,	there	are	still	informal	obstacles	
that	limit	the	extent	to	which	we	may	say	that	women	are	integrated	into	the	CAF.	Examples	of	
this	are	the	hyper-masculine	culture	that	denigrates	the	feminine	and	common	language	use	
that	equates	women	and	bodies	that	are	female	with	weakness.		
Although	women	have	been	participating	in	combat	with	the	CAF	since	1989,	they	meet	
informal	resistance	from	their	peers	due	to	the	maintenance	of	pre-integration	culture.	The	
change	in	policy	has	not	immediately	equated	a	change	in	attitude	or	culture.	There	are	still	
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many	people,	both	from	within	and	outside	of	the	military,	who	do	not	believe	that	women	
belong	in	combat.	The	arguments	against	women	in	combat	are	classically	that:	the	physical	
demands	of	the	job	are	too	much	for	women;	women’s	presence	will	disrupt	unit	cohesion	and	
effectiveness;	and	that	women,	by	nature,	just	do	not	belong	in	combat	(MacKenzie	2015,	100).	
The	belief	that	women	‘just	do	not	belong’	in	combat	likely	stems	from	the	historically	
masculine	nature	of	the	military,	and	combat	more	specifically.	However,	extensive	trials	from	
the	1970s	in	both	Denmark	and	Canada	show	that	women	perform	effectively	in	combat	and	
that	these	arguments	are	only	myths	and	have	been	dispelled	(MacKenzie	2015,	104).	Sex	is	not	
the	attribute	that	determines	performance	with	regards	to	combat.		
Along	with	the	integration	of	women	into	all	roles	of	the	CAF	there	have	been	
concurrent	acknowledgements	of	a	need	to	deal	with	sexual	assault.	This	is	not	to	say	that	
sexual	assault	only	occurred	with	the	integration	of	women,	just	that	it	started	to	be	
acknowledged	in	the	latter	half	of	the	20th	century.	In	1988	the	CAF	put	forward	its	first	policy	
meant	to	deal	with	sexual	harassment:	Canadian	Forces	Adminstrative	Order	(CFAO)	19-39	
Canadian	Forces	Policy	on	Harassment	that	was	based	on	the	Canadian	Human	Rights	Act	
(Department	of	National	Defence	and	Canadian	Forces	Harassment	Prevention	and	Resolution	
Policy).	In	1995	the	first	iteration	of	sexual	harassment	prevention	training,	“Sexual	Harassment	
and	Racism	Prevention	Training	(SHARP),”	was	implemented	by	the	CAF	(Canadian	Forces	
Military	Law	Centre,	2008).		Then	near	the	end	of	the	1990s	the	CAF	opened	an	office	of	the	
Ombudsman	specifically	for	military	members	and	civilians	working	for	the	military	such	that	
they	could	lodge	complaints	of	any	nature	against	the	military	with	sexual	assault	as	a	possible	
complaint.	Complaints	to	the	Ombudsman	were	to	be	protected	from	retribution	or	internal	
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interference	within	the	military	hierarchy,	which	provided	independence	from	the	chain	of	
command	which	controls	the	flow	of	all	other	aspects	of	the	military.	However,	until	recently	
only	retired	military	members	were	hired	into	this	office,	which	raises	questions	of	true	
independence	(Gouliquer	2011,	216).		
Although	the	military	has	always	been	a	male	dominated	institution,	since	the	latter	half	
of	the	20th	century	there	has	been	an	increasing	push	for	better	representation	of	women	
through	formal	policy.	However,	it	is	not	enough	as	the	CAF	arguably	does	not	have	full	gender	
integration.	Currently,	women	make	up	15%	of	the	CAF	overall,	but	only	12%	of	the	regular	
force,	and	only	3%	of	combat	forces	(Park	2008,	1;	Women	in	the	Canadian	Armed	Forces).	As	
well,	women	are	predominantly	found	at	lower	ranks	(Saski	2013,	169).	33%	of	men	in	the	CAF	
are	in	the	combat	arms,	compared	to	11%	of	women	in	the	CAF.	50%	of	women	in	the	CAF	are	
found	in	administration,	logistics,	security,	intelligence,	or	emergency	services	compared	to	
19%	of	men	(Park	2008,	3).	Although	policy	has	opened	up	all	occupations	to	women,	they	are	
still	concentrated	in	the	more	traditional	support	areas.	Beyond	just	numbers	of	women	
though,	the	women	who	choose	to	remain	in	the	military	have	likely	internalized	the	hyper-
masculine	culture	and	thus	while	they	provide	role	models	for	lower	ranking	female	members	
as	examples	of	women	who	have	succeeded,	they	are	not	examples	of	a	clear	change	in	
paradigm	with	a	broader	acceptance	of	women	(Sasson-Levy	2002,	360).	Although	women	in	
the	CAF	deploy	less	than	men,	women	are	1.2	times	more	likely	to	have	high	job	strain	in	the	
CAF,	and	the	number	and	length	of	deployments	were	not	associated	with	work	stress	among	
women	in	the	CAF	(Park	2008,	6).	Better	representation	for	women	will	look	like	a	cultural	
change	away	from	the	denigration	of	the	feminine	(and	therefore	women),	an	environment	
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that	is	as	welcoming	to	women	as	it	is	to	men,	and	an	increase	in	the	number	of	female	
members,	especially	at	higher	ranks	and	in	all	occupations.			
In	the	CAF	in	the	early	2000s	more	than	one	fifth	of	reservists	were	women	as	compared	
to	one	eighths	in	the	regular	force.	As	well,	60%	of	CAF	personnel	are	junior	non-commissioned	
members	(NCMs),	where	their	ranks	are	from	private	to	master	corporal,	20%	are	senior	NCMs	
(sergeant	to	chief	warrant	officer)	and	20%	are	officers	(Park	2008,	2).	The	implications	of	this	
are	that	the	junior	members,	making	up	the	majority	of	the	CAF	personnel,	are	the	group	that	
dictate	the	culture	and	attitude	of	members,	even	though	they	are	guided	by	official	policy	and	
leadership.	Significantly,	this	group	is	more	likely	to	have	a	greater	embracement	of	the	
classical,	hyper-masculine	attitude	the	military	is	known	for,	and	further	pass	this	attitude	down	
through	training.	Although	the	policies	have	some	specifics,	such	as	a	policy	against	
drunkenness	(QR&O	103.3,	74),	they	are	generally	vague	and	the	repercussions	dictated	are	
phrased	by	giving	the	most	severe	punishment	or	lesser,	or	simply	“administrative	action”	
(DAOD	5012,	3).	The	significance	of	this	is	that	with	only	vague	policies	guiding	the	official	
method	of	dealing	with	offences,	the	junior	leadership	that	embraces	the	hyper-masculine	
culture	are	unlikely	to	choose	to	impose	the	more	severe	repercussions	for	offences	they	do	
not	find	significant	to	operational	effectiveness,	like	sexual	harassment	and	sexual	assault.		
	
Research	Question		
Through	this	research	I	explore	the	question	of	how	discourse,	in	recent	policies	and	policy	
responses,	has	enabled	an	environment	that	has	a	permissive	effect	on	a	culture	of	sexual	
assault	within	the	Canadian	Armed	Forces.	A	permissive	environment	for	sexual	assault	and	
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sexual	harassment	is	one	where	policies	with	regards	to	this	behaviour	either	do	not	exist	at	all,	
and	thereby	do	not	regulate	the	occurrence	of	the	behaviour,	or	where	the	policies	do	not	
adequately	address	types	of	behaviour	that	people	may	exhibit.	This	could	be	through	
incomplete	definitions	or	scarce	wording	that	leave	many	aspects	of	the	behaviours	and	event	
situations	unaccounted	for	in	various	interpretations	of	the	policy.	In	contrast,	a	constraining	
environment	has	clear	policy	discourse	that	set	limits	and	consequences	for	various	actions	and	
events.	This	might	seem	too	obvious;	however,	in	setting	policy	there	are	many	situations	and	
events	that	should	be	accounted	for,	and	these	are	not	always	apparent	at	the	time	of	policy	
creation.	Thus	policies	should	be	reviewed	often,	critically,	to	determine	if	they	are	effectively	
doing	the	work	they	were	created	to	do.	For	example,	when	setting	policy	with	regards	to	
sexual	assault	it	is	important	to	consider	what	definition	of	sexual	assault	will	be	used,	what	
actions	constitute	sexual	assault,	and	where	a	line	will	be	drawn	in	what	is	and	is	not	sexual	
assault.	However,	beyond	this	sexual	harassment	also	needs	consideration	as	it	is	a	related	
offence	with	its	own	spectrum	of	actions.	Where	sexual	assault	includes	any	number	of	sexual	
actions	towards	a	person	without	consent	including	touching,	penetration,	or	forced	
performance	of	sexual	acts,	sexual	harassment	is	harassing	language	or	behaviour	of	a	sexual	
nature	including	but	not	limited	to	jokes,	demands	for	sexual	favours,	unwelcome	touching,	
invasion	of	personal	space,	and	propositions	(Sexual	Harassment;	Sexual	Assault).	These	
offences	are	different	but	they	are	correlated	(Morris	1996,	680).	Unless	sexual	harassment	is	
acknowledged	in	policy	for	its	potential	contributions	to	sexual	assault	then	policies	will	not	
curb	sexually	harassing	behaviours	(which	relate	to	sexual	assault).		This	will	leave	the	policy	
environment	permissive,	allowing	sexual	harassment	and	sexual	assault	to	occur	at	high	rates.		
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	 The	representation	of	women	in	the	CAF	is	inadequate,	not	only	because	only	15%	of	
the	CAF	are	women	but	because	the	culture	is	one	of	hyper-masculinity	that	not	only	
emphasizes	aggression,	strength,	and	power	of	men	but	further	denigrates	women.2	Although	
women	may	now	occupy	any	role	in	the	CAF,	up	until	1989	the	policies	of	the	CAF	dictated	
otherwise	(Women	in	the	Canadian	Armed	Forces).	Due	to	the	hierarchical	nature	of	the	
military,	women	have	had	a	significantly	shorter	period	of	time	to	move	through	the	ranks	of	
the	institution	and	so	women	are	primarily	found	in	the	more	junior	ranks.	Furthermore,	
women	continue	to	face	informal	resistance	from	their	peers	that	limits	the	integration	of	
women	and	contributes	to	the	poor	representation	of	women	in	the	CAF.	The	policies	of	the	
CAF	are	significant	contributors	to	the	representation	of	women	as	they	contribute	to	the	
culture.		
I	found	the	representation	of	women	in	the	discourse	of	the	policies	contributes	to	a	
permissive	environment	for	sexual	harassment	and	sexual	assault.	The	CAF	is	a	highly	
hierarchical	institution	where	the	members	at	the	highest	levels	of	the	institution	enact	rules	
and	policies	that	set	the	guidelines	for	the	behaviours	of	all	members	at	all	levels.	The	culture	of	
the	military	is	significantly	impacted	by	the	policies	dictated	by	these	leading	members	because	
it	affects	the	extent	of	the	behaviours	of	each	member.	For	example,	the	specific	policy,	QR&O	
103.17	prohibits	“striking	or	offering	violence”	(QR&O	103.17,	47)	which	puts	a	specific	limit	on	
members’	behaviours.	Although	military	culture	is	also	a	product	of	large	groups	of	members	
working	together,	official	policies	state	the	military’s	position	on	a	broad	scale.	If	the	policies	
are	written	in	a	way	that	is	not	easily	interpreted	to	represent	the	interests	of	women	in	the	
																																																						
2	I	expand	on	this	concept	in	chapter	two.	
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CAF	–	to	make	the	environment	as	welcoming	and	safe	for	them	as	it	is	for	men	–	then	there	is	
little	motivation	for	the	culture	to	change	to	accommodate	this.	Although	there	is	a	connection	
between	representation	of	women	in	policy	discourse	and	occurrence	of	sexual	assault,	there	
has	been	very	little	research	demonstrating	this.	Therefore,	my	research	examines	this	
connection	alongside	literature	and	policies	that	discuss	the	impact	of	combatting	an	
environment	conducive	to	sexual	assault.	
My	research	looks	at	the	connection	between	the	substantive	representation	of	women	
in	the	policy	discourse	of	the	CAF	and	sexual	assault	in	the	CAF.	In	this	research	I	am	not	
attempting	to	make	a	probabilistic	causal	claim.	However,	my	findings	do	indicate	an	
explanation	linking	the	discourse	to	the	higher	instances	of	sexual	assault.	There	are	
recommendations	from	the	CAF	stating	that	simply	increasing	the	number	of	women	recruited	
and	retained	in	the	military	will	improve	the	integration	of	women	more	generally.	However,	
whether	or	not	an	increase	in	women	will	improve	the	environment	for	women	is	questionable.	
I	argue	that	there	is	a	connection	between	the	environment	women	encounter	in	the	CAF	and	
the	policy	discourse	of	the	same	institution.	The	discourse	used	in	the	CAF’s	policies	project	the	
identity	of	the	CAF,	not	only	in	the	specifics	of	the	policies	they	create,	but	in	any	absences.	In	
not	acknowledging	certain	situations,	the	policies	thus	identify	the	institution’s	priorities	and	
what	matters	in	its	operation.	Through	this	political	discourse	analysis	I	find	the	policy	discourse	
of	the	CAF	contributes	to	a	permissive	environment	for	sexual	assault	through	the	vague	
language	and	absences	in	the	policies.	When	the	language	is	vague,	or	there	are	absences	of	
specific	behaviours,	this	widens	the	perceived	allowable	behaviours	by	members;	because	
there	is	no	specific	mention	of	sexual	harassment	this	absence	provides	an	interpreted	
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authorization	of	this	with	no	administrative	repercussions.	The	policy	discourse	may	facilitate	
representation	for	women	by	having	women	participate	in	the	creation	of	policies	and	by	
indicating	consideration	of	the	various	interests	of	women	as	equal	members	of	the	CAF;	
however,	the	policy	discourse	may	present	a	lack	of	substantive	representation	for	women,	
which	contributes	to	the	idea	in	the	hyper-masculine	military	culture	that	women	are	worth	
less	than	men	as	soldiers.		
The	discourse	used	in	policies	impacts	the	language	members	use.	In	discussing	critical	
discourse	analysis,	Janks	says,	“ideology	is	at	its	most	powerful	when	it	is	invisible,	when	
discourses	have	been	naturalized	and	become	part	of	our	everyday	common	sense.	This	is	what	
results	in	writers	using	a	discourse	of	paternalism	unconsciously,	because	it	is	available.	By	
being	there	(…)	available	discourses	constitute	our	identities	and	our	construction	of	the	world”	
(1997,	340).	This	has	an	impact	on	the	everyday	language	that	occurs	in	the	CAF.	For	example,	
the	discourse	in	the	policy	regarding	sexual	misconduct	has	a	strong	emphasis	on	providing	
proof	of	the	alleged	activities	and	on	providing	methods	for	alleged	assaulters	to	prove	their	
innocence:	namely	through	the	‘good	soldier	defence,’	which	relies	on	their	time	in	service.	This	
discourse	emphasis	contributes	to	the	everyday	discourse	regarding	sexual	assault	that	
emphasizes	the	possibility	for	false	allegations	and	shifts	the	onus	of	proof	to	the	victim.		
Policies	and	their	implementation	have	an	impact	on	different,	broad	groups	in	terms	of	
gender,	sexuality,	religion,	race,	and	other	social	characteristics.	This	is	important	because	this	
type	of	consideration	is	frequently	left	out.	For	example,	in	the	CAF’s	recent	survey	and	
statistical	analysis	of	the	prevalence	of	sexual	assault	there	was	no	analysis	of	social	
characteristics	other	than	sex.	This	means	that	it	is	unknown	if	members	of	a	certain	sexuality,	
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religion,	or	race	are	more	frequently	targeted	as	victims	of	sexual	assault	than	others.	While	
instances	of	sexual	assault	are	significant	themselves,	the	representation	of	women	in	policy	
discourse	also	sets	the	stage	for	their	representation	in	all	other	aspects	of	the	CAF.	The	way	
that	policies	are	written	informs	the	behaviours	and	limits	of	behaviours	that	will	be	tolerated,	
as	will	the	training	they	receive	on	ethics	and	general	expectations	of	all	members.	Further,	the	
official	discourse	will	inform	and	affect	members’	informal	discourse	and	language	usage.		
Policy	discourse	and	the	culture	of	the	CAF	have	a	mutually	constitutive	relationship	in	that	
culture	and	representation	will	affect	policy	creation,	and	implementation	of	these	policies	will	
guide	members’	behaviours	and	the	institution’s	culture.	The	policies	of	the	CAF	as	an	
institution	set	the	boundaries	for	the	culture	and	the	individual	members	enact	this,	but	it	also	
works	in	the	opposite	way	in	that	those	who	create	and	amend	the	policies	of	the	CAF	are	well	
integrated	in	the	culture	of	the	CAF,	which	influences	how	the	policies	are	created.	
A	discourse	analysis	in	particular	is	valuable	in	this	instance	because	the	policies	are	
written	with	the	intent	to	create	guidelines	and	boundaries	for	members	and	to	solve	identified	
problems,	such	as	high	rates	of	sexual	assault.	However,	if	the	discourse	used	within	them	
actually	contributes	to	perpetuating	the	problems	they	are	meant	to	solve	through	the	
narratives	used	within	the	discourse,	then	this	must	be	addressed.	As	well,	while	the	CAF	has	
acknowledged	that	sexual	assault	is	an	issue	that	still	needs	to	be	addressed	(Op	HONOUR,	1),	it	
is	valuable	to	look	at	the	motivation	behind	this	intention	as	well	as	the	CAF’s	approach	to	this	
ongoing	problem.	If	the	motivation	is	to	improve	combat	effectiveness	or	the	institution’s	
efficiency,	it	will	look	different	than	if	the	motivation	is	to	recruit	and	retain	more	members,	
especially	women.	These	motivations	will	have	an	important	effect	on	efforts	to	address	the	
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problem.	It	is	valuable	to	look	at	what	these	documents	actually	say	about	women	from	a	
gendered	perspective	and	to	identify	the	narratives	of	women’s	portrayal.	Understanding	how	
CAF	policy	portrays	women,	as	well	as	the	implications	this	may	have	within	the	CAF,	provides	a	
basis	for	how	we	might	improve	this	representation	as	well	as	improve	its	outcomes	moving	
forward.		
The	following	chapters	develop	my	argument	that	the	discourse	of	the	policies	within	
the	CAF	are	permissive	of	sexually	harassing	behaviours	and	sexual	assault.	In	chapter	two	I	
review	the	literature	regarding	instances	of	sexual	assault	generally	and	the	motivations	behind	
it,	as	well	as	the	same	within	military	culture.	The	actual	crime	of	sexual	assault	is	similar	
between	civilian	and	military	settings	though	statistics	indicate	it	occurs	more	within	the	
military.	The	hyper-masculine	culture	of	the	military	contributes	to	this,	as	its	emphasis	on	
dominance	and	aggression	pair	well	with	the	power	motivation	that	lies	behind	many	sexual	
assaults	(Morris	1996,	721).	I	also	look	at	the	CAF	as	a	typical	instance	of	military	culture	
generally	through	previous	works	such	as	Gouliquer	and	Poulin’s	examination	of	discrimination	
in	the	CAF	and	DesChamps’	review	regarding	sexual	assault	(DesChamps	2015;	Gouliquer	and	
Poulin	2012),	and	review	the	literature	regarding	culture	change	arising	from	policy	change.	
Operation	HONOUR,	as	the	CAF’s	push	to	decrease	rates	of	sexual	assault,	is	based	on	the	
concept	of	top-down	culture	change	and	so	I	review	how	culture	is	developed.	I	also	discuss	
gender	integration	within	the	CAF,	both	in	terms	of	official	policies	and	the	general	atmosphere	
that	women	face,	as	well	as	motivations	for	gender	integration.	Women	remain	as	an	out-group	
in	the	military	due	to	the	hyper-masculine	culture,	regardless	of	the	policies	dictating	their	
official	inclusion	to	all	aspects	of	the	military.	Finally,	I	discuss	the	theory	of	representation	as	
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this	background	is	necessary	in	my	examination	of	policies	from	the	CAF	with	regards	to	the	
representation	of	women.		
In	chapter	three	I	outline	the	methods	I	used	to	complete	this	research.	I	used	
poststructuralist	theory	to	inform	my	analysis	and	I	drew	on	Hansen’s	Security	as	Practice	as	
well	as	Janks’	Critical	Discourse	Analysis	as	a	Research	Tool.	I	conducted	my	analysis	as	both	a	
discourse	and	policy	analysis,	looking	specifically	for	representation.		
In	chapter	four	I	analyze	the	various	policies	and	policy	responses	from	the	CAF	with	
regards	to	representation	and	permissiveness	towards	sexual	harassment	and	sexual	assault.	
Through	an	examination	of		the	documents’	context	I	develop	the	idea	that	there	is	not	much	
descriptive	representation	in	the	CAF’s	policy	formation.3	All	noted	individuals	are	white	and	
male.	The	only	noted	female	authors	for	documents	I	analyzed	are	the	ones	who	have	written	
policy	responses	to	the	CAF.	I	further	analyze	each	document	with	regards	to	how	the	language	
indicates	or	does	not	indicate	representation	of	women.	In	the	literature	review	I	discuss	that	
gender	integration	is	not	complete,	though	policies	officially	include	women.	However,	in	my	
analysis	of	the	policies	I	find	that	the	representation	of	women	is	poor	as	the	wording	is	vague	
and	is	permissive	of	harassing	behaviours.	I	further	analyze	the	documents	with	regards	to	
themes	surrounding	sexual	assault:	consent,	victim	blaming,	and	support	for	victims.	Support	
for	victims	through	various	resources	both	for	emotional	and	physical	care	as	well	as	justice	are	
necessary	aspects	of	a	reactive	system.	Education	for	all	members	regarding	consent	and	
language	that	does	not	blame	victims	could	be	a	preventative	action	to	reduce	future	sexual	
																																																						
3	Descriptive	representation	is	the	representation	of	social	characteristics	where	those	who	are	
descriptively	representing	a	group	share	one	or	more	social	characteristics	with	the	group	
(Mansbridge	1999,	628).		
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assaults.	Finally,	I	examine	the	language	of	policies	and	policy	responses	with	regards	to	the	
creation	and	development	of	narratives	of	both	victims	and	aggressors.	This	is	important	
because	while	it	is	useful	to	acknowledge	the	statistically	likely	members	who	may	be	victims	or	
aggressors	(because	the	victims	are	overwhelmingly	women),	it	is	isolating	to	not	acknowledge	
the	other	potential	members	at	all.		
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Chapter	2	Literature	Review:	Policy	Change	as	an	Incomplete	Method	of	Culture	Change	With	
Respect	to	Gender	Integration	in	the	Military	
	
The	2009-2010	Judge	Advocate	General	report	for	the	Canadian	Armed	Forces	stated	that	there	
were	84	charges	of	a	sexual	nature	laid	against	51	accused	(Lorincz	2013).	This	shows	sexual	
assault	in	the	military	is	not	happening	at	a	1:1	assailant	to	victim	ratio,	meaning	that	many	
assailants	have	multiple	victims.	Two	popular	examples	of	this	are	the	former	medic,	who	in	
2011	was	charged	with	20	offenses	for	sexual	assault	and	breach	of	trust	against	women	from	
2002-2009,	and	the	former	Commander	of	Trenton	Canadian	Forces	Base,	who	was	charged	
with	two	counts	of	sexual	assault	and	murder	and	80	charges	of	break-ins	(Lorincz	2013;	Col.	
Russell	Williams	Pleads	Guilty	2010).	Although	these	numbers	indicate	that	the	number	of	
perpetrators	may	not	be	as	high,	we	must	also	consider	that	a	significant	number	of	assaults	
are	not	reported.		
The	literature	regarding	sexual	assault	in	the	context	of	the	military	is	extensive.	Some	
main	focuses	are	on	the	occurrences	and	motivations	of	rape	in	war	as	well	as	aspects	of	the	
military’s	culture	that	contribute	to	the	permissive	environment	(Morris	1996,	Littlewood	1997,	
Loken	2017).	The	literature	establishes	that	male	dominance	and	hyper-masculinity	shape	the	
military	culture,	meaning	that	women	are	generally	not	welcomed	into	the	institution	(Eichler	
2016,	Sasson-Levy	2002,	Gill	and	Febbraro	2013,	Gouliquer	2011).	The	literature	regarding	
gender	integration	generally	concludes	that	even	where	policy	states	full	inclusion,	the	actual	
integration	and	representation	of	women	within	the	military,	both	in	terms	of	numbers	of	
women	and	the	culture	that	rejects	them	is	poor.	After	analyzing	sexual	assault,	Canadian	
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military	culture,	how	policy	contributes	to	culture	change,	and	gender	integration	in	the	
military	I	will	examine	representation	theory.	This	analysis	looks	at	what	may	or	may	not	be	
considered	representation	as	well	as	a	couple	of	methods	of	improving	representation	
(Crenshawe	1991,	Young	1994).	The	poor	representation	and	integration	of	women	in	the	CAF	
contributes	to	an	environment	where	they	are	less	valued	than	their	male	counterparts	
(Sasson-Levy	2002,	378).	This	is	concurrently	occurring	alongside	significant	rates	of	sexual	
assault	that	are	primarily	affecting	female	service	members.	My	review	and	analysis	of	this	
literature	serves	to	provide	background	regarding	these	topics	as	well	as	to	question	the	
correlation	of	these	instances	and	the	permissive	environment	of	the	CAF	for	sexual	assault.		
	
Sexual	Assault	
A	significant	number	of	Canadian	women	and	men	experience	sexual	assault	every	year,	though	
statistics	indicate	that	women	are	victims	significantly	more	often	than	men	(Sexual	Misconduct	
in	the	Canadian	Armed	Forces,	2016).	Sexual	activity	toward	another	person	without	consent	
constitutes	sexual	assault,	though	there	is	wide	misunderstanding	of	what	consent	legally	
means.	These	explicit	definitions	are	necessary	in	the	policies	of	the	CAF	in	order	to	determine	
the	limits	of	acceptable	behaviours	for	members.		
The	Criminal	Code	of	Canada	defines	consent	as	voluntary	agreement	to	engage	in	a	
sexual	activity	and	precludes	consent	from	situations	where	a	person	is	physically	unable	to	
consent,	where	a	person	abuses	a	position	of	trust,	power,	or	authority	to	engage	in	the	
activity,	or	where	a	person	expresses	a	lack	of	agreement	to	engage	in	or	continue	to	engage	in	
the	activity	(A	Definition	of	Consent	to	Sexual	Activity).	Consent	is	more	than	an	absence	of	
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“no”	or	physical	struggle	but	requires	ongoing	and	enthusiastic	agreement.4	Without	consent,	
sexual	assault	has	occurred,	and	without	wider	understanding	of	what	consent	is	there	will	be	
misinformation	as	to	what	constitutes	sexual	assault.	 
Sexual	assault	is	a	variety	of	crimes	surrounding	sexual	behaviour	that	occurs	without	
consent.	It	is	a	crime	that	may	happen	to	anyone;	however,	specific	populations	have	a	higher	
statistical	likelihood	of	sexual	assault.	Sexual	assault	in	the	Canadian	civilian	population	is	a	
crime	that	occurs	mostly	to	young	women:	over	80%	of	sex	crime	victims	are	women	and	one	
quarter	of	North	American	women	will	be	sexually	assaulted	in	their	lifetime	(Vaillancourt	2008,	
10).	82%	of	all	victims	of	sexual	assault	under	the	age	of	18	are	female,	and	young	Canadians	
are	more	likely	to	experience	sexual	assault	(The	Nature	of	Sexual	Offences;	Ogrodnik	2008,	
12).	Half	of	all	victims	are	married	or	in	long-term	relationships	and	80%	of	assailants	are	
friends	or	family	of	the	victim	(Statistics	on	Sexual	Assault	Cont’d).	Furthermore,	only	six	out	of	
every	100	incidents	of	sexual	assault	are	reported	to	the	police	and	only	two	to	four	percent	of	
sexual	assault	reports	are	false	reports	(Sexual	Assault	Statistics	in	Canada).	As	well,	it	is	
estimated	that	less	than	1%	of	sexual	assaults	experienced	by	women	lead	to	an	offender	being	
convicted	(Johnson	2012,	613). 	
Most	sexual	assaults	fall	into	the	category	where	there	is	little	or	no	physical	injury	
(Wathen	2012,	12). These	statistics	indicate	that	not	many	sexual	assaults	are	reported	and	not	
many	victims	sustain	physical	injury	from	their	assault	meaning	the	assault	may	not	have	been	
a	violent,	physical	struggle.	Sexual	assault	is	a	crime	that	occurs	to	a	significant	portion	of	the	
population,	but	not	necessarily	in	the	violent	way	that	many	people	stereotypically	think	of	it.	
																																																						
4	I	elaborate	on	definitions	of	consent	in	Chapter	5,	in	the	section	regarding	consent.	
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Although	a	stereotypical	understanding	of	sexual	assault	involves	physical	assault,	any	type	of	
sexual	assault	is	violent	in	its	own	way	as	it	is	power	and	domination	of	another	person’s	body.	 
The	overall	culture	of	the	military	is	sexualized	and	the	statistical	likelihood	of	being	a	
female	victim	in	the	military	is	higher	than	that	of	being	a	male	victim	(DesChamps	2015,	2).	
Three	factors	make	the	military	a	higher	risk	environment	for	sexual	assault:	most	members	are	
younger	than	the	general	population;	the	living	quarters	are	often	isolated	and	integrated;	and	
men	greatly	outnumber	and	frequently	outrank	women	(Watkins,	Bennett,	Richer,	Zamorski	
2015).	Only	eight	percent	of	members	who	are	above	the	rank	of	lieutenant-colonel	are	women	
(Lorincz	2013).	These	factors	are	indicative	of	women	as	victims.	Sexual	assault	occurred	in	the	
military	before	women	were	active	participants	and	so	there	is	a	need	to	consider	the	general	
culture	and	environment.	However,	the	fact	that	the	majority	of	victims	are	women	is	
significant.		
An	American	example	of	the	military	as	a	sexualized	institution	is	the	Abu	Ghraib	
scandal	in	Iraq,	as	analyzed	by	Enloe.	Both	male	and	female	American	soldiers	were	
photographed	sexually	assaulting	Iraqi	prisoners	by	various	means	(Enloe	2004,	90).	Enloe	
discusses	the	motivations	of	these	humiliations	in	terms	of	power	and	feminization	of	the	
prisoners	(2004,	99).	She	further	discusses	the	role	of	the	female	soldiers	acting	in	a	
masculinized	role	in	order	to	not	only	decrease	their	femininity	but	to	further	highlight	the	
feminization	of	the	Iraqi	prisoners	(Enloe	2004,	98).	This	is	significant	as	an	example,	because	
even	though	the	victims	of	these	sexual	assaults	were	male,	they	still	played	out	with	distinct	
masculine	and	feminine	gender	roles.		
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Although	women	in	the	military	are	at	a	higher	risk	of	experiencing	sexual	assault,	there	
is	still	significant	under-reporting.	It	is	difficult	to	obtain	clear	statistics	on	what	the	rates	of	
sexual	assault	actually	look	like	over	time.	Gill	and	Febbraro	discuss	that	although	the	reported	
rate	of	sexual	harassment	in	the	Canadian	military	decreased	from	26%	in	1992	to	14%	in	1998	
this	could	be	attributable	to	an	increased	emphasis	on	harassment	policies	or	to	the	well	
documented	under-reporting	due	to	members’	lack	of	confidence	in	the	ability	of	the	chain	of	
command	to	adequately	deal	with	their	complaints	(Gill	and	Febbraro	2013,	271).	However,	
there	have	not	been	conclusive	studies	done	to	indicate	if	either	of	these	or	other	factors	are	
responsible.	
The	results	of	surveys	of	regular	force	CAF	members	by	Statistics	Canada	in	2014	
indicated	that	similar	numbers	of	men	and	women	experienced	sexual	assault	while	working	
with	the	CAF	(Stats	Canada	Canadian	Forces	Mental	Health	Survey,	2014).	However,	800	men	
and	700	women	having	this	shared	experience	translates	to	1.2%	of	the	male	population	and	
7.6%	of	the	female	population	because	the	total	number	of	men	surveyed	was	55,500	and	the	
total	number	of	women	surveyed	was	8,900	(Stats	Canada	Canadian	Forces	Mental	Health	
Survey,	2014).	So	although	the	exact	number	of	men	and	women	who	experienced	sexual	
assault	are	similar,	the	percentage	overall	indicates	that	women	are	more	likely	to	be	victims.	
Similarly,	a	survey	from	Defence	Research	and	Development	Canada	from	2013	conducted	by	
Statistics	Canada	indicated	that	approximately	40%	of	women	and	9%	of	men	have	experienced	
sexual	assault,	either	military	work-related	or	not	(Watkins,	Bennett,	Richer,	Zamorski	2015).	
Furthermore,	specifically	in	military	work-related	sexual	assault,	this	survey	found	that	
approximately	15%	of	women	have	experienced	unwanted	touching,	compared	to	1%	of	men,	
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8%	of	women	have	experienced	forced	sexual	activity	compared	to	.2%	of	men,	and	16%	of	
women	have	experienced	any	type	of	sexual	assault	as	compared	to	1%	of	men	(Watkins,	
Bennett,	Richer,	Zamorski	2015).	These	statistics	indicate	that	although	men	also	experience	
sexual	assault	in	the	military,	women	experience	it	in	significantly	higher	numbers.	Women	are	
four	times	more	likely	than	men	to	experience	unwanted	sexual	touching,	are	five	times	more	
likely	to	be	sexually	attacked,	and	six	times	more	likely	to	be	subjected	to	sexual	activity	to	
which	they	were	unable	to	consent	(Sexual	Misconduct	in	the	Canadian	Armed	Forces,	2016).		
Sexual	jokes	are	the	most	common	type	of	inappropriate	sexual	behaviour	members	
experience,	followed	by	inappropriate	sexual	comments	(Sexual	Misconduct	in	the	Canadian	
Armed	Forces,	2016).	This	type	of	language	alone	creates	a	sexualized	environment	that	
indicates	normalcy	of	sexual	harassment.	The	culture	of	the	military,	distinct	from	the	policies	
of	the	CAF,	provides	an	especially	hospitable	environment	for	continued	high	rates	of	sexual	
assault.	In	addition	to	the	normalized	sexual	environment,	women	are	twice	as	likely	to	report	
being	personally	targeted	by	this	sexualized	behaviour	and	language	(Sexual	Misconduct	in	the	
Canadian	Armed	Forces,	2016).	Women,	as	15%	of	the	CAF,	are	disproportionately	targets	of	
sexual	assault	in	the	military.	Thus,	the	prevalence	of	sexual	assault	is	tied	not	only	to	the	
sexualized	environment	that	normalizes	sexual	harassment,	but	also	to	the	low	representation	
and	disproportionate	targeting	of	women.		
Widespread	ignorance	regarding	consent	contributes	to	a	permissive	environment	
towards	sexual	assault.	Those	who	do	not	understand	consent	are	more	likely	to	believe	that	
sexual	assault	only	occurs	when	the	aggressor	uses	violence,	or	believe	that	unconsciousness	
does	not	necessarily	mean	a	lack	of	consent.	In	this	sense	it	is	important	for	all	members	of	the	
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CAF	to	know	what	consent	is.	The	statistics	I	have	stated	regarding	likely	victims	of	sexual	
assault	and	understanding	consent	develop	the	background	necessary	for	adjusting	policy	
regarding	sexual	assault.	Identifying	the	gaps	in	general	knowledge	and	the	likely	victims	of	this	
crime	are	important	towards	steps	to	reduce	the	rates	of	sexual	assault.		
	
	
Canadian	Military	Culture		
Military	culture	is	hyper-masculine.	It	is	a	male-dominated	institution,	dependent	on	group	
cohesion	for	operational	effectiveness.	Although	group	cohesion	is	highly	sought	after	in	the	
military,	there	is	resistance	to	diversity	within	the	military	culture.	This	resistance	was	
historically	encouraged	via	policies	that	limited	women’s	engagement	with	the	military;	
however,	there	is	now	official	movement	towards	diversification.	Informally	the	culture	
continues	to	reject	women	and	femininity,	which	isolates	female	members.		
There	is	a	regulation	in	the	CAF	called	Universality	of	Service,	which	allows	the	military	
to	use	soldiers	as	it	wishes	and	to	demand	higher	standards	of	performance.	Universality	of	
Service	means	that	soldiers	are	liable	to	be	sent	wherever	and	whenever	to	do	whatever	the	
military	requires	of	them	for	operational	success	(Gouliquer	2011,	136).	This	means	that	the	
military	has	complete	power	over	its	soldiers	and	refusal	to	follow	orders	can	be	punished	with	
a	maximum	of	release	from	the	military	but	could	be	less	than	this	(Gouliquer	2011,	137).	This	
is	found	in	section	103.6	of	the	Queen’s	Regulations	and	Orders:	“Any	act,	conduct,	disorder,	or	
neglect	to	the	prejudice	of	good	order	and	discipline	is	an	offence	and	every	person	convicted	
thereof	is	liable	to	dismissal	with	disgrace	from	Her	Majesty’s	service	or	to	less	punishment”	
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(QR&O	103.06,	8).	The	culture	of	the	military	is	developed	through	policies	that	articulate	the	
extent	of	allowed	behaviours.	This	order	maintains	that	anyone	who	neglects	“good	order	and	
discipline”	may	be	“dismissed	or	lesser	punishment”;	however,	how	the	military	defines	‘good	
order’	matters	significantly	to	how	members	believe	they	can	act.	
The	CAF	is	typical	of	military	culture.	Militaries	are	classically	a	male-dominated	
institution	with	hyper-masculine	culture.	Kaplan	discusses	the	masculinity	of	the	military,	
“Given	historical	and	contemporary	reality,	soldiering	is	symbolically	synonymous	with	being	
male,	and	a	means	to	confirm	manhood	and	masculinity”	(Kaplan	2003	via	Gouliquer	2011,	
137).	Masculinity	in	the	military	is	associated	with	physical	strength,	aggressiveness,	and	agency	
(Seymour	2003	via	Gouliquer	2011,	140).	Further,	“men	and	masculinity	seem	to	shape	
workplace	culture	and	to	be	the	definers	of	the	culture,	policies,	practices,	and	structures”	
(Gouliquer	2011,	17).	In	this	way	the	CAF	is	built	on	a	model	of	hyper-masculinity	defining	the	
military,	which	strongly	influences	the	culture.	The	CAF	is	composed	of	85%	men	on	average	
across	regular	and	reserve	forces	and	all	trades.	Gutek	and	Done,	cited	in	Gouliquer	
“demonstrated	that	male	dominated	workplaces	are	highly	sexualized”	(2001	via	Gouliquer	
2011,	215).	In	congruence	with	this,	the	CAF	has	a	well-documented	culture	that	has	allowed	
sexualized	behaviours,	such	as	posters	of	nude	women	in	the	workplace,	and	language	that	
denigrates	women	and	female	bodies	(DesChamps	2015,	18).	This	denigration	of	the	feminine	is	
related	to	the	military’s	conceptualization	as	an	opposite	to	femininity	and	being	female	
(MacDonald	1987	via	Gouliquer	2011,	137;	Morris	1997,	716).	Femininity	is	defined	and	
associated	with	mothering,	weakness,	passivity,	and	submission	(Seymour	2003	via	Gouliquer	
2011,	137).	The	association	of	the	military	with	strength,	and	femininity	with	weakness,	
	 24	
provides	the	basis	for	a	military	culture	that	rejects	and	denigrates	the	feminine.	This	further	
translates	into	similar	attitudes	toward	women,	who	represent	femininity.	“Femininity	is	feared	
within	the	military	because	individual	soldiers	and	the	military	entirely	cannot	afford	to	be	
perceived	as	weak”	(Kaplan	2003,	Kovitz	2000	via	Gouliquer	2011,	145).	The	significance	of	this	
is	that	to	increase	the	substantive	representation	of	women	the	cultural	association	of	women	
with	weakness	must	be	overcome.		
Through	a	half-year	investigation	into	the	culture	of	the	CAF,	DesChamps	concluded	it	is	
a	sexualized	environment	(2015,	i).	This	sexualized	environment	is	a	culture	that	does	not	
accept	women	readily	and	condones	misogynistic	behaviours	and	attitudes	that	“creat(e)	an	
alienating	environment	and	place	barriers	in	the	path	of	female	soldiers	trying	to	attain	a	
fundamental	quality	of	good	soldiering”	(Gouliquer	2011,	230).		The	“fundamental	quality”	
Gouliquer	references	is	teamwork	and	inclusion,	and	these	qualities	are	“integral	to	military	
success”	(Gouliquer	2011,	215).	The	military	builds	its	effectiveness	around	these	qualities	
because	there	is	and	must	be	significant	trust	between	soldiers	participating	in	combat.	
However,	this	leads	women	in	the	military	who	experience	the	alienating	environment	due	to	
misogyny	to	either	isolate	themselves	to	tolerate	and	avoid	the	sexism	or	be	isolated	by	their	
colleagues	who	accept	the	sexism	(both	male	and	female)	if	they	challenge	it	(Gouliquer	2011,	
215).	Furthermore,	this	isolation	as	a	strategy	contributes	to	the	culture	that	supports	
underreporting	of	sexual	assault.	This	alienating	environment	that	women	face	is	a	deterrent	to	
reporting	sexual	assaults.	This	does	not	contribute	to	strong	group	cohesion	when	members	are	
socially	excluded	on	the	basis	of	gendered	stereotypes	regarding	their	sex.	There	are	also	
women	who	internalize	the	misogynistic	attitude	and	downplay	negative	or	harassing	incidents	
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in	order	to	maintain	the	teamwork	and	group	cohesion	despite	their	token	status	(Gouliquer	
2011,	249).	This	strategy	is	effective	in	that	it	allows	women	to	ignore	their	gender	and	include	
themselves	in	the	group	by	contributing	to	the	culture.	Both	isolation	and	internalization	as	
strategies	may	occur	also	in	part	due	to	a	lack	of	confidence	in	the	institution	to	adequately	
deal	with	any	harassment	complaints,	due	to	the	overall	culture	of	the	CAF.	Both	of	these	
strategies	are	consistent	with	a	culture	that	supports	the	underreporting	of	sexual	assault.	
Those	who	internalize	the	hyper-masculinity	accept	the	occurrence	of	sexual	harassment	as	
normal	behaviour	and	deter	others	from	reporting	sexual	assaults,	and	those	who	choose	
isolation	to	tolerate	these	behaviours	have	also	accepted	their	inevitability	and	are	unlikely	to	
report.		
DesChamps,	in	her	review	of	the	CAF	with	regards	to	sexual	assault,	found	that	many	
members	felt	that	sexual	harassment	is	condoned	by	senior	members	and	thus	it	is	not	
behaviour	that	threatens	the	good	order	of	the	institution	(2015,	18).	DesChamps’	
recommendations	discuss	acknowledging	the	seriousness	of	the	problem	of	sexual	assault	and	
establishing	a	strategy	to	effect	cultural	change	regarding	the	sexualized	environment	(2015,	
ix).	I	further	recommend	that	by	senior	leadership	making	explicitly	clear	that	this	type	of	
behaviour	is	not	only	a	serious	problem,	but	threatens	the	good	order	of	the	military	and	its	
operational	effectiveness,	this	poses	more	relatable	and	anchored	motivation	to	change	
behaviours	such	that	ideally	it	will	no	longer	occur.	This	is	not	a	complete	causal	explanation	of	
sexual	harassment	or	sexual	assault	in	the	CAF;	however,	it	contributes	to	the	culture	that	
allows	it.	Further,	sexual	harassment	and	sexual	assault	are	not	equal	actions,	but	an	
environment	that	allows	or	condones	sexual	harassment	is	one	that	breeds	individuals	more	
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willing	to	commit	sexual	assault	(Morris	1996,	690).	This	is	even	further	influenced	by	
individuals	who	do	not	have	a	full	understanding	of	consent	and	instead	only	consider	sexual	
assault	as	a	violent	attack.	In	an	environment	where	many	do	not	understand	that	various	
factors	like	coercion,	inebriation,	and	consciousness	affect	consent,	and	where	members	live	
and	work	in	an	environment	where	jokes	and	language	about	sexual	harassment	are	common,	
sexual	assault	is	not	an	unlikely	outcome.		
The	military	culture	that	isolates	and	rejects	women	and	femininity	is	one	that	breeds	
an	environment	that	condones	sexual	harassment	and	sexual	assault.	Though	the	military	
prides	itself	on	group	cohesion,	the	hyper-masculinity	of	the	institution	does	not	contribute	
positively	to	this.		
	
Sexual	Assault	and	Military	Culture	
The	culture	of	the	military	contributes	to	the	permissiveness	of	the	environment	towards	
sexual	assault.	The	violence	and	aggression	rewarded	within	the	military	culture	are	related	to	
the	demonstration	of	power	that	occurs	in	sexual	assault.	Though	a	culture	change	will	have	a	
positive	effect	on	rates	of	sexual	assault,	simply	adding	more	women	into	the	military	will	not	
significantly	change	the	culture	it	in	a	way	to	reduce	this.		
The	statistics	regarding	women	as	victims	of	sexual	assault	in	the	military	lead	to	an	
understanding	of	women	solely	as	victims.	However,	this	is	not	always	true.	There	are	women	
in	the	military	who	internalize	the	misogyny	of	the	institution	and	perpetuate	the	environment	
of	sexual	harassment,	just	as	their	male	colleagues	do	(Sasson-Levy	2002,	376).	Loken	discusses	
the	hypothesis	that	the	inclusion	of	women	in	the	military	discourages	wartime	rape	from	their	
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colleagues	against	other	military	members	or	non-combatants	and	argues	this	is	not	in	fact	
true.	Loken	finds	organizational	factors,	like	culture,	drive	the	violence	in	these	groups	and	
encourage	conformity	regardless	of	social	characteristics	(Loken	2017,	60).	This	argument	is	
contrary	to	the	assumption	that	female	combatants	are	inherently	less	violent	than	their	male	
counterparts.	It	also	highlights	the	limits	of	women’s	inclusion,	particularly	in	terms	of	a	failure	
to	account	for	the	organizational	pressures	that	both	men	and	women	experience	as	part	of	a	
military	–	relying	instead	on	a	classic	definition	of	femininity	that	would	preclude	women	from	
aggression.	Further,	it	justifies	women’s	inclusion	in	the	military	as	pacifiers	(Loken	2017,	67).	In	
fact,	Loken	finds	that	women	do	not	“disrupt	misogynistic	socialization	practices”	but	instead	
contribute	to	existing	practices	(2017,	66,	88).	Loken	further	finds,	“individuals	are	likely	to	
adopt	the	majority	opinion	or	norms	of	a	group,	even	when	they	believe	that	the	norm	is	
wrong.	Their	preferences	will	change	when	a	group	norm	shifts”	(2017,	83).	This	is	significant	
because	it	indicates	an	increase	in	the	number	of	women	in	the	CAF	will	not	necessarily	move	
to	decrease	rates	of	sexual	assault.	This	is	not	to	say	that	increasing	the	number	of	women	in	
the	CAF,	or	any	military,	is	not	a	good	thing,	just	that	it	should	be	done	with	that	as	the	sole	
motivation,	rather	than	for	an	ulterior	purpose.	An	increase	in	the	descriptive	representation	of	
women	is	in	and	of	itself	an	important	goal,	regardless	of	if	this	increase	may	lead	to	a	decrease	
in	sexual	violence.	
Contrary	to	this,	Gill	and	Febbraro	note	that	there	is	significant	literature	that	
demonstrates	that	women	in	organizations	whose	workforce	is	primarily	male	and	whose	jobs	
are	stereotypically	masculine	experience	more	sexual	harassment	than	women	in	organizations	
that	are	primarily	female	and	whose	jobs	are	more	stereotypically	feminine	(Gill	and	Febbraro	
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2013,	269).	Gill	and	Febbraro	also	discuss	Kenig	and	Ryan’s	findings	from	1986	that	indicate	
that	men	will	attribute	responsibility	to	victims	of	harassment	for	either	provoking	the	
behaviour	or	not	handling	‘normal	sexual	attention’	appropriately	(Gill	and	Febbraro	2013,	
272).	This	finding	is	consistent	as	a	problem	of	a	sexualized	culture	where	inappropriate	
behaviour	is	considered	normal.	Gill	and	Febbraro	conducted	research	in	2003	regarding	
gender	integration	by	interviewing	CAF	members	at	Canadian	Forces	Base	Petawawa	and	
learned	of	women’s	experiences	reporting	through	interviews.	One	woman	they	interviewed	
discussed	being	isolated	after	reporting	harassment	not	only	formally	by	being	removed	from	
her	duties	but	also	by	members	of	her	unit	that	threatened	her	for	reporting	(Gill	and	Febrraro	
2013,	276).	Results	like	these,	where	victims	report	and	then	receive	negative	repercussions,	
have	led	to	the	fear	that	many	share	of	reporting,	which	results	in	significant	under-reporting.		
Although	from	the	2016	survey	from	Statistics	Canada	1.7%	or	960	regular	force	
members	experience	sexual	assault	yearly,	the	Canadian	Forces	Military	Police	Annual	Reports	
from	2013,	2014,	and	2015	state	that	between	all	types	of	sexual	assault5	there	were	only	95,	
119,	and	152	investigations	ongoing	each	year,	respectively	(Cotter	2016,	11;	Canadian	Forces	
Provost	Marshall	Annual	Report	2015-2016).	The	inconsistency	in	these	numbers	indicates	that	
many	members	who	experience	sexual	assault	yearly	do	not	report	these	assaults	or	that	
investigations	are	not	opened	upon	victims	reporting	assaults.	Another	woman	interviewed	by	
Gill	and	Febbraro	had	not	personally	experienced	sexual	harassment	and	explicitly	blamed	
																																																						
5	The	types	of	sexual	assault	listed	are:	aggravated	sexual	assault,	sexual	assault	with	a	weapon,	sexual	
assault,	sexual	interference,	invitation	to	sexual	touching,	sexual	exploitation,	luring	a	child	via	a	
computer,	voyeurism,	other	sex	crimes.	Sexual	assault	is	the	most	common	investigation	with	60-80+	
reports	from	each	year	and	all	other	types	with	less	than	10	yearly.		
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women	for	the	harassment	they	experienced	due	to	their	behaviours	and	clothing	(Gill	and	
Febbraro	2013,	278).	This	is	an	explicit	example	of	a	woman	internalizing	the	misogynistic	
attitudes	prevalent	in	military	culture.	This	is	problematic	because	it	indicates	that	simply	
increasing	formal	representation	of	women	may	not	be	effective	in	terms	of	adjusting	the	
culture	to	be	more	welcoming	of	women	and	less	conducive	to	sexual	assault.		
Morris	argues	that	changing	normative	aspects	of	the	military	may	lead	to	a	reduction	in	
the	incidence	of	sexual	assault	(1996,	654).	She	notes	that	rates	of	sexual	assault	in	individuals,	
groups,	and	societies	are	influenced	by	societal	structure,	group	dynamics,	and	the	
environmental	impact	on	individual’s	psyche	(1996,	680).	Morris	further	notes	that	the	military	
is	considered	a	primary	group	(1996,	691).	Primary	groups	are	characterized	by	“intimate	face	
to	face	association	and	cooperation”	and	they	are	“fundamental	in	forming	the	social	nature	
and	ideals	of	the	individuals	(within	the	groups)”	(Morris	1996,	691).	Furthermore,	the	result	of	
the	socialization	of	group	members	is	that	individual	members	become	a	fusion	such	that	the	
common	purpose	of	each	is	the	purpose	of	the	group	(Morris	1997,	691).	Due	to	the	fact	that	
the	military	is	a	primary	group,	there	is	an	expectation	that	the	“norms	and	attitudes	
engendered	in	the	context	of	military	units	will	have	significant	effects	on	the	behaviour	of	the	
members”	(Morris	1996,	692).	This	is	significant	in	that	military	groups	develop	very	close	
bonds	between	members	to	the	point	that	deindividuation	takes	place	and	each	member	no	
longer	thinks	of	themselves	as	an	“I”	but	rather	as	part	of	the	“we”.	This	is	“essential	to	combat	
performance”;	however,	it	also	contributes	to	a	difficult	to	change	culture	that	currently	
condones	sexual	harassment	(Morris	1996,	694).	DesChamps	recommends	that	a	strategy	must	
be	developed	to	effect	cultural	change	(2015,	ix)	but	this	strategy	must	take	into	account	the	
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nature	of	the	culture	as	a	primary	group.	Although	a	cultural	change	is	necessary	to	change	the	
sexualized	environment	of	the	CAF,	changing	the	attitudes	of	a	majority	of	the	individual	
members	is	a	difficult	feat.	Furthermore,	this	difficulty	lies	in	creating	a	change	that	separates	
the	cultural	emphasis	on	strength	from	the	cultural	emphasis	that	masculine	strength	is	an	
opposite	to	feminine	weakness,	which	contributes	to	the	sexualized	environment	of	the	CAF.		
The	military	remains	a	hyper-masculine	institution	that	emphasizes	military	masculinity	
in	terms	of	dominance,	aggression,	and	violence	that	positions	itself	as	opposite	to	the	feminine	
in	terms	of	compassion	and	sensitivity.	Morris	states	that	certain	specific	attitudes	toward	
masculinity	and	sexuality	toward	women	are	associated	with	heightened	propensity	to	commit	
rape	(1996,	701-703).	She	discusses	these	as	an	emphasis	on	dominance	and	aggressiveness,	
the	minimization	of	gentleness,	sensitivity	and	other	stereotypically	feminine	characteristics,	
hostility	towards	women,	and	views	that	women	should	not	do	“men’s	work”	(1996,	701,	703).	
These	attitudes	exist	in	the	military.	Further,	with	the	hyper-masculinity	of	the	military,	women	
remain	outside	of	the	in-group	and	are	not	immediately	welcomed.	We	see	this	through	
common	language	usage	in	the	military	that	denigrates	women	where	phrasing	meant	to	
indicate	weakness	equates	it	with	being	feminine,	being	a	woman,	or	having	the	parts	of	a	
woman.	This	includes	referring	to	recruits	or	candidates	on	a	course	as	ladies	or	girls	or	using	
vulgar	names	for	women’s	anatomy;	although	the	military	masculinity	is	no	longer	part	of	
official	training,	and	gendered	name-calling	is	no	longer	officially	sanctioned,	it	remains	rooted	
in	military	culture	(Morris	1996,	717).	The	emphasis	on	masculinity	in	the	military	and	its	
definition	as	opposite	to	femininity	develops	a	disparaging	attitude	towards	women	generally.	
Furthermore,	the	necessity	of	primary	group	bonding	for	combat	effectiveness	means	that	this	
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negative	attitude	towards	femininity,	and	therefore	women,	with	its	strong	historical	
background,	remains	prevalent	amongst	most	members.	These	underlying	factors	lead	to	a	
military	environment	that	is	permissive	toward	sexual	harassment	and,	further,	towards	sexual	
assault.	However,	Littlewood	makes	the	point	that	“we	can	try	to	assess	the	contribution	of	
military	ideology	without	assuming	it	is	solely	responsible	(Littlewood	1997,	11).	Sexual	assault	
is	prevalent	in	Canadian	civilian	society,	so	it	is	not	only	military	ideology	that	contributes	to	its	
occurrence;	however,	the	rates	of	sexual	assault	are	higher	in	the	CAF.		
	 The	cultural	dislike	of	femininity	and	women	is	a	contributing	factor	towards	the	
heightened	rates	of	sexual	assault	against	women	in	the	CAF.	Morris	discusses	Nicholas	Groth’s	
three	patterns	of	motivation	for	rape:	power,	anger,	and	sadism.	She	states	that	power	is	the	
most	prevalent	motivation,	with	55%	of	rapes	occurring	from	this,	anger	at	40%	and	finally	
sadism	at	5%	(Morris	1996,	723).	Littlewood	as	well	states	“rape	is	primarily	a	question	of	
political	power”	(1997,	9).	Groth	describes	power	as	a	motivation,	with	the	offender	“motivated	
by	feelings	of	inadequacy	and	weakness	and	by	doubts	about	his	masculinity.	The	offender	
rapes	in	an	effort	to	compensate	for	those	feelings	through	controlling	and	sexually	possessing	
the	victim.	The	intent	is	to	assert	his	competency	and	validate	his	masculinity”	(Morris	1996,	
723).	This	explanation	develops	a	narrative	limited	to	a	male	perpetrator;	however,	most	of	the	
perpetrators	in	the	military	are	male.	This	explanation	further	matches	the	culture	developed	
by	the	emphasis	on	military	masculinity	and	primary	group	bonding.	Further,	it	matches	with	
the	propensity	towards	animosity	towards	the	feminine.	It	is	an	organization	where	individuals	
are	pushed	to	be	aggressive	and	demonstrate	power,	and	so	this	may	come	through	in	terms	of	
sexual	assault.	Further,	the	organization	holds	the	masculine	over	the	feminine,	and	the	
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negative	attitude	towards	women	acts	as	a	contributing	factor	towards	an	environment	that	
appears	to	condone	sexual	assault.		
The	CAF	has	a	justice	system	separate	from	the	Canadian	civilian	one:	The	Code	of	
Service	Discipline	establishes	uniquely	military	offences.	If	a	sexual	assault	allegation	leads	to	an	
investigation	and	then	further	to	a	trial,	the	system	is	set	up	in	a	way	to	favour	the	defendant	
(Temkin	2000,	225).		This	process	in	the	military	is	very	similar	to	the	civilian	progression	of	
events	in	a	sexual	assault	allegation	in	that	charges	are	reviewed	in	trial.	In	the	military,	charges	
are	reviewed	in	either	summary	trial	or	court	martial	depending	on	the	severity	of	the	charge	
(The	Code	of	Service	Discipline	and	Me).	Summary	trials	are	meant	to	deal	with	minor	offences	
to	maintain	discipline	at	the	unit	level	and	so	defendants	do	not	have	a	right	to	be	represented	
by	a	lawyer	and	the	powers	of	punishment	are	more	limited	(The	Code	of	Service	Discipline	and	
Me).	However,	court	martials	are	designed	to	deal	with	more	serious	offences	and	use	
procedures	similar	to	civilian	criminal	courts	(The	Code	of	Service	Discipline	and	Me).		
In	the	process	of	court	martial,	as	in	any	fair	court,	there	is	an	opportunity	for	the	
defendant	to	prove	their	innocence.	However,	one	of	these	opportunities	is	the	use	of	‘good	
military	character’	which	Hillman	discusses.	“Accused	service	members,	unlike	criminal	
defendants	are	allowed	to	introduce	evidence	of	their	“good	military	character”	during	the	guilt	
phase	of	court	martial	(Hillman	1999,	880).	In	the	DAODs	this	shows	up	as	well	where	anyone	
trying	a	case	of	sexual	assault	is	instructed	to	consider	the	military	career	of	the	alleged	
assailant	(DAOD	5019,	8).	This	‘good	soldier’	defence	perpetuates	an	idea	that	long	service	
precludes	members	from	having	conducted	crimes,	like	sexual	assault.	However,	this	is	a	
subjective	element	added	because	good	military	character	is	dependent	on	how	good	conduct	
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is	initially	defined.	As	previously	discussed,	good	military	conduct	is	mentioned	in	policies,	but	is	
not	defined,	meaning	as	long	as	basic	soldierly	functions	like	care	of	uniform	and	weapons	skills	
are	demonstrated,	behaviour	like	sexual	harassment,	as	long	as	it	fits	under	the	condoned	
cultural	environment,	may	still	be	“good	military	character.”	Furthermore,	the	military	
reputation	of	an	alleged	assailant	is	as	relevant	as	the	past	sexual	history	of	a	victim:	that	is	to	
say,	not	at	all.	Regardless	of	a	member’s	military	history,	they	may	have	sexually	assaulted	
another	member	because	their	ability	to	conduct	their	job’s	duties	is	not	related	to	sexual	
assault.	“Someone	you	would	go	to	war	with”	is	a	powerful	statement	of	military	character,	
states	Hillman,	but	points	out	that	the	differences	between	a	good	soldier	and	a	violent	felon	
may	not	be	so	clear	(1999,	895).	In	fact,	the	military	rewards	individuals	who	portray	aggression	
and	strength,	which	are	also	traits	that	may	be	seen	in	individuals	who	have	committed	sexual	
assault.	A	clear	example	of	a	military	member	who	had	an	exemplary	military	history	is	former	
Lieutenant	Colonel	Russell	Williams	who	was	the	commanding	officer	at	Camp	Mirage	during	
operations	in	Afghanistan	and	was	the	commanding	officer	at	Canadian	Forces	Base	Trenton	
from	2009	to	his	arrest	in	2010.	Despite	his	successful	military	career	with	‘good	military	
character,’	Williams	was	convicted	on	two	counts	of	sexual	assault	and	murder	(Col.	Russell	
Williams	Pleads	Guilty	2010).		
The	military	is	a	hyper-masculine	institution	that	is	unwelcoming	to	women	and	
denigrates	femininity.	This	culture	contributes	to	an	environment	that	is	permissive	of	sexual	
assault	(Morris	1996,	740).	Thus,	Morris	suggests	an	increase	in	the	number	of	women	
personnel	(1996,	740).	Morris	suggests	that	the	“integration	of	women	throughout	the	military	
services	would	do	much	to	undermine	group	norms	featuring	the	constellation	of	attitudes	
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comprised	of	hyper-masculinity,	hostility	toward	women,	adversarial	sexual	beliefs,	etc.”	(1996,	
740).	She	goes	on	to	state	that	“the	presence	of	women	as	full	members	of	the	fighting	forces	
would	be	inconsistent	with	a	military	culture	in	which	women	are	viewed	as	the	‘other’	
primarily	as	sexual	targets,	and	in	which	aggression	is	viewed	as	a	sign	of	masculinity”	(Morris	
1996,	740).	An	increase	in	the	descriptive	representation	of	women	would	likely	be	a	positive	
change	in	the	military,	and	would	certainly	be	a	positive	change	specifically	for	the	
representation	of	women.	However,	an	increase	in	descriptive	representation	would	not	
necessarily	lead	to	better	substantive	representation6	of	women.	In	her	review	of	the	CAF,	
DesChamps	states	that	many	women	who	succeed	in	the	military	do	not	move	to	change	the	
culture	but	rather	adapt	and	internalize	the	hyper-masculine	attitudes	prevalent	in	the	military	
(2015,	29).	This	perpetuates	the	culture	of	hostility	to	women,	aggression,	and	power	dynamics	
related	to	inadequacy	of	masculinity.	An	increase	in	women	would	not	preclude	a	culture	from	
continuing	to	define	masculinity	with	aggression.	The	idealization	of	aggression	and	such	
characteristics	in	the	military	is	functional,	as	combat	is	a	primary	objective	of	the	military	
(Morris	1996,	751).	Better	representation	of	women	will	instead	look	like	better	substantive	
representation	of	women	with	an	adjustment	of	culture	away	from	hostility	towards	women,	
and	a	change	in	definitions	of	masculinity	away	from	a	direct	opposite	to	femininity.		
The	hyper-masculine	culture	of	the	military	rewards	aggression	and	violence	and	it	is	
generally	unwelcome	to	women.	The	addition	of	women	to	the	military	is	ineffective	at	
changing	the	culture	because	many	of	these	women	undergo	internalization	of	the	hyper-
																																																						
6	Substantive	representation	is	a	representation	of	a	group’s	interests	and	concerns.	Where	
descriptive	representation	requires	a	shared	social	characteristic,	substantive	representation	
does	not	(Tolley	2011,	581).		
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masculine	culture	that	denigrates	femininity.	This	culture	contributes	to	the	permissive	
environment	towards	sexual	assault.	A	culture	change	is	necessary,	though	it	cannot	be	brought	
about	solely	through	policy	change.	Policy	change	is	necessary	but	not	sufficient.	Rather,	there	
must	be	a	shift	from	hyper-masculinity	and	denigration	of	femininity	to	attitudes	that	accept	
women	and	do	not	equate	femininity	with	weakness.		
	
	
Policy	Change	and	Culture	
I	noted	previously	that	policy	change	is	not	sufficient	for	culture	change,	though	in	the	context	
of	military	it	is	necessary	(but	not	sufficient).	Culture	is	developed	both	bottom-up	and	top-
down	with	norms	created	and	strengthened	both	from	individual	actions	and	through	policy.	
The	military	culture	is	one	of	strong	social	norms,	making	it	resistant	to	change.		
Okros	defines	tight	and	loose	cultures	with	regards	to	strong	or	weak	social	norms	and	
low	and	high	tolerance	for	deviant	behaviours	(Okros	2009,	367).	Tight	cultures	tend	to	be	
homogeneous	groups	with	clear	boundaries	of	membership	and	explicit	social	norms	and	
appropriate	behaviours	(Okros	2009,	367).	Furthermore,	there	are	defined	roles	and	high	levels	
of	obligation	to	fulfill	these	roles,	and	an	emphasis	on	personal	sacrifice	for	the	good	of	the	
group’s	goals	(Okros	2009,	367).	In	contrast	to	this,	loose	cultures	tend	to	be	heterogeneous	
groups	and	it	is	the	individual	who	defines	their	membership	to	the	group	(Okros	2009,	367).	As	
well,	there	are	flexible	norms	and	values	meaning	a	greater	acceptance	of	diversity	and	there	is	
no	strong	emphasis	on	roles	or	defined	identities	within	the	group	(Okros	2009,	367).	There	is	
an	emphasis	on	obligations	to	others,	but	it	is	less	in	terms	of	sacrifice	and	is	more	so	focused	
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on	the	idea	of	maximizing	other’s	wellbeing.	The	military	operates	under	the	mantra,	“mission,	
team,	self,”	to	indicate	the	order	of	priority	for	each	individual	(Okros	2009,	268).	The	CAF	
displays	many	of	the	characteristics	of	a	tight	culture	in	that	they	work	with	an	emphasis	on	
personal	sacrifice	for	the	group	and	for	the	country	they	serve.		
Okros	notes	the	current	military	push	towards	diversity	is	motivated	by	operational	
objectives	like	creating	an	effective,	cohesive	workforce	and	increasing	value	through	the	
addition	of	unique	skills,	perspectives,	or	capabilities	(Okros	2009,	365).	However,	with	the	tight	
culture	of	the	military,	rather	than	integrating	diversity,	individuals	are	assimilated	into	the	
culture.	Okros	describes	the	key	indicators	for	assimilation	as	the	ability	for	new	group	
members	to	successfully	mimic	the	dominant	group	behaviours	and	adapting	to	fit	in	without	
the	dominant	group	altering	at	all	(Okros	2009,	365).	The	significance	of	this	is	that	the	diversity	
initially	valued	is	lost	due	to	only	truly	incorporating	more	individuals	with	the	same	
perspectives.	However,	the	military	maintains	the	necessity	of	this	tight	culture	for	optimal	
operational	effectiveness	(Okros	2009,	368).	In	this	sense,	the	CAF	is	at	a	current	paradox	
where	the	policies	demand	better	integration	across	a	spectrum	of	social	characteristics	while	
also	demanding	the	assimilation	of	these	individuals	to	the	dominant,	hyper-masculine	model	
of	the	prototype	soldier.	Okros	argues	that	if	the	military	moves	beyond	a	demographic-
focused	push	for	diversity	and	instead	embraces	one	that	allows	for	a	looser	culture	and	
tolerance	of	ambiguity	there	will	be	better	integration	of	members	that	fall	outside	the	
dominant	demographic	groups	(Okros	2009,	368).	So,	although	there	is	a	push	for	increased	
diversity	from	the	CAF	due	to	the	tight	culture	of	the	military	that	demands	assimilation,	this	
diversity	would	in	effect	be	descriptive	representation	only,	rather	than	substantive	
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representation.	This	further	contributes	to	the	maintenance	of	the	entire	culture,	rather	than	a	
shift	toward	cultural	change.		
The	culture	of	an	institution,	like	the	CAF,	is	developed	through	two	main	methods:	
bottom-up	and	top-down.	Top-down	is	the	development	of	policies	and	directives	from	the	
highest-ranking	members,	such	as	the	Chief	of	Defence	Staff	(CDS),	who	guide	the	directions	of	
the	military.	An	example	of	this	is	the	Canadian	Military	Doctrine,	which	was	issued	on	the	
authority	of	the	CDS	and	lays	out	expectations	of	the	organization	as	a	whole	in	terms	of	its	role	
and	missions	(Canadian	Military	Doctrine	2009,	V).	Bottom-up	consists	of	the	social	
environment	of	the	institution	where	members	develop	the	norms	and	attitudes	and	continue	
to	socialize	new	members.	Both	of	these	mechanisms	are	important	for	culture	development.	
Currently	the	CAF	employs	a	top-down	method	of	change	through	the	institution	of	Operation	
HONOUR	in	order	to	address	the	systemic	problem	of	sexual	assault.	However,	in	policy	
development,	bottom-up	development	may	also	occur	as	the	policies	set	the	boundaries	for	
acceptable	behaviour	and	then	members	may	develop	norms	within	these	boundaries.	The	
policies	state	behaviours	that	are	not	allowed,	such	as	drunkenness,	and	give	some	
specifications	to	the	context	of	the	offensive	behaviours:	“is	unfit	to	be	entrusted	with	any	duty	
that	the	person	is	or	may	be	required	to	perform,	or	behaves	in	a	disorderly	manner”	(QR&O	
103.3,	74).	This	outline	of	the	unacceptable	behaviour	allows	members	to	develop	norms	of	
where	and	when	they	might	drink,	for	example,	in	a	bar	off	base	or	in	the	mess	on	base	where	
alcohol	is	served	but	not	in	other	common	areas	on	base.	These	norms	are	taught	and	passed	
on	as	new	members	join.	Though	the	requirement	for	these	norms	was	created	through	the	
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policies	(top-down),	the	cultural	norms	themselves	were	developed	by	the	members	(bottom-
up).		
The	norms	created	in	the	military	are	strengthened	by	the	setup	of	the	institution	
whereby	members	spend	significant	amounts	of	time	together	in	stressful	situations	and	are	
very	influential	with	regards	to	each	other’s	attitudes.	This	is	indicative	of	the	military	as	a	
primary	group,	which	is	significant	when	dealing	with	the	question	of	how	the	norms	of	the	
military	culture	might	be	adjusted.	Primary	groups	are	“characterized	by	intimate	face	to	face	
association	and	cooperation...	[they]	are	particularly	influential	in	shaping	their	members’	
attitudes	and	behaviours”	(Morris	1996,	691).	In	this	sense,	members	from	within	the	primary	
group	will	definitively	affect	the	attitudes	and	“the	bases	of	the	individual’s	personality	or	self”	
(Morris	1996,	692),	which	will	in	turn	perpetuate	the	attitudes	that	define	the	culture	of	that	
primary	group.	In	the	military	context	we	see	this	in	terms	of	sexual	assault.	“Even	while	the	
military	services	institute	policies	of	‘zero	tolerance’	of	sexual	harassment	and	assault	and	
provide	formal	training	pursuant	to	those	policies,	informal	socialization	continues	to	
perpetuate	group	norms	that	are	inconsistent	with	those	formal	policies	and	goals”	(Morris	
1996,	720).		
In	August	2015	Operation	HONOUR	was	implemented	in	the	CAF	to	eliminate	harmful	
and	inappropriate	sexual	behaviour	with	the	understanding	that	it	requires	sustained	effort	
because	“culture	is	not	a	thing	to	be	changed	but	a	dynamic	system	that	is	constantly	changing	
due	to	internal	and	external	influences”	(English,	Canadian	Armed	Forces	Progress	Report	
Addressing	Inappropriate	Sexual	Behaviour	2016,	24).	This	acknowledgement	by	CAF	leadership	
is	significant	because	it	is	a	complex	problem	to	adjust	culture	and	English	further	states	that	
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culture	is	the	“bedrock	of	military	effectiveness”	(English,	Canadian	Armed	Forces	Progress	
Report	Addressing	Inappropriate	Sexual	Behaviour	2016,	24).	The	language	of	the	Operations	
Order	for	Operation	HONOUR	put	forward	by	General	Jonathan	Vance	indicates	that	the	
method	of	culture	change	the	CAF	is	attempting	is	top-down.	This	is	indicated	through	the	
change	of	policies	and	General	Vance’s	emphasis	on	upper	leadership	members	portraying	the	
expected	behaviour	and	enforcing	it	from	their	subordinates.	The	Operations	Order	he	sent	out	
in	2015	states:	“Main	Effort:	Leveraging	CAF	leadership	at	all	levels	to	stop	wrong	and	harmful	
and	inappropriate	sexual	behaviour	and	provide	better	support	to	affected	members”	(Op	
HONOUR	2015).	Similarly,	in	October	1992	the	Armed	Forces	changed	their	policies	regarding	
homosexuality,	stating	that	“Canadians,	regardless	of	their	sexual	orientation,	will	now	be	able	
to	serve	their	country	in	the	Canadian	Forces	without	restriction”	(Poulin	and	Gouliquer	2012,	
55).	Gouliquer	and	Poulin	published	research	regarding	homosexuality	in	the	Canadian	military	
in	2012	but	began	interviewing	members	in	1997.	One	of	the	significant	conclusions	of	this	
research	is	that	a	policy	change,	as	a	top-down	method	of	culture	change,	does	not	actually	
lead	to	the	change	in	informal	culture	as	quickly	as	may	be	expected	(Poulin	and	Gouliquer	
2012,	60).	The	five-year	gap	between	the	change	in	policy	and	the	initial	interviews	for	this	
research	was	because	LGBTQ	members	of	the	CAF	still	felt	that	they	had	to	be	secretive	about	
their	sexual	orientation	(Gouliquer	and	Poulin	2012,	57).	For	the	culture	change	to	occur,	from	
a	top-down	perspective,	the	change	must	be	accepted	by	the	larger	group	for	it	to	take	root.	
The	CAF	has	a	reputation	as	an	effective	military	force,	thus	this	is	a	deterrent	from	changing	
the	culture,	especially	because	this	culture	adjustment	is	towards	an	acceptance	of	the	
feminine,	which	is	currently	equated	with	weakness.		
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The	current	push	for	the	CAF	to	develop	in	terms	of	diversity	is	a	good	goal.	However,	
the	motivations	of	the	goal	should	be	to	provide	an	equal	opportunity	for	anyone	to	participate	
rather	than	to	make	the	military	better	or	more	effective	through	differences	in	perspective.	
Currently,	the	military	is	a	tight	culture	and	so	not	everyone	experiences	the	same	kind	of	
opportunity	in	joining	the	military.	Those	who	conform	to	the	current	norms	of	the	culture	
succeed	more	than	those	who	do	not	(Okros	2009,	365).	The	significance	of	this	is	that	men	and	
women	who	portray	masculinity	experience	more	success.	Policy	changes	that	demand	an	
increase	in	the	number	of	women	in	the	military	in	various	positions	is	good,	but	it	does	not	
necessarily	address	the	culture	change	required	to	properly	integrate	women,	rather	than	
assimilate	them.		
	
Gender	Integration		
Gender	integration	in	the	CAF	has	been	an	ongoing	process	over	the	past	century.	The	
motivations	for	gender	integration	can	arise	from	an	instrumental	or	intrinsic	perspective.	The	
instrumental	motivations	come	from	government-mandated	targets	of	various	population	
groups,	whereas	intrinsic	motivation	has	integration	as	the	final	goal.		
Gender	integration	of	the	military	entails	increasing	the	substantive	representation	and	
participation	of	women	in	the	CAF.	It	also	aims	to	treat	women	in	the	military	as	equals,	both	in	
terms	of	attitudes	towards	women	generally	and	with	regards	to	positions	within	the	CAF.	In	
1994	the	CAF	declared	that	in	principle	gender	integration	had	been	completed	due	to	policies	
stating	“equal	opportunity	and	equal	liability”	(Park	1996	via	Davis	2009,	442).	However,	the	
difference	between	completion	of	gender	integration	in	principle	and	in	practice	is	the	
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difference	between	official	policies	and	the	attitudes	of	members	carrying	out	those	policies.	
Although	women	legally	can	participate	in	a	combat	capacity	in	the	CAF,	the	Combat	Arms	
maintains	the	lowest	percentage	of	women	while	simultaneously	continuing	to	be	the	closest	in	
ties	to	the	“masculinized	warrior	image”	(Eichler	2013,	258).	“Numerous	research	reports	
between	1994	and	1999	confirm	that	various	issues,	such	as	harassment,	continue	to	impede	
the	integration	of	women”	(Davis	2009,	442).	Similarly,	the	review	done	by	Marie	DesChamps	in	
2015	found	similar	results	(2015,	7).		
If	the	military	culture	is	to	really	welcome	women,	it	will	require	more	than	just	adding	
more	women	to	the	institution.	Rather	there	must	be	a	paradigm	change	that	adjust	the	culture	
to	accommodate	greater	diversity.	Diversity	includes	characteristics	like	ethnicity,	language,	
religion,	ability	and	disability,	education,	socio-economic	background,	sexual	orientation,	
gender,	and	sex.	The	CAF	is	supposed	to	be	a	reflection	of	broader	society,	yet	it	“does	not	
fairly	reflect	the	ethnic,	cultural,	and	gender	diversity	of	Canadian	society	at	all	levels	of	
leadership”	(Scoppio	2009,	28),	meaning	that	the	CAF	is	not	as	diverse	as	Canada	more	
generally.	Further,	“if	an	army	does	not	reflect	the	values	and	composition	of	the	larger	society	
that	nurtures	it,	it	invariably	loses	the	support	and	allegiance	of	that	society”	(Scoppio	2009,	
27).	This	is	evidenced	by	Goldie,	who	found	“the	CAF	is	rarely	seen	as	a	viable	career	option	for	
young	Canadians.	Young	Canadians,	aged	1-24,	and	adults,	over	25,	indicated	that	they	viewed	
the	CAF	as	a	sexist,	racist,	and	less-than-ideal	place	to	work	(Aubry	2002	as	cited	in	Goldie	2014,	
418).	The	CAF	is	transparently	working	to	increase	the	levels	of	diversity	in	the	institution.	
However,	the	culture	of	the	CAF	does	not	necessarily	promote	this	diversity	as	the	CAF	is	also	
transparently	dealing	with	higher	levels	of	sexual	assault	than	the	civilian	population.	As	
	 42	
previously	mentioned,	the	CAF	is	a	primary	group	that	tends	to	encourage	assimilation	of	
diverse	members	rather	than	integration.	This	is	a	deterrent	for	members	to	join.	As	well,	in	at	
least	the	past	couple	of	years	there	has	been	drive	to	increase	the	representation	of	women	by	
1%	of	the	total	forces	each	year	for	ten	years,	as	part	of	diversifying	the	CAF	(On	the	road	to	
greater	representation	of	women	in	the	CAF).	However,	simultaneously	there	has	been	
significant	attention	on	the	increased	risk	rates	for	women	in	the	CAF	to	experience	sexual	
assault	as	compared	to	their	civilian	counterparts.	So	although	the	CAF	has	goals	to	increase	
diversity,	specifically	with	regards	to	women,	this	is	hindered	by	the	culture	and	the	
repercussions	of	the	culture.		
The	CAF	has	set	targets	of	recruiting	and	retention	to	increase	diversity	that	would	put	
them	in	compliance	with	the	Employment	Equity	Act	and	the	Human	Rights	Commission	(Jung	
2007,	27).	However,	despite	these	goals,	the	number	of	women	recruited	since	2002	has	
declined	(Jung	2007,	28).	Further,	a	push	for	diversity,	especially	at	high	ranks,	is	a	long-term	
process	because	there	is	no	lateral	entry	point:	all	members	must	start	at	the	bottom	of	the	
rank	structure	and	work	their	way	up	through	time	in	and	in	leadership	courses.	Currently	the	
military	employs	a	legal	compliance	in	shifting	towards	diversification:	however,	the	CAF	should	
“see	diversity	as	a	positive	strength	and	value	added	for	the	organization”	(Scoppio	2009,	22).	
Further	than	this,	the	CAF	should	look	beyond	legal	compliance	and	beyond	how	diversity	
improves	operational	effectiveness	and	instead	improve	diversity	because	it	is	intrinsically	
important.	Without	diversity	an	organization	is	more	likely	to	have	systemic	discrimination,	and	
diversity	is	valuable	as	it	is	necessary	to	treat	everyone	as	equals	within	an	institution.	Diversity	
is	an	acceptance	that	every	person	has	the	same	rights	in	Canada,	not	only	in	terms	of	formal	
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inclusion	but	on	a	substantive	level	as	well.	This	means	that	policies	actively	represent	the	
interests	of	everyone	and	promote	equal	participation	and	respect	within	an	institution.	
Scoppio	discusses	three	models:	discrimination	fairness,	access	legitimacy,	and	learning	
effectiveness	(Scoppio	2009,	23).	In	the	discrimination	fairness	model	policies	are	decided	
based	on	doing	the	right	thing	by	law.	For	example,	the	CAF	abides	by	the	Human	Rights	
Commission	and	the	Employment	Equity	Act	by	aiming	to	improve	recruiting	and	retention	of	
female	members,	with	the	motivation	being	solely	to	abide	by	these	directives.	In	the	access	
legitimacy	model	the	motivation	behind	doing	the	right	thing	goes	beyond	compliance	with	the	
law	and	moves	into	motivation	through	the	changes	making	good	business	sense.	In	terms	of	
the	CAF	this	is	the	point	where	studies7	showed	that	increasing	numbers	of	women	and	
allowing	women	into	combat	would	in	fact	not	reduce	operational	effectiveness	but	may	
improve	the	CAF	generally,	and	so	the	CAF	became	more	inclined	to	improve	diversity.		
However,	using	either	of	these	models	prevents	full	and	effective	integration	because	they	are	
done	from	a	perspective	of	adhering	to	guidelines	or	to	reach	some	level	of	improvement	via	a	
specific	group.	This	is	problematic	in	that	women	are	not	a	homogeneous	category	that	bring	
unique	assets	to	the	combat	environment.	Finally,	the	learning	effectiveness	model	makes	
changes	due	to	the	intrinsic	value	of	individuals,	rather	than	for	the	instrumental	value	of	
serving	another	purpose.	In	the	context	of	diversifying	the	CAF	this	would	mean	integrating	
various	groups	with	the	motivation	of	inclusion	because	every	individual	is	equal	and	deserves	
																																																						
7	From	1979	to	1985	the	CAF	conducted	Servicewomen	in	Non-Traditional	Environments	and	Roles	
(SWINTER)	Trials	to	assess	the	potential	impact	of	women	participating	in	combat	roles.	These	trials	
found	that	women	would	be	effective	in	the	role	but	that	integration	of	women	would	require	guidance	
from	leadership	to	address	real	and	perceived	issues	like	training	standards,	harassment	of	women,	
physical	strength	and	aggression	differences	(Davis	2007,	76).		
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equal	opportunities	to	work	in	an	environment	that	is	accepting	of	them.	Currently,	the	CAF	is	
working	to	improve	diversity	within	the	first	two	models:	to	reach	quotas	based	on	the	Human	
Rights	Commission	and	the	Employment	Equity	Act	and	to	improve	operational	effectiveness	
based	on	studies	indicating	that	diversity	of	sex	will	be	favourable.		
With	the	military	as	a	hyper-masculine	institution,	for	women	as	soldiers,	the	job	is	a	
deviation	from	the	stereotypical	woman’s	gender	role.	As	well,	women	are	token	
representatives	and	“their	status	as	a	soldier	is	overwritten	by	their	gender”	(Gouliquer	2011,	
196).	Due	to	this,	women	are	more	likely	to	‘turn	off’	their	gender	when	they	work	in	the	
military	(Gouliquer	2011,	157).	This	is	different	from	men	because	for	most	men	there	was	
never	a	question	of	whether	or	not	they	belong	there.8	Women	in	the	military	must	prove	that	
they	have	the	ability	to	perform,	whereas	men	have	the	benefit	of	the	doubt	as	they	join.	“The	
implicit	perpetuation	of	masculinity	as	the	ideal	of	soldiering	keeps	in	place	barriers	to	women’s	
recruitment	and	retention	in	particular	in	the	combat	arms”	(Eichler	2013,	258).	Even	though	
women	may	participate	in	the	combat	arms	the	standard	of	soldiering	remains	steadfastly	a	
very	specific	definition	of	masculinity.	The	significance	of	this	is	that	women	must	reject	any	
definition	of	their	femininity	in	order	to	prove	that	they	are	masculine	and	can	contribute	in	the	
combat	arms,	regardless	of	whether	one	is	causally	related	to	the	other.		
A	fully	integrated	military	would	have	a	welcoming	organizational	culture	with	no	sex	
segregation	(Gouliquer	2011,	18).	Until	1989	the	CAF	maintained	a	gendered	quota	policy	with	
a	minimum	male	requirement	for	each	occupation:	100%	for	the	combat	arms	and	0%	in	dental	
																																																						
8	The	exclusions	of	course	over	time	being	men	of	colour,	gay	men,	and	men	of	varying	class	
distinctions.	
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trades,	as	examples	(Eichler	2013,	257).	In	2012	only	2.3%	of	personnel	in	the	regular	force	
combat	arms	were	women	and	only	4.9%	in	the	reserve	forces	(Eichler	2013,	258).	
Furthermore,	women	only	make	up	15%	of	the	CAF	generally	(Eichler	2013,	258).	This	means	
that	although	policies	indicate	that	there	are	no	barriers	to	women	serving	in	the	CAF,	in	
practice,	the	integration	of	women	into	the	CAF	is	not	effective	such	that	women	are	more	than	
simply	token	members	across	the	institution,	and	especially	in	the	combat	arms.	Furthermore,	
Davis	found	that	female	members	of	the	CAF	are	twice	as	likely	as	their	male	counterparts	to	
leave	the	CAF,	and	this	becomes	especially	pronounced	at	the	10-20	year	mark	in	their	careers	
(Davis	1994,	5).	Davis	suggests	that	this	may	be	attributed	to	the	hyper-masculine	culture	of	the	
CAF	(Davis	via	Tait	2014	2).	Experiencing	an	unsupportive	work	environment	would	lead	many	
to	look	elsewhere	for	a	career.		
Okros	and	Scott	discuss	an	anthropologist’s	field	work	with	a	Canadian	infantry	unit	in	
Afghanistan	in	2006	(2015,	249).	This	anthropologist	concluded	that,	in	the	CAF,	the	
professional	culture	has	reached	the	point	where	the	only	question	that	matters	to	personnel	is	
‘can	their	peers	do	the	job?’	(Okros,	Scott	2015,	249).	This	appears	to	indicate	that	gender	
integration	in	the	CAF	has	extended	beyond	solely	policy	and	into	actual	practice.	However,	this	
explanation	does	not	delve	into	the	nuance	of	the	culture	whereby	women	must	work	to	shed	
the	assumptions	of	their	male	co-workers	and	adopt	a	masculine	persona.	Even	the	women	
who	enter	the	CAF	with	a	more	masculine	attitude	than	others	must	reject	femininity	and	
internalize	a	sexualized	work	culture.	This	culture	holds	gendered	assumptions	about	members,	
and	so	even	if	the	main	concern	is	“can	my	peer	do	their	job?”	the	implications	of	this	question	
and	the	basis	of	proof	will	look	different	for	men	than	for	women.	Tait	discusses	that	this	comes	
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out	in	the	form	of	joking	and	teasing,	which	can	either	be	fun	and	inclusive	or	harassing	(Tait	
2014,	6),	which	depends	not	only	on	the	intentions	of	the	deliverer	but	also	the	recipient.	Tait	
states	that	jokes	and	teasing	occasionally	alienate	female	soldiers	and	that	“this	is	particularly	
the	case	when	this	teasing	is	used	as	a	vehicle	to	question	female	soldiers’	capacity	to	perform	
their	jobs.	In	this	sense,	teasing	crosses	the	line	when	it	is	intended	to	perpetuate	the	second-
class	status	of	women	in	the	CAF”	(Tait	2014,	6).	In	an	environment	built	around	military	
masculinity,	women	enter	as	not	part	of	the	in-group,	with	a	history	of	policy	dictating	that	
women	are	unwelcome,	so	jokes	about	women	being	unable	to	perform	effectively	may	be	
more	serious	–	especially	in	the	context	of	a	culture	that	still	does	not	entirely	welcome	
women,	and	where	women	are	token	members.		
The	integration	of	women	within	the	CAF	is	an	ongoing	process	that	has	been	motivated	
primarily	by	reaching	gendered	policy	quotas	from	sources	such	as	the	Employment	Equity	Act	
and	the	Human	Rights	Commission.	However,	a	significant	inhibiting	factor	to	better	gender	
integration	is	the	emphasis	on	maintaining	a	hyper-masculine	culture	that	denigrates	the	
feminine.	Better	gender	integration	will	occur	with	culture	change.		
	
Representation	
Representation	can	be	broken	down	into	two	subcategories	that	interact:	descriptive	and	
substantive	representation.	Mansbridge	explains	descriptive	representation	as	“individuals	who	
in	their	own	backgrounds	mirror	some	of	the	more	frequent	experiences	and	outward	
manifestations	of	belonging	to	the	group”	(1999,	628).	This	is	representation	in	terms	of	groups	
distinguished	by	social	characteristics	like	gender,	race,	sexuality,	and	religion.	Descriptive	
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representation	is	satisfied	by	having	only	one	member	from	a	group	present.	“In	contrast,	
substantive	representation	refers	to	what	representatives	do	and	whether	or	not	their	actions	
and	decisions	are	in	the	interests	of	those	they	represent”	(Tolley	2011,	581).	This	means	that	a	
descriptive	representative	must	have	shared	social	characteristics	of	the	group	they	are	
representing.	For	example,	only	a	woman	can	descriptively	represent	women.	However,	
substantive	representation	is	a	representation	of	interests,	meaning	that	anyone	can	act	as	a	
representative	for	a	group.	Pitkin	explained	descriptive	representation	as	‘standing	for’	and	
substantive	representation	as	‘acting	for’	(Pitkin	1967,	11).	The	significance	of	this	is	that	
theoretically	anyone	may	substantively	represent	any	group.	Descriptive	representation	seems	
easy	to	define	as	it	is	just	a	quantification	of	the	groups	that	are	represented.	If	there	are	only	
three	women	in	a	group	of	100,	you	could	argue	that	there	is	descriptive	representation	but	it	is	
quite	poor.	However,	we	must	also	consider	how	the	boundaries	of	a	group	are	defined.	By	this	
I	mean,	can	we	consider	any	woman	a	representative	for	all	women,	and	if	not	then	how	many	
subgroups	of	social	characteristics	must	be	considered	before	we	can	have	adequate	
descriptive	representation?	Substantive	representation	is	even	more	nuanced	in	that	not	only	
must	you	define	the	group	but	also	define	the	interests	of	that	group.		
Many	scholars	are	concerned	with	increasing	descriptive	representation	in	order	to	
increase	substantive	representation,	but	argue	that	increasing	descriptive	representation	is	
valuable	in	its	own	right.	The	underlying	presumption	of	this	is	that	descriptive	and	substantive	
representation	are	causally	related	(Carroll	2000,	1).	An	important	aspect	of	this	theory	is	the	
“concept	of	critical	mass,	or	the	idea	that	women	are	likely	to	make	a	difference	once	they	
constitute	a	certain	proportion	of	the	Parliament,”	or	any	other	institution	(Kanter	1977	and	
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Dahlreup	1988	via	Celis	2006,	86).	Childs	and	Krook	consider	a	critical	mass	to	be	a	sub-group	
making	up	35%	of	the	broader	group,	at	which	point	each	member	of	the	sub-group	is	no	
longer	a	token	representative	(2008,	726).	In	the	CAF	women	make	up	approximately	15%	of	
the	forces	(Park	2008,	1),	meaning	that	there	is	not	a	critical	mass	of	women.	However,	when	
broken	down	into	specific	trades	and	units,	there	are	some	trades,	like	medical	or	dental,	which	
boast	much	higher	percentages	of	women,	and	others,	like	the	combat	arms,	which	have	much	
lower	percentages	of	women	(Park	2008,	2).	If	the	causal	relation	between	descriptive	and	
substantive	representation	exists,	we	would	expect	that	in	the	trades	with	percentages	of	
women	over	35%	that	there	would	be	better	substantive	representation	of	women.	There	have	
not	been	specific	studies	done	in	the	CAF	to	determine	whether	this	does	occur.	The	
significance	of	this	is	that	there	is	still	uncertainty	with	regards	to	whether	the	programs	and	
plans	to	increase	the	numbers,	and	therefore	the	descriptive	representation,	of	women	in	the	
CAF	will	have	a	positive	impact	with	regards	to	the	hyper-masculine	culture	of	the	military	or	
the	substantive	representation	of	women.		
There	is	also	a	politics	of	presence	theory	that	has	a	prescriptively	more	limited	claim	
than	the	critical	mass	theory.	It	states	that	“gender	has	an	influence	on	the	potential	to	
represent	women”	(Celis	2006,	86).	This	means	that	women	who	are	part	of	an	institution	like	
the	government	or	military	“presumably	share	their	experiences	with	female	citizens,	and	their	
presence	increases	the	likelihood	that	women’s	needs	and	interests	will	be	represented,	female	
perspectives	will	be	presented,	or	the	voices	of	women	will	be	heard”	(Celis	2006,	87).	This	
claim	falls	more	in	line	with	Pitkin’s	opinion	when	she	stated	that,	“an	assembly	with	no	
element	of	descriptive	representation	fails	as	representation”	(Phillips	2012,	513).		So,	a	politics	
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of	presence	makes	a	broader	claim	regarding	the	extent	that	substantive	representation	of	
gender	affects	outcomes.		
Whether	or	not	increased	descriptive	representation	improves	substantive	
representation	is	not	clear.	Celis	found	in	her	study	regarding	the	Belgian	Parliament	that	“a	
higher	degree	of	descriptive	representation	does	actually	improve	substantive	representation,”	
(2006,	110).	However,	Phillips	states	that	“empirical	material	on	representation	has	not	
established	enormously	strong	correlations	between	descriptive	and	substantive	
representation”	(2012,	513).	Although	there	is	not	confirmation	whether	there	is	a	significant	
link	between	descriptive	and	substantive	representation,	we	may	consider	that	until	Canadian	
legislation	dictated	the	CAF	must	allow	women	to	join,	and	then	must	allow	women	to	
participate	in	all	roles,	there	was	no	representation	from	the	inside	advocating	for	this	inclusion	
–	meaning	there	is	likely	a	connection	between	descriptive	and	substantive	representation.	
Furthermore,	we	may	consider	that	there	are	likely	other	factors	that	contribute	to	the	
substantive	representation	(or	lack	thereof)	that	exists.	The	culture	of	the	institution	generally	
will	reinforce	the	level	of	representation,	as	well	as	the	policies	of	the	institution	(that	inform	
the	culture	and	draw	the	boundaries	of	the	institution).		Although	theoretically	anyone	may	
substantively	represent	the	interests	of	women	as	a	group	there	was	not	significant	substantive	
representation	of	women	by	men	in	the	CAF	at	least	until	there	was	some	descriptive	
representation	of	women	within	the	institution.	This	is	not	meant	to	argue	a	definite	
correlational	link	between	descriptive	and	substantive	representation	but	rather	to	ground	the	
discussion	in	an	example.	Policies	of	an	institution	contribute	to	guiding	the	behaviour	of	
members	of	said	institution.	Therefore,	the	representation	found	in	these	policies	is	significant	
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in	terms	of	indicating	who	is	considered	part	of	the	institution	and	how	they	should	act.	
Women	are	indicated	to	be	allowed	as	members	of	the	CAF	in	the	policy;	however,	if	that	is	the	
only	substantive	representation	they	receive	in	terms	of	policy	discourse,	then	reading	through	
the	policies	indicates	that	they	may	be	less	valuable	or	outside	members.		
Though	much	of	the	literature	discusses	the	link	between	these	two	types	of	
representation,	“descriptive	representation	is	not	just	a	tool	for	achieving	better	substantive	
representation”	(Phillips	2012,	513).	It	is	valuable	in	its	own	right	because	it	sets	out	who	does	
and	does	not	count	–	who	is	or	is	not	included	–	whether	as	a	citizen	or	as	a	member	of	an	
institution	such	as	the	military.	Descriptive	representation,	whether	it	applies	with	token	
members	or	as	significant	percentages	of	the	group,	also	has	a	significant	impact	on	inclusion.	
“Inclusion	is	not	representation	per	se,	but	it	definitely	matters”	(Phillips	2012,	513).	Having	
members	of	a	group	descriptively	represented	indicates	that	this	group	is	included	in	the	
broader	institution.	The	inclusion	of	women	in	combat	groups	continues	the	opportunity	for	
other	women	to	be	included	later	on,	potentially	with	less	resistance.		
Although	in	the	CAF,	women	make	up	less	than	4%	of	the	combat	arms,	the	symbolic	
and	official	inclusion	of	women	from	1989	onward	is	significant.	The	policy	that	states	women	
may	be	part	of	the	combat	arms,	and	the	token	representation	of	women	in	the	combat	arms,	
are	statements	that	women	are	part	of	the	institution	of	the	armed	forces,	including	its	
stereotypical	role	in	combat.	However,	the	culture	of	hyper-masculinity,	which	does	not	
substantively	represent	women,	maintains	that	although	women	are	included	they	are	not	
necessarily	part	of	the	in-group.	Phillips	states	“challenging	patterns	of	representation	matter	
because	of	the	challenges	this	represents	to	social	and	political	hierarchies”	(2012,	513).	Even	if	
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the	inclusion	and	therefore	descriptive	representation	of	groups	outside	the	dominant	group	
does	not	effect	a	cultural	change,	inclusion	is	an	important	objective.	The	initial	challenge	to	
defined	patterns	of	representation	matters	because	it	changes	the	boundaries	of	inclusion.			
The	challenge	of	descriptive	representation	is	defining	a	group.	‘Women,’	though	it	may	
seem	like	a	clear	boundary	of	inclusion,	is	not	necessarily	so.	Crenshaw	discusses	
intersectionality,	stating	that	the	inclusion	of	Black	people	and	the	inclusion	of	women	has	not	
always	meant	the	inclusion	of	Black	women	(Crenshaw	2013,	791).	From	this	we	examine	the	
problem	of	essentialism:	“the	assumption	that	members	of	certain	groups	have	an	essential	
identity	that	all	members	of	that	group	share	and	of	which	no	others	can	partake”	(Mansbridge	
1999,	637).	Essentialism	further	implies	that	“any	woman	representative	represents	all	women	
equally,”	regardless	of	the	woman’s	other	social	characteristics	like	race,	ethnicity,	or	political	
beliefs	(Mansbridge	1999,	638).	Young	points	out	that	you	cannot	isolate	any	part	of	someone’s	
identity	(1994,	714),	meaning	two	women	who	do	not	share	any	other	social	characteristic	
other	than	their	sex	may	have	very	different	interests	and	they	cannot	simply	isolate	their	
womanness.	The	significance	of	this	is	that	one	woman	acting	as	a	representative	for	all	women	
would	not	necessarily	provide	adequate	substantive	representation	for	another	woman	
because	they	differ	so	much.		Generally,	in	the	military	everyone	is	expected	to	conform	to	a	
standard	such	that	the	group	appears	to	be	a	single	unit.	However,	the	military	is	made	up	of	
many	individuals	of	various	social	characteristics	and	the	military	is	working	to	increase	the	
diversity	of	their	members.	In	the	context	of	the	military	this	is	significant	because	there	are	so	
few	women	representatives	within	the	institution.	In	the	context	of	sexual	assault	and	sexual	
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harassment	this	is	important	to	note	because	each	person’s	experience	will	be	significantly	
different	and	so	one	victim	is	not	necessarily	qualified	to	speak	on	behalf	of	all	victims.	
However,	in	order	to	work	towards	the	goal	of	adequate	substantive	representation,	the	
group,	and	the	interests	of	that	group,	must	be	defined.	In	considering	the	interests	of	women	
we	must	understand	that	“the	representation	of	women’s	interests	will	not	always	be	
unidirectional,	straightforward	or	uncomplicated”	(Carroll	2000,	11).	Every	woman	will	have	
varied	life	experiences	and	not	simply	be	part	of	the	group	‘women,’	but	rather	have	a	unique	
identity	built	from	all	of	their	social	characteristics.	Celis	then	argues	that	“women’s	interests	
then,	are	a	priori	undefined,	context-related,	and	subject	to	evolution”	(2006,	87).	She	further	
explains	“women’s	interests	are	a	hard	to	justify,	subjective	intervention.	It	tends	to	‘freeze’	or	
essentialize	women	and	their	interests	and	to	deny	diversity	among	women”	(Celis	2006,	88).	
This	proves	to	be	a	dilemma	in	terms	of	providing	adequate	substantive	representation	for	
women	as	their	interests	vary	and	cannot	be	determined	simply	through	their	membership	to	
the	category	‘women.’	The	significance	of	this	is	that	the	integration	of	women	in	the	CAF	is	not	
a	simple	problem	to	solve,	but	a	complex	one.	The	representational	needs	of	women	from	
1989,	when	the	policy	was	introduced	to	allow	women	in	the	Combat	Arms,	are	different	from	
today	where	the	integration	goals	women	face	have	adjusted.	Currently,	the	integration	of	
women	must	focus	on	further	amending	policies	to	provide	better	substantive	representation	
of	women,	and	the	culture	must	adjust	to	be	a	more	welcoming	environment.		
Phillips	discusses	problems	in	presuming	that	any	member	of	a	group	is	qualified	to	
speak	for	the	rest	of	the	group	(2008,	558).	This	is	because	the	women	who	act	as	token	
representatives	were	likely	educated	in	the	same	way	as	the	men	in	similar	positions	and	so	
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simply	by	virtue	of	being	a	woman	they	will	not	have	more	information.	Furthermore,	
descriptive	representation	is	not	a	guarantee	of	substantive	representation.	Pitkin	warns	that	
“representatives	who	persistently	act	against	the	declared	wishes	of	their	electorate	cannot	be	
said	to	engage	in	representation”	(Phillips	2012,	513).	In	the	context	of	the	military	we	might	
consider	how	female	members	may	be	expected	to	be	mentors	or	leaders	for	newer	female	
members	and	move	to	change	the	culture	for	the	better	of	women.	However,	the	training	that	
men	and	women	receive	is	the	same	and	many	women	who	are	successful	in	the	military	are	so	
because	they	internalize	the	culture,	complete	with	sexism.	Thus,	women	who	consistently	act	
in	a	way	that	does	not	align	with	the	interests	of	women,	although	are	descriptively	
representing	women,	cannot	necessarily	be	said	to	be	substantively	representing	them.		
Mansbridge	goes	on	to	state	that	“the	problem	of	simple	categorization	becomes	much	
worse	when,	as	is	often	the	case	in	human	affairs,	one	group	is	socially	dominant	and	becomes	
the	norm,	setting	expectations	and	structuring	the	institutions	so	that	those	who	do	not	
conform	to	that	norm	are	perceived	as	deviant	or	lesser	beings…and	cannot	function	as	well	in	
the	structures	designed	for	the	members	of	the	dominant	group”	(1999,	630).	In	the	context	of	
the	military	this	can	be	thought	of	in	terms	of	men	being	the	socially	dominant	group	and	
setting	norms	that	are	difficult	for	women	to	function	within.	However,	it	can	further	be	broken	
down	by	considering	that,	once	women	broke	the	initial	barrier	of	official	inclusion	in	the	
military,	it	became	white	women	who	maintained	dominance	continuing	to	set	expectations	
that	women	of	other	races	would	not	fit	into.	Young	states	that	“most	of	the	rhetoric	
surrounding	women	and	women’s	rights	are	from	a	heterosexual	white	woman’s	perspective,	
so	it	is	dangerous	to	build	the	persona	of	a	‘woman’s	perspective’	from	this	as	it	does	not	
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encompass	all	women”	(1994,	713).	An	example	of	this	are	the	dress	regulations	of	the	CAF.	In	
the	dress	regulations,	for	women,	hair	is	expected	to	be	pulled	into	a	bun	at	the	nape	of	the	
neck	or	to	hang	flat	and	short	above	their	shoulders;	the	CAF	provides	diagrams	of	white	
women	to	demonstrate	(Canadian	Armed	Forces	Dress	Instructions	2016,	2-2-2).	However,	this	
does	not	take	into	account	the	natural	hair	of	Black	women,	which	may	not	fall	flat.	The	
inclusion	of	women	generally	must	account	for	the	inclusion	of	various	groups	of	women	in	
terms	of	race	and	ethnicity	as	well	as	religion,	sexuality,	and	all	other	social	characteristics.	This	
must	be	evident	through	the	policy	discourse	that	guides	the	actions	of	the	CAF.		
Although	when	attempting	to	group	women	together	I	acknowledge	the	problem	of	
essentialism,	I	also	acknowledge,	along	with	Young,	that	women’s	voices	have	been	silenced	
and	to	overcome	systemic	sexism	women	must	be	grouped	together	in	some	way.	However,	
the	entirety	of	women	does	not	have	a	collective	identity	or	a	shared	characteristic.	Young	
points	out	that	“we	must	view	women	as	individuals	but	by	doing	this	it	obscures	oppression.	
Without	conceptualizing	women	as	a	group	you	cannot	conceptualize	the	oppression	as	a	
systemic,	structured,	institutionalized	process”	(1994,	718).	This	includes,	but	is	certainly	not	
limited	to,	sexism	and	sexual	assault	that	systemically	has	a	greater	negative	effect	on	women	
in	the	military	than	men.	Thus,	Young	came	up	with	the	concept	of	a	serial	collective	and	
Crenshaw	uses	intersectionality	in	order	to	substantively	represent	women	without	falling	into	
false	essentialism.	Young	states	that	a	serial	collective	is	any	number	of	individuals	who	share	a	
defining	trait.	She	further	states,	“members	are	unified	passively	by	the	objects	around	which	
their	actions	are	oriented”	(1994,	725).	Each	member	would	“recognize	themselves	in	unified	
relation	with	one	another	and	acknowledge	that	they	undertake	a	common	project…	oriented	
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towards	a	common	goal”	(Young	1994,	724).	The	example	that	Young	provides	of	a	serial	
collective	is	one	of	a	collection	of	individuals	waiting	for	a	bus	(1994,	724).	She	describes	that	
their	collective	is	defined	with	regards	to	the	bus	as	a	material	object	and	the	social	practice	of	
public	transportation	(Young	1994,	725).	The	significance	of	their	collectivity	is	that	they	are	
“united	only	by	their	desire	to	ride	on	that	route…	(but)	do	not	identify	with	one	another…or	
identify	themselves	with	common	experiences,”	(Young	1994,	725).	In	this	way	they	are	a	group	
of	people	but	the	group	is	not	easily	defined	consistently	over	time.		
This	serial	collective	is	not	a	perfect	solution	but	provides	a	framework	to	work	towards	
dismantling	systemic	oppression.	Crenshaw’s	intersectionality	“is	best	framed	as	an	analytic	
sensibility:	a	way	of	thinking	about	and	conducting	analyses”	(Crenshaw,	Cho,	McCall	2013,	
795).	Crenshaw	argues	“it	is	dangerous	to	use	a	framework	that	treats	gender	and	race	as	
different	categories	because	Black	women	fall	in	both”	(1991,	1278).	For	example,	Crenshaw	
discusses	how	“racism	experienced	by	Black	women	is	only	seen	in	terms	of	white	male	access	
to	them	(rape)”	(1991,	1277).	She	further	discusses	that	intraracial	rape	is	treated	differently	
when	the	victim	is	a	Black	woman	or	a	white	woman,	in	that	“intraracial	rape	of	white	women	
is	treated	more	seriously	than	intraracial	rape	of	Black	women”	(Crenshaw	1991,	1277).	In	
examining	sexual	assault	of	Black	women	they	are	racially	discriminated	against	because	their	
rapists	are	less	likely	to	be	charged	(1991,	1277).			
The	value	of	intersectionality	as	a	method	of	analyses	is	that	it	does	not	separate	
categories	but	rather	looks	at	how	categories	are	fluid	and	how	they	intersect	with	each	other.	
“Failure	to	connect	(categories)	keeps	them	from	developing	a	broader,	deeper	perspective	
(Crenshaw	1991,	1278).	Using	both	Young’s	concept	of	serial	collective	and	Crenshaw’s	
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intersectionality	as	methods	of	analysis	would	be	valuable	in	dismantling	systems	of	power	and	
privilege.				
This	might	look	like	a	new	iteration	of	the	Gender	Based	Analysis	Plus	(GBA+)	program	
that	the	CAF	has	implemented	with	regards	to	analyzing	and	adjusting	policies.	By	utilizing	
Crenshaw’s	intersectionality,	problems	of	race,	sex,	and	any	other	social	characteristic	may	be	
analyzed	concurrently	while	also	making	problems	the	responsibility	of	all	members,	as	they	are	
intersected	through	various	social	categories.	Furthermore,	Young’s	concept	of	a	serial	
collective	would	provide	the	structure	for	members	to	align	based	on	goals,	regardless	of	social	
categories,	in	efforts	to	dismantle	various	forms	of	discrimination.	This	would	be	particularly	
valuable	in	terms	of	sexual	assault	as	it	is	underpinned	by	cultures	of	not	only	sexism	but	racism	
as	well.	Only	working	to	analyze	and	curtail	sexual	assault	through	the	lens	of	sexism	overlooks	
other	significant	contributing	factors.	This	is	significant	not	only	in	terms	of	acknowledging	
victims,	but	also	in	terms	of	the	perpetrators	of	sexual	assault	and	the	privileges	associated	
with	white	assailants	versus	people	of	colour.	Sexual	assault	in	the	military	is	a	complex	
problem	rooted	in	various	cultural	structures	of	sexism,	racism,	and	power	generally.	Through	
analyzing	this	issue	with	the	lens	of	intersectionality	and	working	to	dismantle	it	with	various	
serial	collectives	the	complex	nature	of	the	problem	may	be	dealt	with:	simultaneously	
dismantling	various	power	structures	rather	than	attempting	to	work	within	just	one.		
	
In	this	review	of	the	literature	I	have	demonstrated	that	the	military	is	classically	and	
continues	to	be	a	hyper-masculine	institution	that	does	not	serve	as	a	welcoming	environment	
for	women	culturally.	Culture	is	developed	through	policies	as	well	as	through	groups	
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developing	likeminded	attitudes	towards	various	problems	they	encounter	(Morris	1996,	691).	
Further,	culture	is	difficult	to	change,	especially	in	a	primary	group	like	the	military	(Morris	
1996,	692).	Although	policy	change	is	necessary	for	culture	change,	it	is	not	sufficient.	As	well,	
both	descriptive	and	substantive	representation	are	important:	it	is	possible	to	have	
substantive	representation	without	descriptive,	but	it	is	more	likely	to	occur	with	descriptive	
representation	(Phillips	2012,	513).	As	well,	substantive	representation	will	contribute	to	
societal	change	but	descriptive	representation	may	not	because	descriptive	representatives	do	
not	necessarily	have	views	that	differ	from	the	main	body.	This	review	of	the	literature	details	
military	culture,	the	development	of	culture,	as	well	as	sexual	assault	in	a	military	context	and	
the	motivations	behind	it.	However,	the	literature	has	yet	to	look	at	the	connections	between	
representation	and	the	widespread	occurrence	of	sexual	assault,	specifically	in	the	context	of	a	
military	culture,	like	the	CAF.	My	research,	through	a	discourse	analysis	of	CAF	policies,	fills	this	
gap	in	demonstrating	that	there	is	a	connection	between	representation	of	women	and	sexual	
assault	in	the	CAF.		
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Chapter	3:	Method:	Political	Discourse	Analysis	
This	research	is	a	poststructuralist	analysis	of	the	contemporary	policies	and	policy	responses	
that	deal	with	the	sexualized	culture	of	the	Canadian	Armed	Forces.	My	analysis	of	these	
documents	looks	at	the	connection	between	the	rates	of	sexual	assault	and	the	top-down	
construction	of	culture	through	policy	discourse	using	the	lens	of	representation.	In	Security	as	
Practice,	Hansen	states	that	identity	is	“relational,	discursive,	political,	and	social”	(10,	2006).	
Thus	we	may	view	the	identity	and	the	culture	of	the	CAF	within	these.	The	identity	of	an	
institution	such	as	the	CAF	is	not	a	completely	inflexible	one:	it	is	fluid	based	on	its	top-down	
construction	through	policies	and	initiatives	by	the	leadership	and	is	also	based	on	the	attitudes	
of	individual	members	that	make	up	the	institution.	The	policies	that	identify	the	role	of	the	
CAF	within	Canadian	society	determine	its	identity	within	the	social	structure	of	society	and	its	
political	role	in	society.	Hansen	further	states	that	policy	and	identity	are	performatively	linked	
and	as	such	cannot	be	considered	in	causal	terms	(10,	2006).	When	she	states	that	they	are	
performatively	linked,	she	means	that	the	way	that	policy	is	interpreted	and	acted	out	is	
dependent	on	and	also	acts	to	shape	the	identity	(culture)	of	an	institution.		However,	“the	
absence	of	causality	does	not	imply	a	lack	of	structure”	(Hansen	15,	2006).	I	base	the	
foundation	of	this	research	on	this	argument	from	Hansen.	This	research	is	not	meant	to	
develop	an	argument	of	causality	between	the	discourse	in	the	policies	of	the	CAF	and	
instances	of	sexual	assault	within	the	CAF.	Rather,	it	is	an	examination	of	the	performative	
nature	of	certain	policies	of	the	CAF	that	relate	to	its	identity	as	an	institution	with	a	historically	
sexualized	culture	with	an	intention	to	move	towards	full	gender	integration	without	the	
sexualized	culture.		
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	 Janks	states	that,	“critical	discourse	analysis	stems	from	a	critical	theory	of	language	
which	sees	the	use	of	language	as	a	form	of	social	practice”	(329,	1997).	This	echoes	the	
argument	that	Hansen	makes	regarding	policy	and	identity	being	performatively	linked.	As	
such,	I	will	utilize	Hansen’s	and	Janks’	research	to	inform	my	own	analysis	and	evaluation	of	
how	policies	inform	the	culture	of	the	CAF,	specifically	with	regards	to	why	a	permissive	
environment	for	sexual	assault	exists.		
The	CAF	has	a	relatively	resilient	identity	as	a	masculine	institution	(Eichler	2016,	3),	and	
so	this	will	affect	the	discourse	of	policies	and	policy	updates	that	are	published,	both	through	
the	authors	involved	in	creating	policies,	and	through	the	language	they	use.	Although	the	CAF	
is	creating	new	policy	responses	to	combat	rates	of	sexual	assault,	the	identity	of	the	CAF	will	
inform	the	discourse	of	these	policies	in	that	it	will	likely	reflect	a	masculine	narrative	that	does	
not	consider	an	intersectional	perspective	on	race,	gender,	or	sexuality.	Furthermore,	the	
masculine	identity	of	the	CAF	will	inform	the	policy	enactment.	CAF	policies	are	written	in	a	
relatively	vague	format	in	order	to	encompass	a	maximum	situational	reach.	However,	this	
vague	notation	leads	to	a	broad	policy	interpretation.	This	will	have	serious	effects	on	how	the	
policies	are	understood	and	implemented;	the	way	that	these	documents	are	written	matters.		
The	documents	I	examine	in	this	research	are:	The	Queen’s	Regulations	and	Orders	
Chapters	4.02,	5.01,	103.01,	103.25,	103.26,	103.28,	103.29,	103.30,	the	Defence	
Administration	Orders	and	Directives	5012-0	(Harassment	Prevention	and	Resolution),	5019-5	
(Sexual	Misconduct	and	Sexual	Disorders),	the	Royal	Military	College	Policy	on	Inappropriate	
Sexual	Behaviour,	the	Department	of	National	Defence	and	Canadian	Forces	Code	of	Values	and	
Ethics	and	Statement	of	Defence	Ethics,	Operation	HONOUR	Order,	the	2015	External	Review	
	 60	
into	Sexual	Misconduct	and	Sexual	Harassment	into	the	Canadian	Armed	Forces,	and	the	
Gender	Based	Analysis	Plus	Round	Table	Discussion	Report.	The	Queen’s	Regulations	and	Orders	
and	the	Defence	Administration	Orders	and	Directives	are	main	bodies	of	rules	and	regulations	
that	bind	all	CAF	members.	They	should	be	generally	well	understood	by	each	member	and	
should	guide	the	extent	of	member’s	behaviours.	The	Royal	Military	College	Policy	in	
Inappropriate	Sexual	Behaviour	is	a	policy	that	only	applies	to	students	at	the	Royal	Military	
College	(RMC).	However,	RMC’s	policies	and	culture	are	somewhat	representative	of	all	training	
and	culture	in	the	CAF	as	it	is	the	education	institution	for	many	future	officers	and	leaders;	
however,	there	are	some	differences	between	RMC	and	the	CAF	generally	in	terms	of	policy.	
The	Code	of	Values	and	Ethics	and	the	Statement	of	Defence	Ethics	outline	expectations	of	
behaviour	for	all	members.	They	are	taught	to	each	member	in	the	first	course	they	attend	
(Basic	Military	Qualification	Course,	or	Basic	Military	Officer	Qualification	Course).	Expectations	
for	ethical	behaviour	closely	relate	to	expectations	regarding	sexual	harassment	and	sexual	
assault.		
Operation	HONOUR	is	the	policy	the	CAF	has	undertaken,	from	2015	onward,	to	address	
and	eliminate	inappropriate	sexual	behaviour	in	response	to	the	External	Review	conducted	by	
Marie	DesChamps,	discussed	below.	The	Operation	Order	for	this	defines	the	timeline	for	the	
operation	as	well	as	its	intentions	and	goals.	An	Operation	Order	is	a	document	used	for	any	
CAF	operation	that	dictates	the	context	of	the	situation	and	motivation	of	the	operation,	the	
mission	itself,	and	how	the	mission	will	be	executed.		
The	External	Review	into	Sexual	Misconduct	and	Sexual	Harassment	in	the	Canadian	
Armed	Forces	from	2015	by	Marie	DesChamps	is	not	a	policy	document;	however,	it	is	the	
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document	the	CAF	has	used	to	guide	their	ongoing	actions	regarding	sexual	misconduct	
prevention.	The	discourse	within	this	document	has	a	direct	effect	on	how	the	CAF	is	
responding	to	this	issue.	Finally,	the	Gender	Based	Analysis	Plus	Round	Table	Discussion	Report	
is	a	report	on	a	meeting	regarding	a	mass	analysis	of	CAF	policies	in	terms	of	gender	and	
advancing	gender	equality	in	Canada.	The	insight	from	this	report	is	also	being	used	to	guide	
the	ongoing	actions	of	the	CAF	with	regards	to	sexual	misconduct	prevention.	Each	of	these	
policies	or	policy	responses	provides	a	piece	of	the	top-down	construction	of	the	identity	and	
culture	of	the	CAF.	Some	of	them	are	very	closely	related	to	the	contemporary	development	
away	from	the	sexualized	culture	of	the	military,	whereas	others	are	broad	guidelines	of	
behaviours	for	members	and	thus	provide	the	boundaries	of	behaviour.	The	documents	from	
the	QR&Os	and	the	DAODs	are	each	pieces	of	the	overarching	policies	of	the	CAF.	These	policies	
are	updated	irregularly.	The	External	Review	by	Marie	DesChamps	was	conducted	prior	to	
Operation	HONOUR	and	was	significant	in	its	creation.			
I	use	the	first	intertextual	model	as	described	by	Hansen	in	Security	as	Practice	to	
analyze	official	discourse	and	the	intertextual	links	made	within	them	(2006,	66).	While	Hansen	
discusses	using	the	three	intertextual	models	together	in	assessing	discourse,	this	research	is	
only	concerned	with	the	discursive	value	of	official	policy	documents	rather	than	media	debate	
(second	model)	and	popular	culture	(third	model).9	Each	of	the	documents	that	I	have	chosen	
																																																						
9	Hansen’s	model	of	critical	discourse	analysis	centers	on	analysis	through	three	intertextual	
models.	The	first	model	looks	at	official	policy	discourse,	examples	of	such	being	any	text	from	
political	leaders	such	as:	speeches,	political	debates,	interviews,	articles,	and	books	(2006,	54).	
Model	One	is	meant	to	look	at	the	constructions	of	identity	within	official	political	discourse	(2006,	
54).	The	second	model	broadens	the	scope	of	discourse	by	looking	at	the	media	and	corporate	
institutions.	By	analyzing	media	discourse	we	may	identify	the	‘official	discursive	hegemony’	(2006,	
55).	The	actors	from	the	second	model	are	‘major	players	in	the	broader	political	debate’	(2006,	
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meet	the	three	criteria	outlined	by	Hansen	in	that	they	are:	“characterized	by	clear	articulation	
of	identities	and	policies,	widely	read	and	attended	to,	and	have	the	formal	authority	to	define	
a	political	position”	(2006,	76).	The	documents	are	either	policy	documents,	texts	that	are	
meant	to	inform	policy,	or	responses	to	policy	and	all	have	a	relatively	clear	articulation	of	
identity.	The	word	choices	used,	as	well	as	the	scenarios	the	policies	project	with	the	intent	to	
avoid,	indicate	a	sense	of	identity	in	the	CAF.	Finally,	each	of	these	policies	are	guiding	
documents	and	are	the	authority	on	behaviours	and	actions	of	members	of	the	CAF,	and	the	
policy	responses	are	commissioned	by	the	CAF.	Through	this	first	intertextual	model	I	analyze	
the	source	of	these	policies	in	terms	of	when	they	were	written	and	by	whom,	as	well	as	the	
language	within	the	policies.	These	two	aspects	together	develop	the	discourse	of	the	policies,	
which	I	will	use	to	situate	the	identity	of	the	CAF	as	an	institution	with	an	environment	
currently	permissive	to	sexual	assault	through	its	culture,	but	with	the	intention	of	reversing	
this.		
In	the	analytical	process	I	use	open-source	software	Text	Analysis	Markup	System	
Analyzer	(TAMS)	to	code	and	extract	information	from	each	document.	In	discussing	the	
discourse	of	United	Nations	policy	documents	regarding	gender	Shepherd	states	that,	“the	first	
point	of	critical	engagement	must	be	with	the	language	used	to	write	policy”	(2010,	157).	The	
language	used	reveals	a	lot	about	the	documents	and	the	institution	they	are	written	for.	In	
each	of	the	documents	I	examine	I	look	for	the	following	themes:	representation,	consent,	
																																																						
55).	Finally,	the	third	intertextual	model	looks	beyond	the	material	that	‘explicitly	engages	with	
official	political	discourse’	and	instead	articulates	policy	discourse	through	popular	culture.	
Examples	of	this	include:	film,	fiction,	television,	computer	games,	photography,	and	comic	books	
(2006,	55).	An	example	of	this	third	model	is	analyzing	how	a	region	is	represented	in	popular	
culture.	
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support,	blame,	and	narratives	for	victims,	and	culture	construction.	In	examining	for	
representation	I	look	for	descriptive	group	representation	in	terms	of	gender,	race,	religion,	
sex,	and	sexual	orientation,	as	well	as	an	intersectional	approach	to	descriptive	representation.	
I	also	look	for	substantive	representation	of	groups	in	the	policy	language.10	
I	measured	descriptive	representation	by	the	acknowledgement	of	certain	groups	in	the	
language	of	the	policies	as	well	as	in	the	individuals	who	aided	in	the	creation	of	the	policies.	
There	will	be	some	groups	that	are	named,	but	for	other	aspects	of	descriptive	representation	I	
looked	for	absences	of	groups	in	the	content	of	the	policies.	For	example,	the	dress	regulations	
provide	Eurocentric,	female	hair	standards	that	do	not	always	apply	to	afro-textured	hair.	I	
measured	substantive	representation	by	looking	not	only	at	whether	categories	or	groups	are	
mentioned,	but	how	they	are	mentioned.	If	women	are	discussed,	is	it	in	an	intersectional	way,	
or	is	a	certain	group	of	women	clear?	I	also	looked	for	specific	narratives	in	the	writing,	
particularly	those	addressing	victimization	and	the	necessity	of	protection	for	women.		
I	also	looked	for	language	that	relates	to	support	for	victims	and	victim	blaming.11	These	
are	each	important	to	consider	because	once	victims	are	identified	or	identify	themselves	there	
should	be	something	in	place	to	support	them.	Furthermore,	support	for	victims	may	look	like	a	
																																																						
10	Appendix	A	details	the	definitions	of	the	codes	I	used.	
11	I	want	to	acknowledge	that	there	are	implications	of	my	usage	of	the	word	victim	in	this	research.	
Rather	than	use	victim,	some	prefer	the	term	survivor	as	it	recognizes	the	agency	of	someone	who	has	
experienced	sexual	assault	and	emphasizes	a	more	positive	outlook.	However,	my	use	of	the	term	victim	
is	intentional	as	it	more	readily	conveys	the	victimization	of	members	who	experience	sexual	assault	and	
the	further	victimization	of	these	members	who	do	not	see	justice	due	to	significant	underreporting	as	
well	as	low	rates	of	conviction.	As	well,	arguments	against	the	word	victim	are	due	to	the	connotations	
of	helplessness	and	passivity,	though	the	culture	of	the	CAF	is	hyper-masculine	and	sexualized	which	is	
not	welcoming	to	women	generally,	who	are	more	often	victimized	by	sexual	assault	according	to	
statistics	from	anonymous	surveys	of	CAF	members	(Sexual	Misconduct	in	the	Canadian	Armed	Forces	
2016,	5).	
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diffusion	of	responsibility	to	all	members	for	reporting	assaults	they	have	knowledge	of	and	
making	this	part	of	the	CAF	policy.	This	would	result	in	collective	responsibility,	where	it	is	not	
only	the	victim	who	must	confront	the	perpetrator	or	the	chain	of	command,	but	anyone	who	
sees	harassment.	Furthermore,	it	means	that	blame	is	laid	not	only	to	the	attacker	perpetrating	
the	crime,	but	also	to	anyone	with	knowledge	of	it	that	does	not	report	it	and	is	therefore	
enabling	the	crime.		As	well,	consent	is	related	to	the	concept	of	victim	blaming	because	the	
absence	of	general	blame	on	the	victim	is	not	enough,	but	there	must	also	be	an	understanding	
that	the	various	actions	of	the	victim	did	not	lead	to	the	sexual	assault	(i.e.	their	clothing	or	
being	inebriated).		There	must	also	be	an	understanding	of	consent	across	the	institution	in	
order	to	address	the	problem	of	sexual	misconduct.	I	look	at	the	narratives	developed	through	
the	policies’	language	to	see	if	the	narratives	are	limited	and	portray	expectations	of	who	a	
victim	and	who	a	perpetrator	may	be.	This	is	important	because	although	the	majority	of	cases	
see	male	perpetrators	and	female	victims,	this	is	not	always	the	case,	and	male	victims	should	
not	have	further	discouragement	through	limited	expectations	in	policy	language	from	
reporting	or	acknowledging	harassment.	Finally,	I	looked	at	the	construction	of	culture	through	
the	language	of	policy	and	policy	responses.	Specifically,	acknowledgements	of	the	current	CAF	
culture	and	attempts	of	top-down	reconstruction	of	the	culture.	In	my	examination	of	each	of	
these	documents	the	presence	of	any	of	these	themes	is	important.	What	is	equally	important	
however	is	the	absence	of	them.	A	significant	piece	of	the	value	of	this	research	is	in	identifying	
the	silences	in	terms	of	representation,	culture,	victim	support,	and	consent.		
An	example	of	this	is	the	way	the	dress	regulations	are	written	for	the	Canadian	Armed	
Forces.	The	dress	is	laid	out	with	white,	Christian	men	in	mind	and	any	differences	from	this	
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model	of	what	a	CAF	member	should	be	are	considered	‘accommodations’	(Canadian	Armed	
Forces	Dress	Instructions,	2-1-2).	In	the	dress	regulations,	the	religious	accommodations	listed	
are	for	Sikhs,	Muslims,	and	Aboriginal	members.	These	religious	inclusions	are	specific	rather	
than	extensive	and	complete.	There	is	consideration	given,	but	the	consideration	is	for	them	as	
‘others’	and	a	differentiation	from	the	stereotypical	model	of	what	a	CAF	soldier	‘should’	be.	
Thus,	I	would	code	this	for	descriptive	representation.	As	well,	in	a	document	describing	sexual	
harassment	and	sexual	assault	if	it	is	written	in	a	heteronormative	way	with	only	men	as	
aggressors	and	only	women	as	victims	I	would	code	this	for	non-intersectionality	and	limited	
narratives.	Phrasing	with	regards	to	stereotypical	gender	roles	and	heteronormative	positioning	
indicates	a	lack	of	consideration	for	the	different	roles	that	both	men	and	women	can	play.	This	
positioning	also	indicates	an	expectation	that	men	have	power	over	women,	in	a	sense	of	
physical	power	leading	to	assault	or	power	in	the	hierarchy	allowing	for	sexual	harassment.		
In	my	analysis	of	these	documents	I	also	looked	at	the	context	of	the	material	as	this	is	
essential	in	analyzing	discourse,	and	it	aids	in	the	analysis	of	each	document,	and	of	the	
documents	together.	Reading	into	the	meaning	of	the	documents	requires	more	than	an	
analysis	of	textual	signs	of	the	documents.	In	this	analysis	I	included:	the	authors,	the	
publishers,	and	who	provided	the	funding	if	there	was	funding	behind	it.	I	searched	for	these	
themes	in	the	creation	of	the	documents.	This	was	done	through	an	examination	of	who	
contributed	to	their	making.	The	difference	between	descriptive	and	substantive	
representation	here	is	difficult	because	inclusion	is	not	equal	to	representation,	necessarily.	
Having	a	woman	present	in	the	creation	of	a	policy	does	not	mean	that	she	contributed	in	any	
substantial	manner	to	its	creation.	As	such,	I	only	identify	the	descriptive	representation	of	
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groups	by	identifying	the	document’s	creators.	As	well,	I	looked	at	the	social	and	historical	
context	of	the	material.	For	example,	women	were	allowed	into	combat	in	the	CAF	in	1989,	so	
any	policy	changes	around	that	time	may	have	been	due	to	this.	Along	with	the	context,	I	
looked	at	the	projected	implementation	of	the	policies	and	the	policy	responses	in	terms	of	
what	the	target	is	and	who	is	affected.	Furthermore,	I	looked	at	the	target	audience	of	the	
policies,	whether	it	is	the	highest-ranking	members	of	the	CAF,	or	if	the	intended	audience	is	
each	working	member.	Whether	the	intended	audience	is	high,	low,	or	all	ranking	members	of	
the	CAF,	they	will	also	be	both	sexes,	all	genders,	and	all	races,	sexualities,	and	religions.	I	also	
looked	at	which	actors’	interests	will	be	served	or	negated	by	the	positioning	of	the	documents	
and,	generally,	how	each	document	is	positioned	and	the	point	of	view	or	narrative	it	uses	
looking	at	the	implications	for	both	bodies	that	are	men	and	bodies	that	are	women.	As	well,	I	
looked	at	how	these	apply	to	different	(broad)	groups	of	women	on	the	dimensions	of	race,	
sexuality,	religion,	and	ability.	Similarly,	I	analyzed	the	relations	of	power	in	each	document,	
both	clear	and	hidden,	as	well	as	who	is	exercising	power.	In	the	context	of	power,	I	also	looked	
for	what	is	left	unsaid	and	the	implications	this	has	in	its	understanding	by	the	intended	
audience	and	in	its	implementation.	Finally,	I	looked	at	what	repetition	exists	both	within	each	
document	and	across	any	documents.	
	
Previous	studies,	such	as	DesChamps’	External	Review	have	been	done	to	interview	
members	and	gain	a	deeper	understanding	of	the	culture	of	the	CAF.	However,	the	purpose	of	
this	study	is	to	look	at	how	the	culture	stems	from	the	policy	discourse	of	the	institution.	The	
value	of	this	research	is	that	it	analyzes	the	documentation	that	should	inform	the	behaviour	of	
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the	members,	which	complements	the	research	that	analyzes	the	interpretation	of	the	CAF	
culture	by	members.	Each	of	these	policies	was	analyzed	with	regards	to	the	language	within	
them,	but	also	with	regards	to	how	they	fit	into	the	broader	culture	of	the	CAF.	Specifically,	I	
noted	pieces,	such	as	the	language	that	indicates	a	prevalence	to	deter	false	allegations	rather	
than	language	that	supports	victims	who	choose	to	report.	The	significance	of	this	finding	
within	the	language	is	that	DesChamps	found	the	complementary	cultural	behaviour	aligned	
with	this	where	members	who	report	feel	discouraged	from	reporting	(DesChamps	2015,	17).		
The	following	analysis	develops	this	connection	between	the	policy	discourse	and	the	
masculine,	sexualized	culture	of	the	CAF.		
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Chapter	4:	Findings	and	Analysis:	Vague	Language	Contributes	to	a	Permissive	Environment	
for	Sexual	Assault		
In	my	analysis	of	the	policy	documents	of	the	CAF	I	have	found	that	they	have	enabled	a	
permissive	environment	for	sexual	assault	and	especially	for	sexual	harassment.	Although	
harassment	is	mentioned,	and	sexual	misconduct	is	discussed,	it	is	not	adequately	defined.	
Therefore,	from	a	policy	perspective	the	military	is	a	permissive	environment	for	sexual	
harassment	and	sexual	assault	to	occur.	Policies	regarding	sexual	misconduct	discuss	sexual	
assault	but	the	language	remains	ambiguous.	The	phrasing	of	the	various	policies	does	not	
always	provide	adequate	substantive	representation	because	they	are	written	with	complex	
and	vague	language.	For	some	terms	there	is	no	definition	provided,	like	fraternization	in	DAOD	
5019,	or	striking	in	Chapter	103.	This	type	of	language	means	that	it	is	difficult	for	members	to	
understand	the	policies	and	the	policies	are	then	not	comprehensive	enough	to	be	
representative	of	experiences	of	members.	My	analysis	expands	on	these	main	findings	looking	
at	how	these	policies	interact	with	and	inform	the	culture	of	the	CAF.			
	
Context	of	the	Documents	
Each	of	the	policies	were	ordered	on	the	authority	of	figures	such	as	the	Chief	of	Defence	Staff	
or	the	Deputy	Minister	of	National	Defence.	However,	there	is	no	publicly	accessible	data	that	
allows	me	to	see	who	participated	in	the	actual	writing	of	each	policy,	though	I	assume	there	
were	people	who	worked	in	the	offices	of	these	authorities	who	participated	in	the	research	
and	writing	involved	in	the	creation	of	these	policies.	Each	of	the	people	issuing	these	policies	
are	white	men.	The	Defence	Administration	Order	and	Directive	5012	was	issued	on	the	
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authority	of	the	Chief	of	Military	Personnel,	Assistant	Deputy	Minister	Human	Resources	
Civilian	in	December	2000,	and	modified	in	January	2017.	The	Defence	Administration	Order	
and	Directive	5019	was	issued	on	the	authority	of	the	Chief	of	Military	Personnel	in	September	
2008.	The	pieces	from	Chapter	103	and	5	of	the	Queens	Regulations	and	Orders	were	issued	
under	the	authority	of	the	Chief	of	Defence	Staff,	and	Chapter	4	was	issued	under	the	authority	
of	the	Minister	of	Defence.	Chapter	103	was	issued	January	2006,	Chapter	4	was	issued	in	June	
2008	and	amended	in	June	2014,	and	Chapter	5	was	issued	in	April	2009	and	amended	in	
August	2015.	The	Code	of	Values	and	Ethics	was	issued	in	2012	by	the	Chief	of	Defence	Staff	
and	Deputy	Minister	of	National	Defence	at	the	time,	W.J.	Natynczyk	and	Robert	Fonberg.	The	
Statement	of	Defence	Ethics	was	issued	in	August	2014	by	the	Director	of	the	Defence	Ethics	
Programme.	The	Royal	Military	College	(RMC)	Policy	on	Harmful	Behaviour	was	issued	in	
December	2016	by	the	Director	of	Plans	and	Strategy	of	RMC.	The	Operation	Order	for	
Operation	HONOUR	was	issued	on	the	authority	of	the	Chief	of	Defence	Staff,	Jonathan	Vance	
in	August	2015.		
Policy	 Authority	Issued	On	 Date	Issued	
DAOD	5012	 Chief	of	Military	Personnel,	
Assistant	Deputy	Minister	
Human	Resources	Civilian	
December	2000,	modified	
January	2017	
DAOD	5019	 Chief	of	Military	Personnel	 September	2008	
QR&O	103	 Chief	of	Defence	Staff	 January	2006	
QR&O	4	 Minister	of	Defence	 June	2008,	amended	June	
2014	
QR&O	5	 Chief	of	Defence	Staff	 April	2009,	amended	August	
2015		
Code	of	Values	and	Ethics	 Chief	of	Defence	Staff,	
Deputy	Minister	of	National	
Defence	
2012	
Statement	of	Defence	Ethics	 Director	of	the	Defence	
Ethics	Programme	
August	2014	
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RMC	Policy	on	Harmful	
Behaviour	
Director	of	Plans	and	
Strategy	of	RMC	
December	2016	
Operation	Order	OP	HONOUR	 Chief	of	Defence	Staff	 August	2015	
	
The	significance	of	these	dates	is	that	they	are	all	within	the	new	millennium	and	so	should	be	
relatively	progressive.	Sexual	assault	in	the	CAF	was	brought	up	as	an	important	issue	in	the	
mid-1990s	by	Maclean’s	magazine	and	other	sources	after	a	nine-month	investigation	in	the	
CAF	(Mercier,	Castonguay	2014)	and	so	policies	coming	out	after	that	should	take	this	into	
account.	
The	policy	responses	I	examined	were	clearer	about	who	had	participated	in	their	
creation.	The	External	Review	into	Sexual	Misconduct	and	Sexual	Harassment	in	the	Canadian	
Armed	Forces	was	done	by	Marie	DesChamps	in	2015.	It	is	unclear	if	DesChamps	worked	
completely	alone	on	this	review	or	if	anyone	else	participated.	The	Gender	Based	Analysis	
Roundtable	was	done	in	July	2016	and	indicated	a	list	of	17	participants.	Of	these	participants	
all	of	them	are	white,	three	are	members	or	retired	members	of	the	CAF,	four	are	men	and	13	
are	women.	In	the	creation	of	all	documents	I	have	analyzed	for	this	research,	all	creators	are	
white,	and	the	strong	majority	are	men.	The	documents	that	did	not	come	from	white	men	
were	response	documents	that	discussed	changes	that	should	be	made	in	the	CAF.		
In	my	analysis	of	the	policies	and	policy	responses	I	found	that	not	all	documents	could	be	
coded	for	each	theme	I	was	looking	for.	This	is	not	surprising	due	to	the	length	of	some	of	the	
policies.	Further,	the	fact	that	themes	like	consent	and	various	types	of	descriptive	and	
substantive	representation	were	not	widely	identified	contributes	to	my	argument	that	the	
discourse	of	these	documents	lends	to	a	permissive	environment	for	sexual	harassment	and	
sexual	assault	in	the	CAF.	
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Theme	 Documents	Coded	In	
Culture	&	Building	Culture	Top	Down	 Operations	Order	Op	HONOUR,	External	
Review	by	DesChamps,	DAOD	5012,	QR&O	
Chapter	4,	Code	of	Values	and	Ethics,	RMC	
Policy	on	HISB,	Statement	of	Defence	Ethics,	
Gender	Based	Analysis	Roundtable	
Consent	 External	Review	by	DesChamps,	RMC	Policy	
on	HISB,	Statement	of	Defence	Ethics	
Limited	Narratives	 Operations	Order	Op	HONOUR,	Code	of	
Values	and	Ethics,	External	Review	by	
DesChamps,	Gender	Based	Analysis	
Roundtable,	Statement	of	Defence	Ethics	
Support	for	Victims	and	Victim	Blaming	 External	Review	by	DesChamps,	RMC	Policy	
on	HISB,	Statement	of	Defence	Ethics,	DAOD	
5019	
	
In	looking	for	indications	of	support	for	victims	and	the	opposite,	victim	blaming,	I	found	
them	both	in	the	External	Review	by	DesChamps	and	in	policies	of	the	CAF:	the	RMC	Policy	on	
Harmful	and	Inappropriate	Sexual	Behaviour,	the	Statement	of	Defence	Ethics,	and	DAOD	5019.	
The	implications	of	finding	these	relatively	opposite	ideas	within	the	same	policies	indicates	
that	the	discourse	of	the	policies	is	not	sufficient	to	adequately	limit	the	sexualized	
environment	of	the	CAF	(in	developing	the	culture	from	the	top	down).	Both	of	these	topics	
may	be	addressed	within	the	same	document	in	a	positive	way	by	addressing	the	negative	
effects	of	victim	blaming	and	rape	culture12	alongside	the	necessity	of	support	for	victims.	
Addressing	victim	blaming	in	this	way	is	a	better	strategy	than	not	addressing	it	at	all.	However,	
these	topics	may	also	be	negatively	combined,	which	is	what	I	have	found.	Within	the	
documents	there	is	a	call	for	support	for	victims,	which	is	positive;	however,	it	is	combined	with	
																																																						
12	Rape	culture	is	a	prevalent	social	attitude	or	norms	that	normalize	sexually	harassing	behaviours	and	
sexual	assault.	
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language	that	is	consistent	with	rape	culture.	Due	to	the	fact	that	these	topics	are	intimately	
related,	in	the	form	of	how	victims	are	treated	after	experiencing	sexual	assault,	having	them	
oppositely	framed	within	the	policy	discourse	negates	the	positive	effect	of	framing	the	need	of	
support	that	victims	require.	Even	if	there	are	official	supports	in	place,	having	discourse	that	is	
consistent	with	rape	culture	positions	both	members	and	the	official	supports	to	have	an	
attitude	that	inevitably	questions	the	victims’	experiences.						
	
General	Findings	
The	policies	of	the	CAF	officially	define	sexual	assault	as	an	offence;	however,	they	do	not	
discriminate	well	between	sexual	assault	and	sexual	harassment,	and	policy	enactment	allows	
for	some	permissiveness	in	definitions	of	sexual	harassment	and	sexual	assault.	The	vague	
language	used	to	describe	various	offences	leaves	meaning	unclear	and	contains	limited	
narratives	to	describe	victims	and	perpetrators.	Furthermore,	support	for	victims	is	not	well	
advertised,	victims	are	mostly	unwilling	to	report	occurrences,	and	when	they	are	reported	
there	are	policies	in	place	that	lend	to	protecting	the	assailant	rather	than	the	victim.	Although	
policy	change	is	necessary,	on	its	own	it	is	unlikely	to	be	effective	as	a	complete	solution	to	
rates	of	sexual	assault.	Rather,	there	must	also	be	broad	cultural	change	throughout	the	CAF,	as	
stated	by	DesChamps	in	her	External	Review.	DesChamps	recommends	that	the	culture	of	the	
CAF	needs	to	be	changed,	and	I	find	there	ought	to	be	top-down	culture	change,	where	various	
levels	of	leadership	commit	to	developing	and	perpetuating	different	attitudes	regarding	
diversity,	and	sexual	assault.	As	well,	there	needs	to	be	bottom-up	culture	change	where	all	
individual	members	experience	attitude	changes	that	contribute	to	changes	in	the	social	norms	
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of	the	culture.	Operation	HONOUR	consists	of	a	series	of	four	steps	that	introduces	top-down	
change	in	the	CAF.13		
Many	future	officers	and	leaders	within	the	CAF	receive	their	initial	training	at	The	Royal	
Military	College	(RMC)	of	Canada.	Although	students	must	adhere	to	the	same	policies	as	all	
other	CAF	members,	RMC	also	has	their	own	policies	for	students.	In	my	analysis	I	found	that	
generally	RMC	has	a	more	contemporary	approach	to	the	wording	of	their	policies	as	well	as	
how	often	they	are	updated:	the	current	version	of	the	RMC	policy	was	done	after	DesChamps’	
report	was	released.	However,	in	DesChamps’	report	she	states	“participants	reported	that	
sexual	harassment	is	considered	‘a	passage	obligé’	and	sexual	assault	an	ever-present	risk”	
(2015,	14).	I	do	not	find	that	there	is	necessarily	a	correlation	present	between	the	more	
progressive	wording	of	RMC’s	policy	with	fewer	instances	or	better	reporting	of	sexual	assault	
at	the	institution.	RMC’s	policy	specifically	discusses	what	does	and	does	not	constitute	consent	
(Royal	Military	College	of	Canada	Policy	on	Harmful	and	Inappropriate	Sexual	Behaviour,	4):	this	
is	significant	because	DesChamps	discusses	how	a	lack	of	understanding	of	what	consent	means	
has	negative	effects	in	terms	of	sexual	assault	(DesChamps	2015,	46).	The	discourse	of	the	
policies	may	not	have	a	direct	effect	on	the	rates	of	sexual	assault	that	occur	either	at	RMC	or	
within	the	CAF	generally.	However,	I	demonstrate	in	this	research	that	the	policies	contribute	
																																																						
13	The	four	phases	of	Operation	HONOUR	are:	initiation,	preparation,	deployment/employment,	and	
maintain	and	hold.	The	first	phase	is	about	creating	a	comprehensive	strategy	and	developing	a	
mandate.	The	second	phase	utilizes	commanders	to	communicate	the	strategy	down	the	chain	of	
command,	administer	discipline,	and	educate	members	on	harmful	and	inappropriate	sexual	behaviour.	
The	third	phase	is	where	new	policies	are	issued.	The	final	phase	is	meant	to	be	a	point	of	full	
operational	capacity	and	maintenance	of	values	with	regards	to	sexual	assault.		
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to	the	development	and	maintenance	of	culture,	which	in	turn	would	normalize	or	disturb	
societal	norms	consistent	with	rape	culture.		
In	my	analysis	I	separated	my	findings	into	themes;	however,	many	of	the	themes	can	
be	considered	part	of	a	substantive	representation	of	women	in	the	CAF.	I	discuss	
representation	generally	and	aspects	of	various	policies	that	clearly	did	or	did	not	indicate	a	
descriptive	or	substantive	representation	of	women.	However,	I	also	look	at	the	way	language	
is	used	in	the	policies	and	the	limited	narratives	regarding	victims	and	perpetrators.	Through	
these	themes	I	examine	for	the	most	part	a	lack	of	substantive	representation,	but	in	a	specific	
way.	Further,	I	look	at	the	culture	of	the	CAF	as	a	hyper-masculine	institution	that	generally	
does	not	substantively	represent	women,	especially	when	other	members	have	sexually	
assaulted	them.	As	well,	I	examine	the	themes	of	consent,	support	for	victims,	and	victim	
blaming.	These	again	are	all	specific	analyses	of	the	substantive	representation	of	victims	of	
sexual	assault	in	the	policies	of	the	CAF.		
	
Representation	
In	the	actual	coding	of	each	document	language	that	indicated	a	descriptive	or	substantive	
representation	of	gender,	race,	religion,	sex,	or	sexual	orientation	were	only	indicated	in	the	
External	Review	by	DesChamps,	the	Gender	Based	Analysis	Roundtable	Report,	the	Operation	
HONOUR	Ops	Order,	DAOD	5012,	and	the	RMC	Policy	on	Harmful	and	Inappropriate	Behaviour.	
This	is	not	surprising	as	I	expected	the	language	of	the	policies	to	not	be	very	straightforward	in	
terms	of	representation	of	specific	groups	of	people.	There	was	more	frequent	mention	of	
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gender,	sex,	and	sexual	orientation,	which	also	is	not	surprising	as	I	chose	policies	specifically	in	
reference	to	sexual	assault,	which	tends	to	be	a	gendered	topic	of	discussion.		
The	RMC	policy	states	that	“members	may	experience	harassment	regardless	of	their	
sexual	orientation,	gender,	gender	identity,	or	relationship	status”	(Royal	Military	College	of	
Canada	Policy	on	Harmful	and	Inappropriate	Sexual	Behaviour,	9).	This	is	inclusive	because	it	
does	not	provide	a	narrative	of	who	the	victims	and	perpetrators	necessarily	are.	As	well,	it	is	
inclusive	of	transgender	members	because	it	includes	gender	and	gender	identity.	This	is	
contrary	to	the	Ops	Order	for	Operation	HONOUR	which	states	that	“members	should	not	be	
devalued	based	on	their	sex,	sexuality,	or	sexual	orientation”	(Ops	Order	Op	HONOUR,	2).	At	
first	glance	this	appears	inclusive:	however,	sex	indicates	biological	sex;	sexual	orientation	
indicates	heterosexuality,	homosexuality,	or	bisexuality;	and	sexuality	is	a	descriptor	to	indicate	
sexual	preferences	and	kinks.	This	phrasing	is	exclusive	of	transgender	members	because	it	
does	not	reference	gender,	which	differs	from	sex.	Although	the	definition	of	the	phrasing	used	
is	exclusive	there	are	likely	many	members	who	do	not	recognize	the	difference	and	exclusion	
in	this	wording	and	would	likely	not	attend	to	the	differences	between	sex	and	gender.	Despite	
this,	the	phrasing	used	in	policies	should	be	accurate	and	inclusive	because	for	the	purposes	of	
sexual	assault	they	are	meant	to	provide	protection.		
In	DesChamps’	External	Review	she	continues	to	come	back	to	the	idea	that	by	
integrating	more	women	into	the	military	and	appointing	more	women	to	positions	of	senior	
leadership	the	CAF	may	eliminate	the	sexualized	environment	of	the	current	CAF	(DesChamps	
2015,	vii).	This	is	a	clear	discussion	of	the	potential	for	work	done	by	descriptive	representation.	
However,	DesChamps	also	discusses	that	women	at	higher	ranks	in	the	CAF	appear	not	to	suffer	
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from	the	sexualized	environment	and	concludes	that	this	is	because	they	have	internalized	it	
(DesChamps	2015,	16).	In	this	way,	the	representation	of	women	at	higher	levels	in	the	military	
may	be	descriptive	only	and	not	do	the	work	that	DesChamps	predicts	better	integration	of	
women	will	provide,	in	that	they	will	not	substantively	represent	women.	It	is	also	important	to	
note	that	there	are	significantly	higher	attrition	rates	for	women	in	the	CAF:	three	out	of	four	
women	will	release	within	the	first	five	to	ten	years	of	their	career	(Gender	Based	Analysis	
Roundtable,	3)	and	women	are	twice	as	likely	as	their	male	counterparts	to	leave	the	CAF	(Tait	
2014,	3).	This	difference	could	be	attributed	to	many	things,	but	it	is	likely	that	it	is	at	least	
partially	attributable	to	the	significantly	higher	rates	of	sexual	assault	for	women	in	the	CAF,	as	
well	as	attitudes	towards	those	who	report	sexual	assault.	As	well,	it	may	be	attributable	to	the	
generally	unwelcome	culture	towards	women	and	femininity	and	emphasis	on	hyper-
masculinity	in	the	CAF.		
Although	the	policy	substantively	represents	all	groups,	the	follow-through	on	this	
policy	is	not	necessarily	equivalent.	The	RMC	Policy	on	Harmful	and	Inappropriate	Sexual	
Behaviour	states	“in	the	event	that	an	incident	of	HISB	does	occur,	this	policy	directs	that	those	
who	have	been	found	to	have	committed	an	act	of	HSIB	will	be	held	accountable	for	their	
actions”	(Royal	Military	College	of	Canada	Policy	on	Harmful	and	Inappropriate	Sexual	
Behaviour,	8).	This	clear	statement	is	good,	and	especially	because	it	was	preceded	by	an	
inclusive	definition	of	harassment.	It	appears	to	be	substantive	representation	of	all	victims,	
once	the	barriers	of	reporting	and	determining	guilt	have	been	crossed.	The	RMC	Policy	was	
updated	after	the	External	Review	by	DesChamps	was	released	and	appears	to	take	into	
account	her	recommendations,	which	I	will	elaborate	on	throughout	this	analysis.	However,	
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DesChamps’	review	shows	that	most	members	are	afraid	of	reporting	these	types	of	incidents	
(DesChamps	2015,	28).	Furthermore,	the	culture	of	the	CAF,	including	RMC,	is	built	to	protect	
alleged	assailants	from	potential	false	accusations	rather	than	victims	after	actual	occurrences.	
Members	are	discouraged	from	reporting	by	their	peers	and	immediate	supervisors	and	are	
regularly	questioned	in	a	negative	manner	by	whomever	they	report	to	(DesChamps	2015,	59).	
So	the	wording	of	this	policy	is	good,	but	without	the	underlying	change	in	culture	to	address	
how	individuals	think	about	reports	of	sexual	assaults,	this	is	not	effective.	Although	the	
wording	of	the	policies	in	this	case	is	good	in	terms	of	the	definitions,	it	continues	to	contribute	
to	the	permissive	environment	for	sexual	assault	found	in	the	CAF	through	the	emphasis	on	
mitigating	false	accusations.	This	permissive	environment	is	significant	because	sexual	assaults	
in	the	military	occur	most	often	with	the	motivations	of	ascertaining	power	(Morris	1996,	723),	
so	if	this	method	continues	to	be	the	most	permissive	through	the	policy	discourse,	the	culture	
and	the	environment	will	remain	permissive.	The	representation	for	victims,	who	are	
statistically	more	likely	to	be	women	(DesChamps	2015,	ii),	must	be	clearer	in	the	discourse	in	
order	to	make	the	environment	more	constraining	in	terms	of	sexual	assault.		
The	existence	of	Operation	HONOUR	is	a	policy	change/operation	that	substantively	
represents	women	specifically	because	it	acknowledges	that	the	experience	of	many	women	
(DesChamps	2015,	12)	in	the	CAF	is	one	of	harassment	and	assault	and	is	actively	working	to	
change	that	experience.	The	main	effort	of	the	operation	is	“leveraging	leadership	to	stop	
wrong	and	harmful	inappropriate	sexual	behaviour”	and	provide	support	(Ops	Order	Op	
HONOUR,	2).	This	substantively	represents	all	victims	of	sexual	assault:	a	group	that	statistically	
includes	more	women.	This	phrasing	provides	substantive	representation	because	it	
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acknowledges	a	requirement	to	not	only	prevent	the	instances	from	occurring	but	to	provide	
support	after	the	fact.	The	fact	that	victims	are	more	frequently	women	indicates	that	it	is	a	
systemic	problem	with	regards	to	sex	and	thus	there	ought	to	be	a	requirement	of	policy	
creation	and	enactment	to	emphasize	the	protection	of	women.		
Generally,	however,	the	policies	that	govern	the	everyday	behaviour	of	CAF	members,	
namely	the	Queens	Regulations	and	Orders	and	the	Defence	Administration	Orders	and	
Directives,	do	not	provide	good	substantive	representation	of	victims.	This	is	because	the	
policies	are	written	in	complex,	vague	language	inefficient	at	addressing	the	systemic	nature	of	
sexual	harassment.	For	example,	in	DAOD	5012	harassment	is	defined	as	“Improper	conduct	by	
an	individual	that	is	directed	at	and	offensive	to	another	individual	in	the	workplace	including	at	
any	event	or	any	location	related	to	work”	(DAOD	5012,	2).	However	this	definition,	with	
regards	to	location	lacks	clarity:	does	it	include	the	mess14	or	a	bar	that	is	located	close	to	a	CAF	
base?	Each	of	these	locations	are	not	spaces	where	work	is	conducted,	but	a	mess	exists	within	
a	base	which	is	the	location	of	members’	work.	Furthermore,	the	definitions	are	not	
comprehensive	enough	to	be	representative	of	the	types	of	experiences	victims	have.	For	
example,	“Sexual	misconduct	consists	of	one	or	more	acts	that:	are	either	sexual	in	nature	or	
committed	with	the	intent	to	commit	an	act	or	acts	that	are	sexual	in	nature”	(DAOD	5019,	2).	
This	definition	is	entirely	unclear	providing	essentially	no	more	detail	than	the	title	‘sexual	
misconduct.’	Where	DesChamps	identifies	a	lack	of	education	as	a	contributing	factor	to	some	
sexual	assault	(DesChamps	2015,	60),	this	definition	exemplifies	this.	I	find	that	an	
																																																						
14	A	mess	is	a	bar	on	base	where	members	may	go	after	working	hours	to	eat	food	and	drink	
alcohol.		
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improvement	on	this	would	identify	aspects	of	consent	in	sexual	situations,	as	due	to	this	
definition	as	a	sexual	act	that	occurs	within	the	CAF,	whether	consensual	or	not,	it	falls	under	
the	charge	of	sexual	misconduct.	The	representation	of	victims	in	these	policies	is	not	
adequate,	and	I	find	that	for	the	most	part	these	policies	contribute	to	a	permissive	
environment	for	sexual	assault	in	the	CAF.		
	
Consent		
The	concept	of	consent	is	very	important	in	studies	of	sexual	assault.	In	the	Criminal	Code	of	
Canada,	consent	is	“the	voluntary	agreement	of	the	complainant	to	engage	in	the	sexual	
activity	in	question”	(A	Definition	of	Consent	to	Sexual	Activity).	Further,	the	Criminal	Code	
elaborates	on	situations	where	no	consent	exists:	“when	an	agreement	is	expressed	by	(…)	a	
person	other	than	the	complainant,	if	the	complainant	is	incapable	of	consenting	to	the	activity,	
where	the	accused	induces	the	complainant	to	engage	in	the	activity	by	abusing	a	position	of	
trust,	power	or	authority,	where	the	complainant	expresses	a	lack	of	agreement	(…),	or	where	
the	complainant	having	consented	to	engage	(…)	expresses	(…)	a	lack	of	agreement	to	
continue…”	(A	Definition	of	Consent	to	Sexual	Activity).	Consent	is	not	simply	the	absence	of	no,	
but	requires	ongoing,	voluntary	agreement.	Further,	“it	is	not	a	defence	(…)	that	the	accused	
believed	that	the	complainant	consented	to	the	activity,”	(A	Definition	of	Consent	to	Sexual	
Activity). 
DesChamps	notes	in	her	report	that	there	are	many	members	of	the	CAF	who	have	a	
poor	understanding	of	what	consent	is	and	that	it	is	generally	poorly	defined	by	the	CAF	
(DesChamps	2015,	47).	As	the	CAF	is	an	institution	of	the	Government	of	Canada,	it	uses	the	
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same	definition	of	consent	used	by	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada.	CAF	members	must	be	held	
to	the	standards	in	the	Criminal	Code	of	Canada,	where	consent	is	determined	with	reference	
to	the	complainant’s	internal	state	of	mind	at	the	time	of	the	event	(A	Definition	of	Consent	to	
Sexual	Activity).	This	means	that	silence	cannot	be	interpreted	to	be	consent,	nor	can	lack	of	
consciousness	or	significant	intoxication.	Similarly,	it	means	that	for	rape	to	have	occurred,	a	
victim	does	not	have	to	have	physically	fought	back	but	rather	just	have	not	indicated	that	they	
wanted	to	continue	(DesChamps	2015,	50).	DesChamps	found	in	her	review	of	the	CAF	that	
members	interviewed	indicated	a	“perception	that	victims	implicitly	consented	to	or	invited	
their	own	assault”	(2015,	45).	This	indicates	a	poor	understanding	of	what	consent	is,	and	a	
victim-blaming	attitude.		
This	definition	of	consent	is	important	because	the	DesChamps	report	notes	a	significant	
number	of	victims	are	women	of	low	ranks,	while	their	assailants	are	men	of	a	higher	rank	who	
use	coercion	(DesChamps	2015,	50).	She	further	notes	that	given	an	overall	focus	on	obedience	
and	conformity	within	the	chain	of	command	junior	members	may	feel	they	have	little	choice	
but	to	go	along	with	someone	who	may	have	an	impact	on	their	career	progression	
(Deschamps	2015,	19).	With	this	context	in	mind	it	is	not	unreasonable	to	expect	that	many	
victims	will	in	fact	not	physically	fight	back	against	an	assault.		
The	RMC	Policy	on	consent	is	explicit	and	aligns	with	the	definition	put	forward	by	the	
Criminal	Code	of	Canada.	Furthermore,	the	definition	gives	examples	in	order	to	provide	the	
exact	parameters	of	accepted	behaviour.	For	example,	it	specifies	that	consent	must	be	
voluntary	and	given	willingly	and	that	the	consent	is	for	a	mutually	agreed	activity.	As	well,	it	
specifies	that	silence	is	not	consent;	being	asleep	or	unconscious	prevents	a	person	from	giving	
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consent;	coercion	is	not	consent;	a	mental	disability	prevents	consent;	consent	in	the	past	is	not	
present	time	consent;	consent	must	be	ongoing;	consent	cannot	be	given	on	behalf	of	another	
person;	abuse	of	power	does	not	lead	to	consent;	and	that	the	initiator	is	responsible	for	
ensuring	the	consent	of	the	other	party	(Royal	Military	College	of	Canada	Policy	on	Harmful	and	
Inappropriate	Sexual	Behaviour).	This	is	a	good	example	of	a	specific	policy	that	provides	clear	
boundaries	as	well	as	examples	(like	being	unconscious	or	silence	not	counting	as	consent).		
It	is	important	for	members	across	the	CAF	to	have	a	good	working	knowledge	of	what	
consent	means,	not	only	in	official	definitions	for	policies,	but	what	it	looks	like	in	practical	
situations.	Some	of	these	practical	situations	are	ones	involving	inebriation	due	to	alcohol,	
coercion	due	to	the	rank	structure,	states	of	consciousness,	and	the	difference	between	the	
absence	of	‘no’	and	the	presence	of	‘yes.’	
	
Culture	
In	my	analysis	looking	for	indications	of	culture	and	top-down	construction	of	culture	I	found	
that	the	CAF	has	put	forward	enough	policies	that	culture	should	be	shaped	and	influenced	by	
them.	The	culture	of	a	military	is	influenced	by	its	policies.	However,	it	is	important	to	note	that	
the	tendency	toward	rape	culture	and	a	sexualized	environment	is	not	entirely	learned	within	
the	CAF.	Within	Canadian	culture	there	is	already	a	pervasive,	sexist	culture	and	the	CAF’s	
reputation	is	such	that	those	with	these	cultural	tendencies	would	also	be	attracted	to	this	
profession.	While	cultural	attitude	consistent	with	rape	culture	already	exist,	the	policies	within	
the	CAF	work	to	maintain	these	cultural	attitudes.		
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There	is	a	significant	responsibility	on	members	at	the	junior	leadership	level	to	deal	
with	various	problems	that	arise.	This	responsibility	is	furthered	due	to	the	fact	that	the	policies	
of	the	CAF	are	quite	vague,	meaning	the	limits	on	behaviours	of	members	are	extensive.	This	
responsibility	on	junior	members	means	that	culture	may	not	be	being	built	top-down	as	
intended	but	rather	bottom-up.	The	policies	provide	a	very	wide	allowance	of	behaviours	and	if	
junior	members	do	not	find	issue	with	behaviours	and	policies	do	not	explicitly	condemn	them,	
then	they	are	condoned.	For	example,	DesChamps	states	in	her	report	that,	“experiences	with	
sexual	harassment	begin	as	early	as	basic	training,	where	inappropriate	language	used	by	
trainers	appears	to	go	unpunished”	(2015,	15).	Sexually	harassing	language	is	commonplace	
and	the	policies	of	the	CAF	do	not	explicitly	condemn	it,	meaning	it	is	given	wide	allowance.	In	
the	wording	of	the	policies,	there	are	items,	such	as	scandalous	behaviour	where	a	punishment	
is	“dismissal	from	Her	Majesty’s	service	or	to	less	punishment”	(QR&O	103,	7)	and	junior	
leadership	may	not	bother	to	pass	on	a	punishment	at	all.	This	is	a	broad	range,	though	for	
sexual	misconduct	the	specified	punishment	is	administrative	action,	which	typically	ranges	
between	written	warnings	to	monetary	fines.	Frequently	these	punishments,	if	they	occur,	are	
weak	and	insignificant	in	a	member’s	career.	In	February	2015	a	CAF	officer	was	sexually	
assaulted	by	another	officer,	working	as	a	physician	(Former	military	officer	says	she	was	
sexually	assaulted	by	military	physician).	He	was	arrested	in	January	2016	and	charged	with	one	
count	of	sexual	assault	and	allowed	to	work	but	with	conditions:	initially	a	female	attendant	
must	be	present	for	any	appointments	with	female	patients,	and	now	Nordstrom	may	only	see	
male	patients,	as	well	a	sign	must	be	present	in	his	practice	stating	these	restrictions	(Former	
military	officer	says	she	was	sexually	assaulted	by	military	physician).	Though	he	has	been	
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charged	but	not	convicted,	Nordstrom	continues	to	practice	without	any	suspension.	
Furthermore,	one	of	his	bail	conditions	was	a	ban	on	consumption	of	alcohol	and	when	he	
breached	this	condition	was	only	fined	$500	(Former	military	officer	says	she	was	sexually	
assaulted	by	military	physician).	This	sexual	assault	charge	has	been	ongoing	for	19	months.	
This	lengthy	time	being	taken	to	come	to	a	conclusion	regarding	a	sexual	assault	charge	is	a	
problem	because	if	correctly	convicted	the	time	between	the	charge	and	conviction	leaves	
others	vulnerable	to	victimization	by	the	assailant.	The	policy	regarding	sexual	misconduct	
states	punishment	to	be	administrative	action,	but	has	no	specification	for	administrative	
actions	before	a	conviction	has	been	made.	This	is	significant	in	this	example	specifically	
because	physicians	hold	inherent	trust	in	society	due	to	their	position	and	frequently	interact	
with	vulnerable	populations.		
	 DesChamps	states	that	“organizational	culture	is	the	pattern	of	basic	assumptions	that	a	
given	group	has	invented,	discovered,	or	developed	in	learning	to	cope	with	its	problems	of	
external	adaptation	and	internal	integration	and	that	have	worked	well	enough	to	be	
considered	valid,	and	therefore	to	be	taught	to	new	members	as	the	correct	way	to	perceive,	
think,	and	feel,	in	relation	to	those	problems”	(2015,	12).	This	definition	indicates	that	culture	is	
not	immediately	created,	and	therefore	cannot	be	immediately	changed.	As	well,	it	involves	all	
people	within	a	cultural	environment,	no	matter	how	large.	This	means	that	in	order	to	adjust	
the	culture	of	the	military,	each	member	must	adjust	their	basic	assumptions,	thoughts,	and	
feelings	regarding	any	encountered	problems	and	adjust	to	acknowledge	certain	instances	as	
problems	in	the	first	place.	Some	members	interviewed	by	DesChamps	said	that	they	feel	that	
the	sexualized	culture	is	tied	to	the	broader	challenges	women	face	integrating	into	the	
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organization	(DesChamps	2015,	18).	Her	report	further	specifies	an	underlying	sexualized	
culture	that	makes	culture	change	key;	policy	change	is	not	enough	and	leaders	must	pay	direct	
and	sustained	attention	to	this	problem	(DesChamps	2015,	iv).	This	is	not	to	say	that	any	policy	
change	at	all	will	not	be	effective.	In	fact,	DesChamps	states	that	the	language	of	the	policies	
relating	to	sexual	assault	and	harassment	must	change	to	closer	reflect	the	criminal	code	of	
Canada,	and	to	specifically	address	the	sexualized	environment	(DesChamps	2015,	ix).	
However,	unless	the	culture	and	individual	attitudes	of	members	are	not	also	amended,	the	
policy	change	will	be	less	effective	than	it	could	be.	The	language	of	the	Ops	Order	indicates	
that	the	CDS	knows	a	culture	change	of	this	measure	will	require	a	long	term	effort;	however,	it	
still	places	deadlines	such	as	2019	for	‘Full	Operational	Capacity’15	(Ops	Order	Op	HONOUR,	4),	
which	means	that	there	is	still	an	expectation	of	(relatively)	quick	results	that	are	likely	not	
possible	due	to	the	complex	nature	of	culture	change.		
	 DesChamps	acknowledges	both	high	and	low	level	harassing	events	and	recommends	
widespread	cultural	reform,	arguing	policy	change	will	be	ineffective	without	it	(2015,	ix).	She	
notes	doing	this	requires	addressing	serious	incidents	of	sexual	assault,	but	more	than	that	the	
lower-level	incidents,	such	as	sexualized	and	demeaning	language,	must	be	addressed.	I	find	
that	this	ought	to	occur	at	the	unit-level	by	the	senior	leadership	(commanding	or	other	
officers),	and	then	also	by	junior	leadership	(where	the	responsibility	of	punishing	these	
instances	frequently	falls).	I	find	that	due	to	the	culture	and	the	ambiguous	wording	of	the	
policies	surrounding	sexual	harassment	and	sexual	assault	that	junior	leadership	are	unlikely	to	
																																																						
15	Full	Operational	Capacity	is	phrasing	that	indicates	a	fully	effective	fighting	force	of	the	CAF.	
In	this	context	it	means	that	sexual	assault	and	sexual	harassment	will	no	longer	be	a	systemic	
problem	within	the	CAF.		
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address	these	harassing	incidents	in	a	way	that	discourages	the	behaviour	from	occurring	again.	
DesChamps	recommends	cultural	change	through	all	levels	of	the	CAF	and	addressing	both	low	
and	high-level	incidents	of	sexual	harassment	and	sexual	assault	but	does	not	provide	further	
detail	for	how	this	might	be	done.	I	presume	that	a	top	down	approach	could	be	effective	
where	the	senior	leadership	of	units	are	leveraged	(as	stated	in	the	Operation	Order)	(Ops	
Order	Op	HONOUR,	4)	and	junior	leadership	may	mimic	a	new	response	to	responding	to	these	
harassing	events.		An	example	of	the	culture	is	one	interviewee’s	statement	to	DesChamps	
when	he	said	“girls	that	come	to	the	army	know	what	to	expect”	(2015,	16).	Those	in	the	
current	cultural	climate	of	the	CAF	believe	that	this	normal	is	a	good	normal	that	everyone	
should	learn	to	live	with	rather	than	one	that	is	discriminatory	(DesChamps	2015,	16).	The	
identification	of	serious	and	less	serious	incidents	is	important	to	note	because	the	language	of	
the	CAF’s	policies	state	a	single	example	of	a	type	of	offence,	such	as	scandalous	conduct	
generally,	and	for	these	offences	offer	vague	punishments.	This	means	that	in	a	spectrum	
ranging	from	sexual	assault	to	thievery,	the	policy	only	states	scandalous	conduct	as	an	offence	
and	then	further	states	the	punishment	to	be	“dismissal	from	Her	Majesty’s	service	or	to	less	
punishment”	(QR&O	CHAPTER	103,	7).	Further,	in	DAOD	5019	regarding	sexual	misconduct,	it	
states	it	to	be	“acts	that	are	either	sexual	in	nature	or	committed	with	the	intent	to	commit	an	
act	or	acts	that	are	sexual	in	nature,	and	constitutes	an	offence	under	the	Criminal	Code	or	
Code	of	Service	Discipline”	(DAOD	5019,	2).	The	punishment	for	sexual	misconduct	is	stated	to	
be,	“administrative	action,”	which	“may	only	be	taken	if	there	is	clear	and	convincing	evidence	
that	the	CAF	member	engaged	in	sexual	misconduct”	(DAOD	5019,	7).	The	phrasing	
administrative	action	is	very	vague	however	and	the	policy	further	states	“as	a	general	
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principle,	the	appropriate	administrative	action	is	one	that	best	reflects	the	degree	of	
incompatibility	between	the	CAF	member’s	sexual	misconduct	and	the	CAF	member’s	
continued	service	in	the	CAF”	(DAOD	5019,	8).	This	phrasing	expresses	that	although	for	
offences	like	scandalous	conduct	a	member	may	be	dismissed	from	the	CAF,	for	sexual	
misconduct,	including	sexual	assault,	a	member	will	likely	only	face	some	vague	form	of	
administrative	action	and	will	continue	to	serve.	This	is	an	issue	because	most	assailants	have	
multiple	victims.	Therefore,	by	allowing	members	convicted	of	sexual	misconduct	to	continue	
serving,	other	members	remain	in	danger	due	to	repeat	offenders.	This	sustains	a	culture	of	
permissiveness	toward	sexual	assault	as	offenders	may	feel	enabled	to	assault	again,	and	
others	may	feel	enabled	to	assault.		
The	lack	of	identification	of	the	range	of	seriousness	of	incidents	within	the	policies	
further	contributes	to	the	environment	of	systemic	sexism	as	this	thrives	on	the	existence	of	
small,	unquestioned	acts.	Many	less	serious	incidents,	of	any	type	of	offence,	are	dealt	with	at	a	
lower	leadership	level	among	NCMs	and	junior	officers.	DesChamps	saw	specific,	disregarding	
behaviour	of	these	less	serious	events	when	she	conducted	her	interviews	for	her	report	(2015,	
v).	Due	to	this,	whatever	culture	currently	exists	among	NCMs	will	be	enacted	through	the	
punishments	given.	This	makes	it	likely	that	demeaning	language	towards	female	members	will	
not	be	acknowledged	as	a	problem,	because	this	language	is	considered	normal	within	the	
military	culture.	As	well,	sexual	harassment	may	be	acknowledged	but	dealt	with	in	a	group	
setting	where	the	most	senior	authority,	who	would	still	be	a	junior	NCM,	makes	vague	jokes	
about	it	not	happening	again	(DesChamps	2015,	v).	The	significance	of	this	is	that	the	policies,	
with	their	vague	wording	that	only	discusses	the	extreme	end	of	offences	and	punishments,	
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contribute	to	a	permissive	environment	for	sexual	assault	because	all	offences	that	lead	up	to	
sexual	assault	are	not	adequately	acknowledged	and	a	range	of	reasonable	punishments	are	
not	provided.			
The	language	of	the	policies	and	policy	responses	of	the	CAF	contribute	to	its	culture.	
DesChamps	states	the	CAF	is	a	sexualized	environment,	and	I	have	further	determined	it	is	not	
entirely	welcoming	to	the	integration	of	women.	DesChamps	states	that	the	sexualized	
environment	disproportionately	targets	women	as	victims	(DesChamps	2015,	2).	This	is	one	
example	of	how	the	culture	of	the	CAF	is	not	conducive	to	fully	integrating	women.	Although	
the	policies	of	the	CAF	state	the	inclusion	of	women	in	any	and	all	positions,	there	is	low	
descriptive	representation	of	women,	and	further	low	substantive	representation	of	women	
from	both	male	and	female	members	which	is	evidenced	in	the	culture	that	uses	language	to	
denigrate	female	bodies	and	femininity.	The	sexualized	environment	that	DesChamps	has	
identified	is	a	contributory	factor	to	the	ineffective	integration	of	women.	Furthermore,	I	found	
that	the	language	of	the	policies	lends	to	the	permissive	nature	of	the	CAF	in	terms	of	sexual	
harassment	and	subsequently	sexual	assault.	Policies	are	written	in	a	way	to	mark	the	extreme	
extent	of	behaviours	with	regards	to	sexual	assault	as	well	as	the	extreme	extent	of	possible	
punishments	without	any	indication	as	to	the	range	that	could	exist	for	either	of	these.	This	is	a	
problem	because	sexually	harassing	and	assaulting	behaviours	have	a	significant	range	in	terms	
of	seriousness	and	by	only	recognizing	the	most	extreme	leaves	lack	of	clarity	for	what	
behaviours	are	or	are	not	acceptable.	These	should	be	rectified	in	order	to	move	towards	a	
culture	change	and	decrease	in	rates	of	sexual	assault	in	the	CAF.		
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Language	and	Limited	Narratives	
The	language	used	in	the	policies	for	the	most	part	is	vague	and	it	is	difficult	to	define	
boundaries	of	behaviour	for	members.	DesChamps	states	“defining	and	addressing	prohibited	
sexual	conduct	clearly	in	plain	language	is	the	foundation	upon	which	the	CAF	will	be	able	to	
reduce	incidents	of	sexual	assault	and	sexual	harassment”	(DesChamps	2015,	46).	This	is	
supported	by	her	finding	that	members	thought	the	policies	were	complex.	Complexity	may	be	
necessary	in	order	to	encompass	any	potential	negative	situation.	However,	the	complex	and	
vague	language	means	that	it	is	neither	understood	by	all	members	nor	provides	adequate	
boundaries.	The	DesChamps	report	recommended	using	plain	language	consistent	with	the	
Criminal	Code	of	Canada	(DesChamps	2015,	46).	This	means	that	instead	of	using	terms	like	
sexual	misconduct,	which	are	not	entirely	clear,	to	use	terms	like	sexual	assault,	because	it	
already	has	a	clear,	court-decided	definition.	Defence	Administration	Order	and	Directive	5019-
5,	Sexual	Misconduct	and	Sexual	Disorders,	uses	a	definition	of	sexual	misconduct	that	
references	the	Criminal	Code.16	Although	the	use	of	the	term	sexual	misconduct	rather	than	
sexual	assault	might	indicate	that	it	covers	sexual	harassment,	it	does	not.	Between	DAOD	
5019-5,	which	deals	with	the	sexual	misconduct,	and	DAOD	5012,	which	address	harassment	
generally,	sexual	harassment	is	not	covered.	The	definition	of	harassment	can	include	sexual	
harassment,	and	the	definition	of	sexual	misconduct	can	be	interpreted	to	include	sexual	
assault.	However,	sexual	harassment	is	not	explicitly	discussed,	meaning	it	is	apt	to	be	
																																																						
16	The	definition	of	sexual	misconduct	from	DAOD	5019	is,	“sexual	misconduct	consists	of	one	
or	more	acts	that:	are	either	sexual	in	nature	or	committed	with	the	intent	to	commit	an	act	or	
acts	that	are	sexual	in	nature,	and	constitutes	an	offence	under	the	Criminal	Code	or	Code	of	
Service	Discipline”	(DAOD	5019	2008,	2).	
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neglected	or	overlooked	should	it	be	reported.	The	language	of	the	policies	must	provide	an	
adequate	basis	for	acknowledging	and	dealing	with	all	aspects	of	sexual	assault	and	sexual	
harassment,	especially	because	the	military	has	a	reputation	as	an	unwelcoming	place	for	
women,	who	typically	experience	greater	levels	of	these.		
In	the	case	of	sexual	harassment,	the	CAF	definition	“is	overly	complex	and	unduly	
narrow	and	fails	to	capture	a	broad	range	of	inappropriate	sexual	conduct”	(DesChamps	2015,	
iv).	According	to	the	Defence	Administration	Order	and	Directive	5012,	each	of	these	criteria	
must	be	met	for	harassment	to	have	occurred:		
	
Improper	conduct	by	an	individual,	that	is	directed	at	and	offensive	to	another	
individual	in	the	workplace,	including	at	any	event	or	any	location	related	to	work	and	
the	individual	know	or	ought	reasonably	to	have	known	would	cause	offence	or	harm.	It	
comprises	objectionable	act(s),	comment(s),	or	display(s)	that	demean,	belittle,	or	cause	
personal	humiliation	or	embarrassment,	and	any	act	of	intimidation	or	threat.	It	also	
includes	harassment	within	the	meaning	of	the	Canadian	Human	Rights	Act	(i.e.	based	
on	race,	national	or	ethnic	origin,	colour,	religion,	age,	sex,	sexual	orientation,	marital	
status,	family	status,	disability,	pardoned	conviction,	and	conviction	for	which	a	record	
suspension	has	been	ordered).	Harassment	is	normally	a	series	of	incidents	but	can	be	
one	severe	incident	which	has	a	lasting	impact	on	the	individual	(DAOD	5012,	2).		
	
This	definition	is	problematic	for	a	few	reasons.	The	term	improper	conduct	is	not	defined	and	
there	is	not	a	reference	to	another	policy	or	piece	of	literature	to	provide	a	definition.	Further,	
	 90	
an	individual	“knowing	or	ought	reasonably	to	have	known”	(DOAD	5012,	2)	seems	like	decent	
wording;	however,	DesChamps	has	indicated	in	her	review	that	there	are	many	individuals	
within	the	CAF	who	have	internalized	the	misogynistic	culture	and	do	not	see	sexualized	
language	as	harassing	or	questionable.	As	well,	this	definition	of	harassment	requires	the	
‘improper	conduct’	to	be	directed	at	another	individual;	however,	language	or	behaviour	that	is	
used	generally	to	demean	an	entire	group	but	not	directed	to	an	individual	is	just	as	harassing.	
The	specifications	that	harassment	must	be	a	series	of	incidents	or	one	severe	incident	is	also	
problematic	because	specifying	the	necessity	of	an	event	as	severe	discourages	members	from	
reporting	any	series	of	slight	incidences.	As	well,	who	defines	when	any	number	of	events	
becomes	a	series,	and	must	it	always	be	directed	toward	the	same	person	for	a	series	to	begin	
or	can	multiple	victims	be	counted?	Further,	how	do	we	define	severe	or	lasting	impact?	This	
definition	also	does	not	take	into	account	one	victim	who	has	experienced	a	number	of	
harassing	events	from	multiple	perpetrators.	The	phrasing	of	this	harassment	definition	
undermines	attempts	to	remedy	the	sexualized	culture	of	the	CAF	because	it	discourages	
members	from	reporting	many	incidents.	Thus,	I	argue	this	definition	is	not	adequate	and	does	
not	encompass	enough	types	of	incidents	in	order	to	adequately	address	the	harassment	that	
occurs	in	a	sexualized	environment	like	the	CAF.	This	is	a	significant	oversight	because	sexual	
harassment	can	be	any	number	of	unwanted	inappropriate	language	or	behaviours	ranging	
from	asking	sexual	questions	or	making	jokes	to	following	a	person	or	touching	them	in	any	
manner	(What	is	Sexual	Harassment?).	If	a	written	policy	does	not	capture	this	broad	range,	
especially	when	the	policy	is	written	for	people	who	already	exist	in	a	sexualized	environment,	
this	builds	a	potential	for	harassment	to	occur	without	official	means	to	stop	it.		
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Despite	the	DesChamps	report,	however,	the	Ops	Order	for	Operation	HONOUR	
continued	to	use	vague	language	without	explicit	definitions.	In	the	Operation	Order	for	OP	
HONOUR,	the	problem	definition	is	relatively	extensive;	however,	it	continues	to	use	vague	
language.	For	example,	“indecent	acts”	is	used	but	not	defined.	This	is	important	because	a	
term	like	this	holds	cultural	connotations	as	to	how	it	should	be	interpreted.	It	could	mean	
specific	sexual	acts	between	consenting	parties,	but	it	also	could	mean	any	sexual	act	without	
consent.	This	is	unclear	because	in	DAOD	5019	it	states	that	fraternization	between	consenting	
parties	is	prohibited,	but	a	definition	of	fraternization	is	not	given	(DAOD	5019,	3)	and	it	is	only	
through	DesChamps’	review	that	we	learn	fraternization	is	with	reference	to	parties	from	
enemy	groups	(DesChamps	2015,	37).	With	this	as	a	reference,	it	is	unclear	what	norms	should	
be	used	to	interpret	the	wording.		
The	Defence	Administration	Orders	and	Directives	and	the	Queen’s	Regulations	and	
Orders	are	both	policy	documents	written	with	very	vague	language.	This	is	significant	because	
these	are	the	documents	that	guide	the	allowed	behaviours	of	members	of	the	CAF	and	the	
ambiguous	wording	means	that	there	are	many	behaviours	that	can	slip	through	the	cracks	as	
acceptable.	Similarly,	the	Statement	of	Defence	Ethics	is	also	written	with	vague	language.	It	is	
written	with	the	idea	that	there	is	a	normalizing	force	in	the	CAF	where	everyone	will	
understand	what	is	right	and	what	is	wrong	and	what	is	meant	by	ethical	behaviour.	An	
example	of	this	wording	is	when	it	states	that	members	will	“perform	duties	to	the	highest	
ethical	standards”	(Statement	of	Defence	Ethics).	The	CAF	as	a	military	institution	is	a	primary	
group	that	holds	tight	normalizing	forces,	meaning	that	most	members	have	very	similar	
behaviours.	However,	ethics	is	a	grey	area	where	there	are	many	different	ideas	of	what	is	and	
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is	not	acceptable.	In	order	to	have	policies	act	as	a	top-down	culture	definition	they	need	to	be	
written	in	a	more	precise	manner.	The	CAF’s	attitude	toward	sexual	assault	and	harassment	
prevention	ought	to	be	one	that	is	focused	on	the	systemic	nature	of	the	offences.	The	
differences	in	prevalence	between	the	CAF	and	Canadian	society	generally	may	be	attributed	
partially	to	the	culture	of	the	CAF:	emphasizing	aggression	and	violence	and	denigrating	women	
and	femininity.	There	ought	to	be	cultural	change	that	stems	partially	from	language	
adjustments	in	policies.	For	example,	the	policies	for	the	CAF	generally	should	include	
definitions	of	consent,	as	is	found	in	the	RMC	policy.	Better	definitions	and	clearer	language	will	
educate	members	about	practical	scenarios	(such	as	sexual	conduct	when	one	or	more	partners	
are	inebriated,	or	unconscious).		
The	document	states	that	members	will	“help	to	create	and	maintain	safe	and	healthy	
workplaces	that	are	free	from	harassment	and	discrimination”	(Statement	of	Defence	Ethics).	
However,	this	is	only	effective	wording	if	everyone	holds	the	same	definition	of	harassment.	
DesChamps	discussed	interviewing	various	members	of	the	CAF	and	found	some	male	
members	who	did	not	think	that	the	environment	of	the	CAF	was	sexualized	or	harassing	for	
female	members	but	rather	that	it	was	normal	behaviour	(DesChamps	2015,	16).	This	runs	
contrary	to	some	female	members	that	DesChamps	interviewed	who	said	that	they	had	
experienced	various	types	and	levels	of	harassing	language	and	behaviour	in	the	CAF	
(DesChamps	2015,	16).	Due	to	the	fact	that	members	do	not	have	the	same	ideas	of	what	is	and	
is	not	harassment	the	vague	language	is	not	effective.	The	imprecise	language	of	the	policies	
and	a	lack	of	policies	that	explicitly	condemn	sexually	harassing	behaviour	and	a	culture	that	
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accepts	this	behaviour	towards	women	as	normal	contributes	to	a	permissive	environment	for	
sexual	harassment	and	sexual	assault.		
The	organization	of	the	Queens	Regulations	and	Orders,	as	a	body	of	policies	that	
govern	the	behaviours	of	all	CAF	members,	is	not	necessarily	all	encompassing.	Chapter	103,	
Service	Offences	has	many	sections	but	none	that	relate	directly	to	sexual	assault.	One	of	the	
sections	is	about	striking	another	member	and	another	one	is	about	false	accusations,	and	
there	is	a	broad	section	regarding	drunkenness.	Each	of	these	may	be	tangentially	related	to	
sexual	assault	and	could	be	interpreted	through	the	lens	of	sexual	assault,	though	this	relation	
is	not	made	clear.	A	more	specific	example	is	Chapter	103.25,	which	states	“every	officer	who	
behaves	in	a	scandalous	manner	unbecoming	an	officer	is	guilty	of	an	offense	and	on	conviction	
shall	suffer	dismissal	with	disgrace	from	Her	Majesty’s	service	or	dismissal	from	Her	Majesty’s	
service”	(QR&O	103.25,	68).	This	appears	to	be	a	straightforward	policy	regarding	the	conduct	
of	officers	in	the	CAF;	however,	at	no	point	in	this	section	is	‘scandalous	behaviour’	defined.	
This	means	that	the	definition	of	scandalous	behaviour	is	at	the	discretion	of	any	senior	officer	
who	may	determine	that	another	member	is	acting	in	a	way	they	find	scandalous.	Chapter	
103.26	is	similar	to	103.25	but	refers	to	cruel	or	disgraceful	conduct,	but	again	without	a	
definition	of	what	this	means.	Chapter	103.28	references	abuse	of	subordinates,	stating	“every	
person	who	strikes	or	otherwise	ill-treats	any	person	who	by	reason	of	rank	or	appointment	is	
subordinate	to	him	is	guilty	of	an	offence	and	on	conviction	is	liable	to	imprisonment	for	less	
than	two	years	or	to	less	punishment”	(QR&O	103.17,	47).	This	policy	is	more	specific	in	that	
they	specify	striking	or	ill-treating;	however,	it	is	not	clear	how	wide	or	narrow	the	definition	of	
ill-treatment	is.	The	use	of	derogatory	language	against	an	entire	group	based	on	their	sex,	or	
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sexual	preference,	could	be	considered	ill-treatment,	though	this	definition	may	only	consider	
physical	acts	of	harm.	In	that	case,	this	policy	would	seemingly	cover	sexual	assault,	though	not	
all	sexual	assaults	are	violent	affairs	but	may	be	quiet	abuses	of	power	and	coercion.	These	
types	of	vague	policy,	without	clear	definitions,	mean	that	the	understanding	of	each	is	left	to	
cultural	norms.	So,	while	for	some	groups	a	cultural	norm	could	consider	sexual	harassment	or	
sexual	assault	as	scandalous	behaviour,	there	are	groups	that	would	not	agree.	The	cultural	
norms	of	the	CAF	do	not	reject	demeaning	language	and	harassing	behaviour	towards	women,	
which	opens	up	opportunity	for	sexual	assault	to	occur	without	ramifications.	Furthermore,	
without	a	clear	definition	of	scandalous	conduct,	sexual	harassment	and	assault	could	be	
interpreted	to	fall	under	this	umbrella	but	it	is	not	specified.	The	gap	within	Chapter	103	
between	relatively	specific	policies	against	striking	one	another	and	drunkenness	as	well	as	
vague	policies	against	scandalous	behaviour	provides	a	permissive	environment	for	sexual	
assault.	
Policy	language	is	important	because	it	attempts	to	express	some	of	the	intentions	of	
those	who	created	the	policies	to	those	who	must	abide	by	them.	This	is	mostly	so	in	terms	of	
the	general	conduct	of	members	of	the	CAF,	rather	than	in	terms	of	the	culture.	Speculation	on	
the	intentions	of	authors	is	difficult,	though	to	some	extent,	the	policies	indicate	their	objective	
of	how	members	act.	Further,	policy	language	defines	the	boundaries	of	accepted	behaviour	
and	if	the	language	is	unclear	then	this	means	the	boundaries	are	unclear.	Furthermore,	the	
language	in	DesChamps’	External	Review,	and	any	other	response,	is	important	because	this	is	a	
guiding	document	the	Chief	of	Defence	Staff	uses	to	conduct	change	from	within	the	CAF.		
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The	language	within	the	DesChamps	report	places	women	as	victims.	DesChamps	states	
that	the	sexualized	culture	is	hostile	to	women	and	LBGTQ	members	and	that	the	strong	
majority	of	victims	of	sexual	assault	in	the	CAF	are	women	and	assailants	are	men,	and	thus	
chooses	to	use	pronouns	that	reflect	this	(DesChamps	2015,	2).	DesChamps	does	mention	that	
there	are	male	victims	of	sexual	assault	but	implies	that	the	perpetrators	of	this	are	other	men	
(DesChamps	2015,	19).	This	continues	the	exclusive	narrative	of	men	as	perpetrators	of	this	
crime	and	refuses	to	acknowledge	that	women	as	well	may	be	assailants.	This	is	significant	with	
regards	to	both	male	and	female	victims	as	if	their	understanding	of	who	may	be	an	assailant	is	
limited	to	men	only,	then	it	is	likely	that	they	will	suffer	more	and	be	less	likely	to	report	the	
offensive	conduct	if	it	was	perpetrated	by	a	woman.	The	other	limited	narrative	that	
DesChamps	perpetuated	is	that	the	victims	are	lower-ranking	women	and	higher-ranking	men	
are	assailants.	This	type	of	narrative	isolates	male	victims	and	dismisses	women	as	
perpetrators.	The	implications	of	this	are	that	male	victims	will	be	less	likely	to	report	being	
victims	of	sexual	assault,	as	victims	state	their	reluctance	to	report	stems	from	distrust	in	the	
system	(DesChamps	2015,	29),	which	would	be	exacerbated	by	a	dismissal	of	their	experience.	
Although	this	statement	is	statistically	true,	DesChamps’	report	would	have	benefitted	from	a	
statement	that	includes	other	victims.	As	well,	if	members	have	a	current	misunderstanding	of	
what	constitutes	consent	and	sexual	assault,	perpetuating	limited	narratives	of	who	are	or	are	
not	assailants	and	victims	further	maintains	this.			
The	Queen’s	Regulations	and	Orders	Chapter	103.29	is	entirely	about	making	false	
accusations	(QR&O	103.29,	72).	Though	this	is	not	specifically	with	regards	to	sexual	assault,	it	
could	be	interpreted	to	include	this.	This	is	problematic	because	there	now	exists	a	large	
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incentive	not	to	be	found	falsely	accusing	someone	of	sexual	assault	and	even	though	the	
Criminal	Code	of	Canada	is	clear	with	regards	to	non-consensual	sexual	touching,	there	remains	
a	perception,	especially	in	military	culture,	that	victims	may	have	invited	their	assault.	The	
significance	of	this	is	that	if	the	chain	of	command	has	determined	that	a	victim’s	report	is	not	
sexual	assault	then	they	may	in	turn	be	charged	with	falsely	accusing,	which	acts	as	a	
disincentive	for	victims.	Similarly,	QR&O	Chapter	103.30	is	about	drunkenness	and	the	wording	
indicates	that	being	intoxicated	at	all	may	lead	to	being	charged.	This	policy	is	a	disincentive	for	
victims	who	were	assaulted	while	under	the	influence	to	report	because	they	could,	technically,	
subsequently	be	charged	with	drunkenness.	These	policies	are	disincentives	to	report	not	only	
because	they	may	not	receive	the	support	they	need	but	may	receive	charges	themselves	
The	fear	of	false	allegations	is	supported	generally	in	the	culture	where	members,	
usually	women,	who	report	are	subject	to	isolation	in	the	community	(DesChamps	2015,	17),	
and	in	the	policies	that	protect	alleged	assailants.	The	Defence	Administration	Orders	and	
Directives	5019	point	4.9	states	“Before	determining	appropriate	administrative	action,	the	
approval	authority	shall	consider	all	the	evidence	surrounding	the	sexual	misconduct.	In	
weighing	that	evidence,	the	approval	authority	is	required	to	consider	the	following:	(a)	a	CAF	
member’s	entire	period	of	service,	taking	into	account	the	CAF	member’s	rank,	military	
occupation,	experience,	and	position”	(DAOD	5019,	8).	This	aspect	of	the	policy	is	problematic	
in	that	the	member’s	position	and	time	does	not	affect	whether	or	not	they	have	committed	
sexual	assault,	or	will	have	made	them	more	or	less	likely	to	commit	assault.	In	fact,	DesChamps	
reports	that	more	perpetrators	tend	to	be	members	of	higher	rank	(DesChamps	2015,	ii).	This	is	
evidenced	by	situations	such	as	ex-Colonel	Russell	Williams	who	commanded	Canadian	Forces	
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Base	Trenton	before	being	found	guilty	of	sexual	assault	and	murder,	among	other	charges	(Col.	
Russell	Williams	Pleads	Guilty	2010).	The	rank	and	position	of	a	member	does	not	preclude	
them	from	committing	crimes	and	the	policy	that	states	consideration	of	this	is	problematic	
because	it	is	not	true	evidentiary	support	of	whether	or	not	a	crime	was	committed.	
DesChamps	also	found	that	the	chain	of	command	appears	mostly	to	be	interested	in	
protecting	itself	from	the	negative	effects	of	complaints	and	protecting	the	reputation	of	
leaders,	and	is	less	concerned	with	protecting	the	well-being	of	any	complainants	(DesChamps	
2015,	21).	In	the	CAF	there	appears	to	be	an	emphasis	on	reducing	false	reports	rather	than	
with	dealing	with	any	reports	that	come	through.	However,	most	victims	do	not	report	due	to	
fear	of	negative	consequences	on	their	career,	fear	of	collateral	charges,	and	a	deep	skepticism	
that	the	chain	of	command	will	respond	sensitively	and	appropriately	(DesChamps	2015,	21).	In	
the	CAF	over	a	period	of	12	months,	960	members	anonymously	reported	being	victims	of	
sexual	assault,	but	the	Canadian	Forces	Military	Police	report	states	130	initiated	investigations	
regarding	sexual	assault	for	the	year,	indicating	that	only	13.5%	of	sexual	assaults	are	reported.	
This	means	that	victims	of	sexual	assault	are	statistically	unlikely	to	report	when	sexual	assault	
does	occur.	As	well,	a	ten-year	study	of	false	allegations	of	sexual	assault	at	a	major	
Northeastern	University	finds	that	the	prevalence	of	false	allegations	is	between	two	and	ten	
percent	(Lisak,	Gardinier,	Nicksa	2010,	1318).	So,	while	it	is	an	issue,	what	remains	a	greater	
issue,	especially	in	an	environment	where	harassment	is	considered	normal	behaviour,	is	
significant	underreporting	(DesChamps	2015,	33).	Likely	contributors	to	this	attitude	regarding	
false	reporting	are	the	existence	of	policies	that	discuss	false	reporting	as	well	as	the	
internalization	of	a	misogynistic	culture	that	does	not	perceive	behaviours	as	harassing,	but	
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rather	as	a	normal	part	of	life	in	the	CAF	(DesChamps	2015,	16;	QR&O	103.29,	72).	If	members	
expect	that	sexual	harassment	and	even	sexual	assault	are	experiences	of	many	members,	then	
the	motivation	to	report	may	decrease	as	this	is	no	longer	an	isolated	incident	but	a	systemic	
experience.		
Defence	Administration	Order	and	Directive	5019-5,	Sexual	Misconduct	and	Sexual	
Disorders,	states	that	administrative	action	may	only	be	taken	if	there	is	clear	and	convincing	
evidence	that	the	CAF	member	engaged	in	sexual	misconduct	(DAOD	5019,	7).	However,	clear	
and	convincing	evidence	does	not	have	a	global	understanding.	This	is	especially	problematic	
with	a	culture	focused	on	protecting	from	false	allegations	and	protecting	the	reputation	of	
members	and	the	institution,	as	well	as	focused	on	finding	resolutions	at	the	lowest-level.	This	
policy	further	states	the	facts	of	the	case	must	be	considered,	along	with	the	victim	and	the	
victim’s	circumstances,	the	CAF	member’s	relationship	to	the	victim,	and	the	degree	to	which	
the	act	was	intrusive	or	violent	(DAOD	5019,	7).	Firstly,	the	emphasis	on	both	the	victim	and	the	
alleged	perpetrator’s	circumstances	means	that	if	the	alleged	perpetrator	is	of	a	higher	rank	
(which	DesChamps	indicates	is	a	frequent	situation	(DesChamps	2015,	16)),	then,	according	to	
this	policy,	less	weight	will	be	given	to	the	victim’s	testimony.	However,	an	assailant’s	position	
does	not	preclude	them	from	assaulting	another	member.	Secondly,	the	language	of	this	policy	
indicates	that	an	assault	that	ended	up	violent	is	worse	than	an	assault	that	occurred	through	
coercion	or	from	an	unconscious	victim	(DAOD	5019,	7).	This	language	has	elements	of	victim-
blaming	in	that	it	indicates	that	victims	should	‘fight	off’	their	attacker	in	order	to	be	taken	
more	seriously.	This	creates	a	false	ranking	system	of	how	serious	various	kinds	of	sexual	
	 99	
assault	are	and	discourages	members	from	reporting.	Furthermore,	it	comes	from	an	
uneducated	perspective	regarding	victim	behaviour	in	sexual	assault.17	
The	language	used	by	the	CAF	in	their	policy	documents	is	imprecise,	meaning	there	are	
a	variety	of	interpretations	that	members	may	use	when	using	the	documents	to	either	inform	
their	behaviour	or	to	inform	an	assessment	of	other	member’s	behaviour.	The	omission	of	a	
specific	discussion	regarding	sexual	harassment	is	significant.	This	means	there	is	no	clear	
directive	regarding	what	is	and	is	not	sexual	harassment	as	well	as	how	it	should	be	dealt	with.	
Further,	the	inclusion	of	a	section	regarding	false	allegations	is	also	significant.	Finally,	the	lack	
of	specific	lenient	or	tough	punishments	for	sexual	assault,	but	instead	the	general	
administrative	action	and	the	phrasing	that	specifically	indicates	various	evidence	must	be	
reviewed,	is	all	indicative	of	the	priorities	of	the	top	leadership	of	the	CAF,	which	do	not	
prevent	or	sufficiently	react	to	sexual	assault.	Instead,	these	policies	provide	a	permissive	
environment	for	sexual	harassment	and	sexual	assault	to	occur.		
	
Support	for	Victims		
Between	the	policies	I	analyzed	for	this	research	there	are	differing	emphases	on	support	for	
victims	and	language	that	comes	across	as	victim-blaming.	There	are	a	number	of	programs	and	
services	that	exist	to	offer	support	to	victims;	however,	access	to	them	by	most	members	is	
inadequate.	Some	of	the	services,	like	Chaplains,	are	only	available	during	certain	times	and	
members	must	get	permission	from	their	chain	of	command,	which	is	a	deterrent	if	their	
																																																						
17	There	is	a	documented	phenomenon	of	‘freezing	up’	called	tonic	immobility	where	a	victim	
does	not	fight	in	the	midst	of	a	sexual	assault	but	instead	experiences	involuntary	immobility	
(Moller,	Sondergaard,	Helstrom,	2017).	
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immediate	supervisor	is	not	supportive	(DesChamps	2015,	75).	Further,	nurses	and	social	
workers	are	helpful,	but	their	role	is	limited	because	they	are	only	involved	once	a	person	is	
referred	for	medical	care	(DesChamps	2015,	3).		As	well,	DesChamps	notes	in	her	report	that	
most	participants	she	interviewed	were	unaware	of	what	programs	and	services	are	available	
to	victims	because	they	are	not	informed	properly	after	reporting	(DesChamps	2015,	v).	
Mechanisms	have	been	put	in	place	to	support	victims;	however,	there	needs	to	be	a	flow	chart	
put	in	place	such	that	whomever	a	victim	goes	to	is	able	to	direct	them	to	the	information	and	
resources	they	need	in	a	logical	and	consistent	manner.		
Another	aspect	of	the	policies	that	does	not	provide	support	for	victims	is	the	emphasis	
on	lowest-level	resolution,	which	requires	victims	to	confront	their	harassers	(DesChamps	2015,	
29).	This	is	problematic	because	victims,	especially	if	they	are	of	a	lower	rank	then	their	
attackers,	will	likely	be	discouraged	from	confronting	their	attackers	due	to	the	hierarchical	
system	of	the	military.	In	the	Ops	Order	it	is	indicated	that	now	everyone	is	responsible	for	
reporting	harassment	and	misdemeanours	rather	than	only	the	victim	(Ops	Order	Op	
HONOUR).	This	is	a	good	change	because	it	invokes	the	team	atmosphere	of	the	military	and	
provides	better	support	for	victims.	There	is	significant	under-reporting	of	sexual	assaults	from	
the	victims	themselves	due	to	fear	of	negative	repercussions	in	their	career	(DesChamps	2015,	
15).	Compelling	all	members	to	be	responsible	for	reporting	sexual	assault	works	towards	
adjusting	the	team	attitude	from	one	of	protecting	the	perpetrator	to	one	of	protecting	the	
victim.	It	changes	the	perspective	of	the	situation	from	a	victim	reporting	a	sexual	assault	going	
against	the	team	to	one	of	a	perpetrator	betraying	the	team	by	sexually	assaulting	another	
member.	The	changes	being	made	in	the	CAF	through	Operation	HONOUR	are	positive	changes	
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that	show	better	support	for	victims;	however,	the	policies	that	continue	to	govern	the	CAF	
must	be	adjusted	as	well.		
The	policies	of	the	CAF	should	work	to	prevent	and	adequately	react	to	sexual	assault.	
While	there	is	a	current	push	through	Operation	HONOUR	to	do	both	of	these	things,	the	
language	found	in	the	policies	does	not	do	so.	Although	official	support	services	exist	for	
members,	their	visibility	is	not	great	for	those	who	need	them.	Through	cultural	change	in	the	
military	there	will	be	better	support	for	victims	of	sexual	assault.		
	
Conclusion	
The	language	of	these	policies	from	the	CAF	is	complex,	and	members	reported	it	as	difficult	to	
understand	(DesChamps	2015,	63).	Further,	it	did	not	provide	adequate	boundaries	for	
behaviours,	nor	did	it	provide	adequate	definitions	for	various	offences,	or	name	offences	such	
as	sexual	harassment	at	all.	Some	policies	do	better	than	others	with	regards	to	dismantling	the	
hyper-masculine	nature	of	the	military,	providing	support	for	victims,	and	not	limiting	the	
narratives	of	victims	and	assailants.	The	RMC	policy	was	the	most	inclusive	policy	with	clear	
language.	This	is	likely	because	it	is	reviewed	frequently	with	input	from	every	department	at	
the	school.	Furthermore,	RMC	has	recently	been	acknowledging	their	shortcomings	with	
regards	to	sexual	harassment	and	sexual	assault	occurring	at	the	school.	The	two	policies	that	
were	written	to	guide	the	behaviours	of	all	CAF	members,	the	QR&Os	and	the	DAODs,	were	the	
least	inclusive.	The	Ops	Order	for	Operation	HONOUR	is	generally	a	positive	document	that	
signals	significant	changes	in	the	CAF.	However,	some	problems	with	its	language	include	using	
vague	terms	like	‘indecent	acts’	without	defining	them	(Ops	Order	Op	HONOUR,	2).	
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Furthermore,	the	Statement	of	Defence	Ethics	is	a	necessary	document	but	because	the	
language	used	in	it	is	vague	it	is	ineffective	at	defining	clear	boundaries	of	ethical	behaviour.	
Through	my	analysis	I	conclude	that	the	policies	of	the	CAF	contribute	to	a	permissive	
environment	for	sexual	harassment	and	sexual	assault	through	the	vague	language	used	that	
fails	to	define	clear	boundaries	for	these	kinds	of	behaviours.	While	the	general	culture	of	the	
CAF	contributes	as	well,	the	leadership	of	the	CAF	emphasizes	that	culture	is	developed	top-
down	through	policy.	As	such,	I	argue	that	these	policies	must	be	amended	in	order	to	restrict	
the	environment	with	regards	to	the	occurrence	of	sexual	harassment	and	sexual	assault.		
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Chapter	5:	Conclusion	
Sexual	assault	is	still	a	prevalent	problem	in	the	CAF	that	affects	a	significant	number	of	
members,	mostly	women,	each	year	(DesChamps	2015,	2).	This	problem	of	sexual	assault	is	
influenced	by	the	policies	and	the	culture	of	the	military	and	how	these	two	factors	interact.	
The	culture	of	the	CAF	is	a	sexualized	environment	(DesChamps	2015,	13).	The	culture	of	the	
military	is	informed	by	its	policies	and	together	the	culture	and	the	policies	of	the	CAF	are	
permissive	of	an	environment	where	sexual	harassment	and	sexual	assault	occur,	regularly,	
without	significant	ramifications.	Members	are	deterred	from	reporting	through	the	chain	of	
command	because,	statistically,	their	supervisor	is	their	attacker	as	well	as	the	fact	that	
reporting	a	sexual	assault	is	likely	to	affect	their	career	(Deschamps	2015,	29).	Members	who	
report	are	moved	out	of	their	units	or	taken	off	their	regular	duties	(DesChamps	2015,	29):	this	
response	appears	to	punish	the	victims	for	reporting.		
In	my	analysis	of	the	political	discourse	put	forward	from	the	CAF	I	have	found	that	
members	may	also	feel	deterred	from	reporting	because	the	language	of	the	policies	is	written	
to	protect	rather	than	to	punish	those	who	commit	sexual	assault.	The	language	of	the	policies	
states	the	punishment	to	be	administrative	action,	without	any	further	clarification	of	what	
severity	is	appropriate.	This	may	be	compared	to	committing	an	offence	such	as	drunkenness	
where	the	punishment	is	stated	to	be	between	90	days	and	less	of	two	years	imprisonment	
(QR&O	Chapter	103,	74).	Similarly,	striking	a	superior	officer	may	be	punished	by	a	lifetime	
prison	sentence	(QR&O	103,	47).	The	incompatibility	of	the	punishments	of	these	policies	
indicates	an	unwillingness	to	accept	and	punish	perpetrators	of	sexual	violence.	Furthermore,	
in	DAOD	5019,	the	policy	regarding	sexual	assault,	there	is	an	entire	section	that	discusses	the	
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level	of	evidence	required	in	order	to	receive	a	conviction,	whereas	this	section	is	not	included	
in	other	policies,	including:	striking	a	superior	officer,	drunkenness,	or	scandalous	conduct.	As	
well,	the	evidence	that	may	be	submitted	includes	the	alleged	assailant’s	military	record,	
although	this	provides	no	true	evidentiary	support	of	an	innocence	plea.		
The	policies	of	the	CAF	make	it	difficult	to	find	or	punish	assailants	because	victims	are	
generally	unwilling	to	report	and	there	is	no	clarity	in	the	policies’	definition	of	the	offensive	
behaviour.	The	reaction	of	the	CAF	to	these	crimes	is	important,	but	of	equal	importance	is	the	
environment	the	CAF	has	developed	where	sexual	assault	occurs	with	such	frequency.	The	
culture	of	the	military	is	hyper-masculine	with	incomplete	gender	integration	and	inadequate	
representation	of	women.	This	contributes	to	the	permissive	environment	for	sexual	assault.	
Although	an	increase	in	the	descriptive	representation	of	women	may	not	affect	the	culture,	an	
increase	in	the	substantive	representation	of	women	likely	will.	This	would	equate	to	a	cultural	
shift	in	the	military	away	from	equating	women	and	femininity	with	weakness.	The	CAF	has	
been	built	on	traits	such	as	aggression,	violence,	strength,	and	power.	However,	it	is	
unnecessary	to	develop	the	military	as	an	opposition	to	women	and	femininity.	Rather,	a	
military	can	be	strong	and	also	inclusive	of	women.	Group	cohesion	in	the	military	has	been	
determined	necessary	for	operational	effectiveness;	however,	the	hyper-masculinity	of	the	
military	is	not.	Women	and	femininity	should	not	be	separated	as	an	opposite	to	masculine	
strength.	This	attitude	promotes	a	lack	of	substantive	representation	of	women	that	is	
prevalent	within	the	CAF.		
Due	to	the	fact	that	the	military	is	a	primary	group,	members	from	within	the	primary	group	
will	definitively	affect	the	attitudes	and	“the	bases	of	the	individual’s	personality	or	self”	
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(Morris	1996,	692),	which	will	in	turn	perpetuate	the	attitudes	that	define	the	culture	of	that	
primary	group.	In	the	military	context	we	see	this	in	terms	of	sexual	assault.	“Even	while	the	
military	services	institute	policies	of	‘zero	tolerance’	of	sexual	harassment	and	assault	and	
provide	formal	training	pursuant	to	those	policies,	informal	socialization	continues	to	
perpetuate	group	norms	that	are	inconsistent	with	those	formal	policies	and	goals”	(Morris	
1996,	720).	However,	the	policies	of	the	institution	do	influence	the	culture.	The	emphasis	in	
CAF	policy	language	on	the	most	serious	offences	and	punishments	translates	to	members	in	
leadership	positions	who	do	not	take	seriously	the	complaints	about	lower-level	harassment	
(DesChamps	2015,	21).		
An	increase	in	descriptive	representation	of	women	is	not	necessarily	the	compelling	factor	
to	decrease	rates	of	sexual	assault,	though	it	is	more	likely	that	an	increase	in	substantive	
representation	will.	A	majority	of	sexual	assaults	are	motivated	by	desire	for	power	(Morris	
1996,	723).	Increasing	the	substantive	representation	of	women	–	not	equating	femininity	to	
weakness	–	negates	the	sexual	assault	of	women	to	take	advantage	of	a	perceived	power	
imbalance.	This	substantive	representation	ought	to	occur	first	through	the	political	discourse	
of	the	CAF,	which	informs	the	culture.	Further,	this	substantive	representation	ought	to	be	
performed	by	all	levels	of	leadership	in	order	to	affect	the	culture	at	all	the	level	of	individual	
members.	This	concept	appears	to	have	been	instigated	through	Operation	HONOUR:	“My	
intent	is	to	eliminate	harmful	and	inappropriate	sexual	behaviour	within	the	CAF	by	leveraging	
the	unequivocal	support	of	my	Commanders	and	all	leaders	in	the	CAF”	(Ops	Order	Op	
HONOUR,	2).		A	further	improvement	in	the	discourse	of	Operation	HONOUR,	such	as	clarity	in	
wording,	will	aid	in	this	effort.		
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Although	the	CAF	is	looking	to	change	its	reputation	as	an	institution	rife	with	sexual	
assault,	this	has	been	impeded	by	a	culture	resistant	to	change,	as	well	as	policies	that	have	not	
been	updated	accordingly.	Although	new	documentation,	like	Operation	HONOUR,	has	been	
put	forward	by	the	CAF,	the	basic	policies	that	guide	members’	behaviours	(the	QR&Os	and	the	
DAODs)	require	a	more	contemporary	update.	This	update	would	provide	the	inclusion	of	a	
policy	specific	to	sexual	harassment,	as	well	as	changes	in	language	surrounding	sexual	assault,	
and	clarity	in	unacceptable	behaviours	and	the	corresponding	range	of	punishments.		
	 The	future	directions	for	this	research	could	be	a	follow-up	regarding	the	effectiveness	
of	Operation	HONOUR	as	an	instigator	to	cultural	change	within	the	CAF.	This	may	be	done	
through	interviews	with	serving	members	or	through	a	political	discourse	analysis,	on	the	
assumption	the	CAF	policies	are	updated.	As	well,	this	research	could	be	furthered	with	a	
temporal	study	examining	the	policies	from	the	1980s	and	1990s	and	comparing	them	to	
present	policies.	This	type	of	study	would	indicate	whether	there	has	or	has	not	been	a	cultural	
shift	within	the	CAF	towards	better	substantive	representation	of	women	and	adjustments	
surrounding	preventing	and	reacting	to	sexual	assault.		
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Appendix	A:	Coding	Definitions	
Consent:	In	the	language	of	the	document	there	is	indication	that	not	only	victims	are	not	being	
blamed,	but	that	consent	is	an	issue	that	is	being	considered	(in	terms	of	teaching	and	
understanding).	Enthusiastic	consent,	verbal	consent,	no	consent	etc.	
	
Culture:	The	culture	of	the	CAF	is	referenced	with	regards	to	sexual	assault.	
	
Language:	The	language	of	the	document	indicates	that	language	usage	is	important.	This	could	
be	in	the	context	of	developing	culture	or	in	other	contexts.	Language	usage	specifically	in	
written	policies	or	oral	language	usage.	
	
Limited	Narratives:	In	the	language	of	the	document	there	will	be	indication	that	the	narratives	
used	to	inform	the	policy	are	limited	in	that	they	only	consider	a	certain	experience.	This	might	
be	that	it's	clear	that	only	women	as	victims	and	men	as	perpetrators	are	considered.	
	
Representation>Descriptive:	In	the	creation	of	the	documents	or	in	the	language	of	the	
documents	there	will	be	an	indication	that	more	than	just	white	men	are	present.	Ideally	there	
will	be	women	and	more	ideally	there	will	be	more	than	just	white	women.	Even	a	single	
woman	is	descriptive	representation.	
	
Representation>	Gender:	Representation	either	in	the	creation	of	the	document	or	in	the	
language	of	the	document	that	indicates	that	there	was	consideration	of	gender.	It	cannot	just	
be	the	word	gender	(if	it	means	sex),	it	has	to	be	gender	as	a	social	construct.	
	
Representation>Intersectionality:	In	the	language	of	the	document	there	is	indication	that	
intersectionality	of	individuals	has	been	considered	across	sex,	sexuality,	religion,	race,	and	
gender.	It	will	consider	that	women	are	not	all	white	or	that	men	are	not	all	white	(as	an	
example).	
	
Representation>Race:	Either	in	the	creation	of	the	document	or	in	the	language	of	the	
document	there	is	representation	that	refers	to	differences	in	race/acknowledges	potential	
differences	in	race.		
	
Representation>Religion:	In	the	creation	of	the	document	or	in	the	language	of	the	document	
there	is	reference	made	to	differences	in	religion/potential	differences	due	to	religion.	
	
Representation>Sex:	There	is	representation	either	in	the	creation	of	the	document	or	in	the	
language	of	the	document	that	indicates	that	there	is	representation/consideration	of	both	
men	and	women.	
	
Representation>Sexual	Orientation:	Either	in	the	creation	of	the	document	or	in	the	language	
of	the	document	there	is	representation	of	various	sexual	orientations.	There	should	be	
consideration	of	at	least	homosexuality.	
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Representation>Substantive:	Doesn't	necessarily	include	women	in	the	creation	of	the	
document	but	in	the	language	of	the	document	there	will	be	active	consideration	of	women.	
Where	it's	not	only	that	they	are	present	but	there	is	concern	for	the	paradigm	that	women	
engage	with	(and	how	it	generally	rejects	them).	There	will	be	concern	for	the	interests	and	
concerns	of	women	-	which	may	look	like	a	number	of	things.	
	
Support	for	Victims:	The	language	in	a	document	indicates	support	for	victims	(opposite	of	
victim	blaming).	Putting	the	onus	on	the	would-be	perpetrators	to	not	do	this,	or	the	onus	on	
observers	to	support	victims.	
	
Top	Down	Building:	The	language	of	the	document	indicates	that	the	policies	of	the	CAF	
develop	the	culture	of	the	CAF.	The	formal	policies	develop	the	behaviour	of	the	individual	
members.	
	
Victim	Blaming:	In	the	language	of	the	documents	there	will	be	indication	that	the	victim	of	
sexual	harassment	or	sexual	assault	is	somehow	to	blame	-	for	being	alone,	for	being	
inebriated,	for	dressing	in	a	certain	way,	for	being	part	of	the	culture	etc.	
	
	
	
	
